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A SURVEY OF STATUTORY CHANGES
IN NORTH CAROLINA IN 1941
This article includes discussion of a selected group of those statutes
passed by the 1941 General Assembly which are of importance in the
law generally or which raise legal problems of some importance. It does
not purport to deal with all public laws enacted or to summarize com-
pletely those public laws which are mentioned.' With rare exceptions,
public-local and -private laws are omitted. The article has been prepared
by the members of the faculty of the Law School of the University of
North Carolina. 2
The abbreviation "C.", as used in the text, indicates a chapter of the
North Carolina Public Laws of 1941. The abbreviation "C.S." indi-
cates the Consolidated Statutes (though, for convenience the usual
reference given is to the appropriate sections of Michie's Code of 1939).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative Procedure atd Judicial Review.
The present nation-wide ferment in Administrative Law penetrated
into the General Assembly of North Carolina, though in the main the
results of such penetration, if any, were postponed to a future day. It
is commonplace knowledge that powers of control over wliole industries,
such as insurance and public utilities, over many and diverse trades and
occupations such as barbering and the practice of medicine, over impor-
tant portions of all industry such as labor relations and security issues,
have been placed in administrative commissions, boards, bureaus, officers,
and agencies. Their work is no longer confined to policing in order to
eliminate abuses; such agencies as unemployment compensation com-
missions, retirement boards, and others are administering laws designed
to redistribute the good things of life. Whole areas of human enterprise
are newly brought within the sphere of public control by the device of
authority vested in administrative bodies. Although a few such bodies
are provided for in state constitutions, the great majority of the multi-
tudinous administrative agencies set up by both state and federal gov-
ernments are created by statute. Commonly each agency is created, its
'For a descriptive and more comprehensive summary, see (1941) POPULAR
GOvERNmENT No. 3, pp. 3-42.
2 Acknowledgment is here made of the valuable assistance of Hon. Thad Eure,
Secretary of State, and his assistant in the preparation of the laws for publica-
tion, Mr. William C. Lassiter of the Raleigh bar, in making available to the fac-
ulty, at the earliest possible time, copies of the new laws and the index of chapter
numbers.
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powers granted, and its procedure authorized in its own separate
statute. Although there has been some borrowing of provisions in one
statute for use in another, it remains true that the statutes setting up
these agencies are diverse, and there is no uniformity of provisions cov-
ering the same matters such as procedure or the right to and scope of
judicial review.' The result has been a diversity in the operations of
the many administrative bodies so great and apparently so needless as
to arouse a widespread and persistent movement for reform, especially
since in the diversity are found practices and procedures deemed incom-
patible with fundamental fair play. Dispute has centered on the issue
whether certain uniform rules for procedure and for judicial review
would be desirable for all the diverse agencies, or whether the agencies
and their problems are so different that uniform rules for them all would
be harmful. Dispute also arises as to what the uniform rules should
be, granting that there should be any. Lead in the reform movement
was taken by the American Bar Association. Its efforts culminated in
the Logan-Walter Bill, 2 which among other things provided procedural
safeguards in the making by federal administrative agencies of rules and
regulations of general application, and provided for -determination in
court of their validity; it also provided procedural safeguards in the
decision of controversies by administrative agencies, and made uniform
provisions concerning judicial review. A number of agencies were ex-
cepted from the act which passed both the House and Senate, but was
vetoed by the President.3 Meanwhile an apprehension that all was not
well with the operations of the many federal administrative agencies
must have been entertained by the President, for at his suggestion the
Attorney General in 1939 appointed a committee on administrative pro-
cedure, which conducted extensive examinations into the operation of
particular federal administrative agencies, published studies concerning
each of many such agencies, and, in 1941, published a final report which
included many recommendations for specific improvements in procedure
to be made by specific agencies, and many general recommendations
which are embodied in a proposed bill.
4
' For a general discussion of needless diversities in the statutes applicable to
certain administrative tribunals see Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation
Under Licen.sing Statutes (1938) 17 N. C. L. REv. 1, 5. The diversity in provisions
for judicial review is shown by Hoyt, Shaping, Judicial Review of Administrative
Tribunals (1937) 16 N. C. L. Rav. 1; Report of the Committee on Administrative
Agenciei and Tribunals (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 407.2 H. B. No. 6324, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). The bill as drafted by the Asso-
ciation committee, together with extensive comment and explanation, may be found
in Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law (1939) 64 A. B. A.
R.P. 575.
'The deep seated differences in viewpoint centering on the act may be found
by comparing the President's veto message asi published in (1941) 27 A. B. A. J.
52, with the answer of one of the greatest living jurists. Pound, The Place of the
Judiciary in a Dentocratic Polity (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 133.
'FINAL RaP. Ayr'y GENERAL's COMMITTEE ON ADMIN. PRoc. (1941).
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Paralleling these federal developments is a comparable movement in
this state, stimulated in part by the link between the lawyers of the
state and the American Bar Association. 5 Identical bills were intro-
duced in the House8 and Senate7 providing certain uniform rules of
practice for state administrative agencies and a uniform method of
judicial review. The bills embodied, with a few modifications, the uni-
form act proposed for adoption in the separate states by a committee of
the American Bar Association.8 This legislation, which has been called
the Little Logan-Walter Bill, fared even worse than its parent. The
state legislation received unfavorable reports from the committees on
judiciary of the House and Senate. However, as will appear herein-
after, the defeat of this legislation by no means settled the problem for
this state; therefore mention of some of the strength and weakness of
the measure may be in order.9 One good provision of the bills was
the one which prohibits administrative agencies from using in contested
cases any information or evidence not of record at the hearing, provided
that if the agency desires to use evidence in its possession or furnished
by its staff or others in addition to the evidence at the hearing, it may
do so after furnishing copies to the parties and affording them, on re-
quest, an opportunity to meet the new evidence at a further hearing.10
The bills took account of the situation where all those who participate
in the decision of an administrative agency dlo not hear the evidence by
providing for a tentative decision to be prepared by a member or em-
ployee of the agency, to which exceptions may be made and argued
before those who participate in making' the decision. The bills pro-
vided that whenever an administrative agency institutes an investigation
on its own motion no decision shall be made until all parties in interest
are furnished a written specification of the issues and are afforded an
opportunity to present evidence and arguments on these issues. These
provisions appear to meet the requirements laid down in the Morgan
cases." The bills required written findings of fact not only as to ulti-
'Report of the Committees on Admin. Law and on Unif. Code of Admin. Proc.,
in 42 N. C. BAR Ass'N REP. 74 (1940). Addresses at meetings of lawyers by
members of the American Bar Association have aided in centering local attention
on the problem. Hoyt, supra. note 1, is a reprint of an address by a member of the
American Bar Association's special committee on administrative law, which ad-
dress advised the state bar of progress made by the committee which later bore
fruit in the form of the Logan-Walter Bill, supra note 2. The speaker also advised
the bar of comparable developments in Wisconsin.
e H. B. No. 424. IS. B. No. 160.
'(1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 432.
'A thorough discussion of the matters embodies in its proposed bill is to be
found in the Report of the Committee on Administrative Agencies and Tribunals
(1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 407.
"0 For the reasons favoring such a scheme see Hanft, Utilities Commissions as
Expert Courts (1936) 15 N. C. L. Ray. 12, 35.
"'Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 Sup. Ct. 906, 80 L. ed. 1288
(1936) ; 304 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 773, 82 L. ed. 1129 (1938).
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mate conclusions of the agency but as to controverted questions of fact
on which those conclusions rest.1 2 Judicial review on the findings or
the record before the administrative agency was provided, the review
to be before the court without a jury. The value of such a provision
is emphasized by the effect of a recent decision of the supreme court of
the state.13 A bus company was allowed by the utilities commissioner
to operate between two cities over the route of another bus company,
provided the first company take on no passengers for a trip solely over
this portion of the route. The first company took its rights on this con-
dition. But after operating for a time, it applied to the commissioner
to remove the restriction. He refused, and on appeal to the superior
court a jury trial de novo was had. As was to be expected, the jury
promptly removed the restriction. The supreme court decided that the
matter had properly been left to the jury. The removal of the restric-
tion by the jury is of little immediate importance, for such "closed
door" restrictions are rare in this state, but the result demonstrates
that consistent policies by North Carolina administrative agencies may
be frustrated where the judicial review of their decisions is by jury
trial de novo. Inexpert re-determination of the decisions of expert
agencies is a constant threat to any policy such agencies may seek to
carry out. The result is further subject to criticism on the ground that
it makes of the superior court and jury a super-administrative agency
performing nonjudicial functions.' 4
On the other hand it is arguable that some special types of admin-
istrative determination should be subject to review by jury trial. The
general assembly seems to have accepted this idea in the matter of
revocation of licenses by administrative bodies, for an act passed in
1939 applicable to such revocations by a considerable number of admin-
istrative agencies'15 provided jury trial on appeal. This act represents
a step actually accomplished in the direction of uniformity in procedure
and judicial review.
At one stage in their drafting, the defeated state bills authorized
the reviewing court to reverse an administrative agency if necessary
findings of fact were made against the weight of the evidence. But by
2 The North Carolina law is already established to this effect in the case of
awards made by the Industrial Commission. Singleton v. Durham Laundry Co.,
213 N. C. 32, 195 S. E. 34 (1938). Similar holdings of other courts are discussed
in the Report of the Committee on Administrative Agencies and Tribunals (1939)
64 A. B. A. REP. 407, 428.
"' Utilities Comm. v. Carolina Scenic Coach Co., 218 N. C. 233, 10 S. E. (2d)
824 (1940).
"' Cf. Federal Radio Comm. v. General Elec. Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50 Sup. Ct.
389, 74 L. ed. 969 (1930); Hodges v. Public Serv. Comm., 110 W. Va. 649, 159
S. E. 834 (1931).
"' N. C. CODE A-N. (Michie, 1939) §§6604(1)-6604(8), commented on (1939)
17 N. C. L. REv. 327, 331.
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the time the bills were introduced their sponsors had retreated from so
extreme a position on this highly controversial issue to the prevailing
position that reversal may be had if necessary findings are not supported
by "substantial and competent evidence". This is the rule already pre-
vailing with regard to numerous administrative agencies."0 An almost
exactly parallel retreat preceded the eventual fate of the national bill.
The Logan-Walter bill included as a ground for reversal "that the find-
ings of fact are clearly erroneous". This was stricken by Senate amend-
ment leaving the milder provision, "that the findings of fact are not sup-
ported by substantial evidence". 17
Against the defeated state bills it may be argued that the provision
for uniform judicial review was unconstitutional inasmuch as it failed
to give the reviewing court the right to form an independent judgment
on both law and fact in the decision of cases reviewing rates set by ad-
ministrative tribunals, where the rates are attacked as unconstitutional
because confiscatory.' 8 In answer it may be argued that constitutional
law is now to be found not in the cases but in the minds of the new
supreme court justices, and that the requirement above mentioned will
disappear as soon as the new court has a chance to speak on the subject.
The most inclusive objection to the bills as a whole lies in their
failure to distinguish between the regulation making function of admin-
istrative agencies and their function of passing on particular litigation.19
Herein the state bills suffer by comparison with the Logan-Walter bill.
Further, the definition of "administrative agency" in terms so broad as
to include any state officer having authority to make "any ... determina-
1 Schulman, Administrative Procedure-A Survey of Suggested Reforms
(1940) 15 TEMP. U. L. Q. 1, 5; Report of the Committee on Adminzistratilve
Agencies and Tribunals (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 407, 408; cf. Clark v. Carolina
Cotton & Woolen Mills, 204 N. C. 529, 168 S. E. 816 (1933); Reed v. Lavender
Bros., 206 N. C. 898, 172 S. E. 877 (1934).17H. R. No. 6324, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) p. 13, lines 22-24.
18 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527,
64 L. ed. 908 (1920) ; cf. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S.
38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 80 L. ed. 1033 (1936). The Report of the Committee on
Administrative Agencies and Tribunals (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 407, 417, 431
reveals that the committee which drew the bill which was substantially embodied
in the North Carolina bills was perfectly aware of the requirement of the Ben Avon
case that the reviewing court be given the right to form an independent judgment
on lav and fact where the constitutional issue of confiscation is raised. Perhaps
the committee was of the opinion that the requirement was. sufficiently met in its
provision authorizing the reviewing court to reverse for violation of constitutional
rights. But if the rates fixed by an administrative agency were sufficiently sup-
ported by competent evidence then the court could find no confiscation in violation
of constitutional rights unless it did what the bill does not expressly authorize:
namely, form an independent judgment on the evidence. Certainly the act would
be more lucid if the Ben Avon requirement were met by express provision.
" One consequence is that by virtue of paragraph 3 of section Z of the bills even
in the event of an investigation looking toward administrative rules and regulations
all interested parties would have to be furnished a written specification of issues.
Where the rules and regulations are to apply to a large and unascertained number
of regulated persons or enterprises this would be unworkable.
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tion" appears too broad. It would seem to include any state officer
having authority to detemine anything.20
Although the assembly was not content with these bills, it passed a
joint resolution providing for the appointment by the governor of an
unpaid commission of seven members to study the situation and make
recommendations to the general assembly with respect to a basic code
of administrative procedure and judicial review.21 This commission
should have no difficulty in locating the problems, determining what the
issues are, and finding applicable data and materials. The proposed
uniform bill for states and accompanying discussion; the Logan-Walter
bill, with the years of study which preceded it, and the tremendous dis-
cussion which accompanied its career; and the voluminous researches
of the Attorney General's committee, assure an abundance of materials
and of viewpoints.22 Once the commission has arrived at tentative pro-
visions for a new statute it may well take advantage of the requirement
of the joint resolution that state administrative agencies furnish re-
quested information by asking each one to show wherein the uniform
provisions would hamper the operations of that agency, and what ex-
ceptions or changes are required. This would preclude vague talk of
"hamstringing" administrative agencies where the talk is. founded on
nothing more than the quite human desire of regulators to escape
regulation.
It is to be hoped that the new commission will proceed with vigor
and thoroughness, for on its work center the state developments in a
national movement of unusual importance in administrative law, which
is itself one of the most important changes in the system of justice to
occur in several centuries.
Acts Affecting Organization of Particular Administrative Agencies.
Utilities Commission. C. 97 brought to an end a unique North Caro-
lina experiment in the structure of the commission set up for the control
of public utilities. It also came near to closing an historic circle and re-
turning us to the form of commission with which we started in 1891.1 In
" Compare the definition in FINAL REP. AT'y GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON
ADmiN. PROC. (1941) 192. The difficulty in the North Carolina bills arose from
striking out part of the definition in the model bill of the American Bar Asso-
ciation committee.
" Resolution 27, Resolution 34. Identical bills were introduced in the House
and Senate for this purpose and, through inadvertence, both were passed and
ratified. However, it is anticipated that only one commission will be appointed.
22 Citations to numerous articles and comments in this field, together with brief
mention of comparable movements in several states, may .be found in Schulman,
supra note 16.
a The changes in the form and powers of the commission since its beginning
are briefly sketched in Hanft, Control of Electric Rates in North Carolina (1934)
12 N. C. L. REv. 289, 290.
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that year the commission began as a "Railroad Commission" of three
members elected for terms of six years by the general assembly. 2 In
1899 the legislature ejected the incumbents and put in new ones by the
device of abolishing the Railroad Commission and creating the Corpora-
tion Commission to take its place. It was the same commisson with a
new name, new faces, and, for the future, a new way of choosing the
commissioners. The first new incumbents, like the old, were chosen by
the general assembly, but it was provided that thereafter the commis-
sioners were to be elected by the voters.&3 The Corporation Commission
survived until in 1933 it fell as a casualty of the depression, and the state
launched in its stead an experiment in the structure of the commission.
The legislature prescribed a single utilities commissioner, on whose
shoulders was to rest the burden of carrying forward the work of utility
regulation. 4 This was not wholly unique; Oregon had replaced her com-
mission with a single commissioner two years before.5 The distinctive
feature of the North Carolina expeiiment, so far as the structure of
utilities commissions was concerned, lay in the fact that two associate
commissioners were provided, who could, at the option of the full-time
commissioner, be called in to sit with him in the tetermination of
issues of fact0 where the amount involved was $3,000 or more, or the
interest of the public was involved. The office of full-time commissioner
was elective, but the associates were appointed, and were paid on a per
diem basis. The terms of commissioner and associates were four years.
This commission existed until, in its turn, it became a casualty of
the prosperity of 1941. In the interim the commission had enjoyed an
early vigor and, so far as the three-man commission was concerned, a
later somnolence. It began its work by hearing a highly important case,
instituted by the commissioner, which resulted in the reduction of the
rates of the largest telephone company in the state.7 The reduction in
the rates of this company bore fruit in other reductions without the
necessity of litigation. But with the passing of years the cases before
the full commission diminished in importance, and the associate com-
missioners were called on infrequently. Over the last two years one of
the associates served a total of twenty and one-half days, the other
considerably less. Finally C. 97 abolished the commission and set up
one closely resembling the original "Railroad Commission" of 1891.
'N. C. PuB. L. 1891, c. 320.
'N. C. Pub. L. 1899, c. 164 and c. 506; Nichols, Judicial Review of the North
Carolina Corporation Commission (1924) 2 N. C. L. Ray. 69 at 71.
'N. C. Pub. L. 1933, c. 134, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §112(a)-(q).
Ore. Laws 1931, c. 103.
N. C. Pub. L. 1933, c. 134, §§10, 11. Thus, literally, the act made of the asso-
ciates a sort of little jury, with authority to determine issues of fact only. In
actual operation the associates, when called in, joined with the commissioner in
the determination of the whole case, not merely the issues of fact.
'Re Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 7 P. U. R. (n. s.) 21 (1934).
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Again the commission is to be composed of three full-time commissioners
holding office for six-year terms; but instead of being selected by the
-legislature they are appointed by the governor, with the consent of the
senate. Even in the matter of selection there was, however, some ac-
ceptance of the earlier viewpoint, for the existing commissioner was
named chairman of the new commission for his first six-year term in
the act itself, i.e., he was chosen by the legislature.
The experiment terminated by C. 97 was one which opened a wide
field of possibilities. At least as applied to utility regulation the idea
of a full-time commissioner having available the services of two men
engaged in other walks of life was original; it might have been developed
into a unique, successful, and valuable type of governmental instru-
mentality in this field instead o-F being suffered to decay from disuse.
The associate commissioners having fallen into disuse it is not sur-
prising that the legislature abolished them; but the substitution made is
surprising. The associate commissioners had so little to do that they
became unnecessary; but despite the lack of work for the associates
they were replaced by full-time commissioners. Addition of a thor-
oughly competent trial examiner, plus a staff engineer skilled in utility
matters, would seem to have been more effective in carrying the state
forward in the direction of adequate control of public utilities.
The statute accomplished a forward step by authorizing the commis-
sion to make rules of practice for hearings before a single commissioner
or employee of the commission, which rules shall provide for a proposed
report, exceptions thereto, and a final hearing before the full commission.
Probably this means not that every case heard before a single trial officer
must go to the full commission, but that an opportunity must be afforded
to bring it to the full commission in the manner specified. By thus
affording hearings before single commissioners or employees acting as
trial examiners the statute uses a device already common in enabling
commissions to handle a volume of business too great for the full com-
mission to hear as the initial trial tribunal.8
Although progress was made by the present act much remains to be
done. The North Carolina statutes relating to utility control are in bad
condition. Particularly unfortunate is the law which prescribes jury
'Rules of practice for hearings before trial officers, for proposed reports, ex-
ceptions, and hearing before the administrative agency have been the subject of
much study. For a set of such rules ir actual operation see the Rules of Practice
Before the Interstate Commerce Commission in Proceedings Under the Interstate
Commerce Act and Related Acts, 8 INTrSTAr COm. AcrS. ANN. 6223 (Supp.
1934), especially rule XIV <d), p. 6259. Both the majority and supplemental bills
prepared after extensive study by a committee appointed by the Attorney General
of the United States contain such rules in detail. FINAL REP. Ar'y GENERAL'S
COMMITME ON ADMIN. PRoc. (1941), bill p. 192, especially §§303-309, bill p. 217,
especially §309. See also the bills prepared by committees of the American Bar
Association (1939) 64 A. B. A. REP. 432, §3(2), 587, 598, §3(e).
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trial de novo on appeal from the commission. 9 The statutes are likewise
badly organized.10
Highway and Public Works, Commission. The State Highway and
Public Works Commission has consisted of a chairman and ten commis-
sioners holding office for terms of six years, so arranged that the terms
of a portion of -the commissioners expired every two years.1 C. 57
changes this to provide that the governor is to appoint a chairman and
ten commissioners whose terms are to be four years and are all to begin
and expire at the same time. Staggered terms result in a commission at
all times composed of men who are experienced and tend to insure a
continuity of policy. Coupled with the fact that the terms of six years
covered a longer period than the term of any governor, the staggered
terms made it impossible for any governor to appoint the entire com-
mission, thus tending to make the body an independent one. This com-
bination is in common use where the objective is to create an independent
body to handle specialized work in the exercise of special skill and judg-
ment applied to the merits of the problems in hand. The opposite prac-
tice embodied in C. 57 of enabling each incoming governor to appoint
the entire commission shortly after he takes office furthers the idea that
the highway and prison program is a field for the policy of each incom-
ing administration, which should be free to select its own commission to
the end that its program be carried out. That this shift of policy arises
from considerations affecting this particular commission is evidenced by
the fact that this same legislature in setting up a new utilities commis-
sion2 prescribed six-year staggered terms.
When the commission was set up in 1933 the legislature specified
that it was the intent and purpose of the act that the members represent
the state at large and not any particular district.8 In 1937 the carving
up of the state into ten divisions was prescribed, each commissioner to
be resident in a separate division though each was to represent both the
state and his division.4 C. 57 leaves the requirement that each commis-
sioner reside in a separate division, but returns to the 1933 policy to the
extent of prescribing that he represent the state at large and not any
particular division. New language emphasizes that the state highway
'The bad effects of such law are commented on under "Administrative Law-
Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review," at p. 435, supra.
" For example, the motley accumulation of various statutory provisions giving
the commission authority over the rates of electrical utilities is set out by Hanft,
.supra note 1, at 293, n. 25.
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7748(b).
2 S. B. No. 188, commented on elsewhere herein. Sde also C. 25, providing four-
year staggered terms for the appointive members of the Board of Trustees of the
State Employees' Retirement System, and C. 151, providing the same for ap-
pointive members of the State Board of Education if the constitutional amendment
it proposes is adopted. 'N. C. Pub. L. 1933, c. 172, §2.
' N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 297, §1, N. C. CODE ANIX. (Michie, 1939) §7748(b).
19411
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system as a whole shall not be sacrificed to local -desires. Nevertheless
each commissioner is to inform himself of the needs of his particular
division, apparently to the end that these needs may be taken into ac-
count as part of the problems of the system as a whole. The commission
is directed to formulate policies, rules, and regulations governing the
construction, repair, and maintenance of the highway system with due
consideration for farm to market roads and school bus routes.
The changes apparently further the possibility of a statewide roads
program as an objective of incoming gubernatorial administrations.
Unemployment Compensation Commission. The existing unemploy-
ment compensation commission was replaced by a new one by virtue of
C. 279. The old commission was composed of three members, the new
one of seven; two members of the old commission were appointed by the
governor and the other was the commissioner of labor acting ex officio,
all seven of the new members are appointed by the governor; the terms
of the old commissioners were six years, the terms of the new are four
years; the salaries of the two old appointees were fixed by the governor
with the approval of the council of state, the salary of the new chairman
is so fixed and the others are paid on a per diem basis. The new com-
mission is to meet at least once in each sixty days, and may hold special
meetings, and the chairman is vested with the authority of the commis-
sion while it is not in session. Whereas there were formerly state and
local advisory councils of employers, employees, and members of the
public, now there are to be only such local councils. Thus the principal
change seems to be a full-time chairman and six part-time commissions
in lieu of three full-time commissioners and state advisory council.
Department of Motor Vehicles. Split from the department of rev-
enue is a new department of the state government to be known as the
department of motor vehicles. The recited purpose of the act, C. 36, is to
put under one administrative head agencies now operated under the de-
partment of revenue dealing with regulation of motor vehicle traffic,
whether such activities are at present handled directly by the commis-
sioner of revenue, or by the motor vehicle bureau, auto theft bureau,
division of highway safety, the major of the state highway patrol, or
officials handling the Uniform Drivers' License Act. However, func-
tions relating to the collection of motor fuel taxes, inspection of gasoline
and oil and the collection of the inspection taxes, and the issuance of
permits to vehicles engaged in the transportation of petroleum products,
remain in the commissioner of revenue. The authority of the utilities
commission over motor vehicle carriers is not affected.
The head of the new department is to be a commissioner of motor
vehicles, appointed by the governor, responsible to him, subject to re-
[Vol. 19
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moval at his discretion, and paid a salary to be fixed by him with the
approval of the advisory budget commission. The new department is
to be organized by the commissioner with the approval of the advisory
budget commission, but by the act it is divided into at least two divi-
sions, the divisions of registration and of highway safety and patrol.1-
Departntent of Tax Research. The governor was authorized, by C.
327, in his discretion, to separate the statistical and research unit of the
department of revenue and designate it as a department of tax research,
headed by a director to be appointed by the governor, to serve at his will,
and be paid a salary to be fixed by him with the approval of the advisory
budget commission. The director is given broad powers to study taxation
in this and other states, as well as the relation between state and federal
taxation. He is also made a member of the state board of assessment in
lieu of the governor or some person designated by the governor; and is
made chairman of that board in the place of the commissioner of revenue,
who, however, remains a member.
Other Agencies. (1) The board of conservation and development,
consisting of twelve members appointed by the governor with the consent
of the senate, holding staggered six-year terms,' was under the terms of
C. 45, supplanted by a new board of the same name and with the same
powers, appointed by the governor alone, with fifteen members holding
office for four-year terms all beginning and ending at the same time. Thus
this agency was likewise re-shaped in order to make it potentially an
instrument for furthering the policies of gubernatorial administration.2
(2) Chapter 117 of the Consolidated Statutes, having to do with
state buildings and grounds in the city of Raleigh was reorganized, and
the powers of the board of buildings and grounds were expanded, by
C. 224. Among many other powers, the board was authorized to make
reasonable and necessary rules and regulations to provide for the care,
conservation, and protection of such buildings and grounds. Violation
of the rules and regulations was made a misdemeanor.3
(3) By C. 306 the membership of the historical commission was
increased from five to seven.
'The act amends numerous existing statutes to make them conform. By
specifying N. C. Pub. L. 1929, c. 75, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §491(a),
evidently the act substitutes the new commissioner for the commissioner of revenue
as attorney upon -whom service may be made of process upon non-resident drivers
after automobile accidents.
1 N. C. Pub. L. 1927, c. 57, §3, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1901(c).
2 See the discussion of the changes in the Utilities Commission under sub-
division A of this topic.
It has long been established that violation of duly authorized Tules and regula-
tions of an administrative agency may be made a criminal offense by statute.
Unites States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L. ed. 563 (1911) ;
State v. Southern Ry., 141 N. C. 846, 54 S. E. 294 (1906) ; State v. Dudley, 182
N. C. 822, 109 S. E. 63 (1921); (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 50.
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Professional and Trade Licenses.
In addition to the statutes affecting attorneys, discussed elsewhere,'
there was the usual scattering of acts tinkering with the statutes gov-
erning the licensing of members of the professions, learned and other-
wise, and trades-though perhaps the crop of new legislation in this
field was rather below the average for recent years. It runs true to
form, however, in that most of it is designed either to make it harder
for the uninitiated to be initiated, harder for the uninitiated to earn a
living in the field of endeavor appropriated to the initiated, or easier to
get rid of those of the initiated who do not conform to the mores of the
thajority. The following comments (all save one extremely brief) seem
all it is appropriate to say in these pages.
Architects. The architects' licensing statute formerly exempted any
person making plans for buildings for others if the person furnishing
the plans did not hold himself out as an architect. C. 369 eliminates this
and adds certain specific exemptions, such as exemption of any person
who furnishes plans for the construction of residence, farm, or com-
mercial buildings of a value not exceeding $15,000.
The lack of any consistent policy on the part of the legislature in
passing statutes having to do with licensing of trades and occupations 2
is shown by the fact that C. 369 re-defines the practice of architecture
so as to limit it to services for pay. The same legislature, as shown be-
low, amended the barbering statute to make it include barbering not for
pay. Which is really most likely to involve any public interest, free
barbering by unlicensed persons, or free architectural services by unli-
censed persons?
General Contractors. The licensing statute for general contractors
was by C. 257 amended in a number of particulars, including the speci-
fication of classifications for licenses, and provision for licensing indi-
viduals on the basis of examinations taken by their managing employees,
and of partnerships and corporations on the basis of examinations taken
by managing officers or members of the personnel.
Tile Contractors. Some improvement in the licensing statute for tile
contractors was made by a number of amendments included in C. 219.
For example, the definition of tile contracting criticised in this Review3
was replaced by a somewhat better one. Also, whereas the statute for-
merly permitted any partnership or corporation to engage in tile con-
tracting if it had a licensed member, an amendment requires the licensed
'See "Attorneys" at p. 453, infra.
2Hanft and Hamrick, Haphaz-ard Regimentation Under Licensing Statultes
(1938) 17 N. C. L. REv. 1.
'(1939) 17 N. C. L. REv. 337.
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member to be personally present and in charge of the tile contracting
work.
4
Barbers. The barber licensing statute was considerably amended by
C. 375. Included were provisions bringing about the requirement of a
certificate from the state board of barber examiners even where the bar-
bering is done without pay,5 except where those barbered are members
of the family.6 Looking to the statute as amended, if a person so much
as gives scalp massages to friends free of charge7 without a certificate
from the board of barber examiners8 he is a criminal and may land in
jail.9 Are the criminal laws wisely used to make criminals of those who
stand in the way of the economic programs of other people?
In lieu of authority in the board of barber examiners to make sani-
tary regulations, a detailed set of such regulations is contained in the
act. Violation of such regulations is made a ground for revocation of
the offender's certificate, and also a misdemeanor.
Cosmetologists. Among other changes the cosmetologists (beauty
parlor operators) succeeded in tightening their statute by more than
doubling the number of hours of cosmetic art school training required.
C. 234.
Exit Dry Cleaners. The dry cleaners licensing statute 0 having been
declared unconstitutional by the supreme court," its liquidation is pro-
vided for in C. 127.12
Enter Scale Mechanics. An analysis-defying monstrosity was added
to North Carolina's motley collection of trade licensing statutes by
C. 237. One thing is plain; the statute is intended to apply in some
manner to scale mechanics. Beyond that lies obscurity. Section 2 de-
clares that any person who is skilled in installing, adjusting, maintain-
ing, and repairing scales and who acts for pay and is registered is to
be known as a "Scale Mechanic" if he complies with the act. If he
'The bad effect of the former provision is shown in (1939) 17 N. C. L. REv.
338 n. 5.
'C. 375 §§l, 2, 11. 'Id. §12.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5003(b) as amended by the new act.
'Id. §5003(a) as amended. *Id. §5003(u) (1).
10 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§5382(1) -5382(9).
11 State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. (2) 854 (1940). The case is difficult
to reconcile with State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586 (1938), com-
mented on in Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing
Statutes (1938) 17 N. C. L. REv. 1, which held valid the licensing statute for
photographers. This latter North Carolina decision was rejected as a precedent by
the Georgia court shortly afterwards. Bramley v. State, 187 Ga. 826, 2 S. E. (2d)
647 (1939). The Georgia court, in holding invalid the Georgia licensing statute
for photographers, called attention to the dissenting opinion in the Lawrence case.
12 What appears to be an inadvertent mistake is to be found in section 2(2),
which provides for payment of the residue of the funds of the commission to the
"payees" thereof as shown by the commission's records. "Payors" was probably
intended; i.e., proportional reimbursement to those who paid in these funds was
contemplated.
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falls short of all this the consequence seems to be that he shall not be
known as a "Scale Mechanic".
A "Scale Mechanic" so defined is by Section 3 required to have
specified prerequisites. Included in the list is a requirement that he be
registered as such with the state superintendent of weights and meas-
ures. Here is a fascinating circle of thought. By Section 2 he is a
"Scale Mechanic" only if he is registered. By Section 3 he must be
registered only if he is a "Scale Mechanic". If he does not register then
he does not have to register because he is then no "Scale Mechanic" and
only "Scale Mechanics" need register.
Another interesting prerequisite is that the "Scale Mechanic" must
be endorsed by three reputable citizens for whom he has rendered sat-
isfactory scale repair service. In what capacity? As a "Scale Me-
chanic" ? If so, here may be a new weapon for keeping down competition.
No one in future may ever become a "Scale Mechanic" unless he already
is one, for only a "Scale Mechanic" can render the service necessary as
a prerequisite to becoming one. This sobering construction is bolstered
by Section 7 which makes it a crime to impersonate in any way a regis-
tered "Scale Mechanic". Is claiming to be able to repair scales and re-
pairing scales for three reputable citizens such an impersonation? If
so, could the apprenticeship be served by repairing scales for disrepu-
table citizens ?
A further intellectual oddity lies in prerequisite (c), which is that
the "Scale Mechanic" shall furnish to the superintendent of weights and
measures satisfactory proof of his ability to comply with the provisions
of the act. Section 4 lists as a condition for registration that the "Scale
Mechanic" give satisfactory proof of prerequisite (c) to the superintend-
ent. In short, he must give the superintendent satisfactory proof that
he has given the superintendent satisfactory proof that he can comply
with the act: Why stop this "house that Jack built" business here? Why
not make him give the superintendent satisfactory proof that he has
given the superintendent satisfactory proof that he has given the super-
intendent satisfactory proof that he can comply with the act?
On further inspection of the act it turns out that no one can ever
become a "Scale Mechanic", because, as already shown, one prerequisite
is registration, and by Section 5 a requirement for a certificate of regis-
tration is the furnishing of a surety bond as provided for in Section 3,
and Section 3 does not provide for the furnishing of a surety bond,
therefore none can be furnished as provided for in Section 3.
The defects in the act pointed out in the last two paragraphs of this
discussion apparently arise from the fact that Section 3(c) of the bill
as introduced required a surety bond; by amendment this was replaced
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by the requirement of satisfactory proof to the superintendent of ability
to comply with the act; but, appropriately enough, no one bothered to
adjust the rest of the act to fit the amendment.
Section 7 of the act, as above stated, makes it a misdemeanor to
impersonate a registered "Scale Mechanic". It is possible that the fram-
ers of the act simply intended to set forth provisions whereby any
qualified person can, at his option, take steps to earn the title "Scale
Mechanic", as evidence to the public that he is a skilled craftsman.13
If that be true, the "impersonation" forbidden must mean the use of the
title to obtain business by someone not complying with the act. If so,
the act may have some value if the public becomes familiar with what
"Scale Mechanic" means legally. Otherwise scale repairers can get
just as much business by calling themselves scale repairers and not
"Scale Mechanics", and the act, under this construction, would not apply
to them so long as they did not use the title, "Scale Mechanic".
On the other hand, if the act is designed to prevent anyone from
repairing scales unless he complies with the act and becomes a "Scale
Mechanic", the act is subject not only to the criticisms above set out,
but to the further criticism that nowhere is it stated that all persons
repairing scales must comply with the act.
The present statute may fail altogether on the ground that an act
of the legislature, in order to have effect as law, must be intelligibly
expressed.' 4
ADOPTION-OF MINORS
Defects in the then existing adoption statute of this state' as applied
by the supreme court of the state were discussed, and the law in this
and other states was presented, in an article in the February issue of
this REVIEW. 2  C. 281 was designed to remedy such defects. In this
discussion of the new amendments no full presentation of the principles
and law on each point will be made, because such a procedure would be
repetitious; instead reference will be made to applicable portions of the
above article.
"3 Statutes affording means whereby an accountant may become entitled to
represent himself as a "certified" public accountant, or a shorthand reporter as a
"certified" shorthand reporter, or a nurse as a "registered" nurse are familiar.
(1926) 26 COL. L. Rzv. 472, 423 n. 6; (1937) 21 MARQ. L. Rv. 93.
, See Drake v. Drake, 15 N. C. 110, 115 (1833) ; State v. Partlow, 91 N. C. 550,
553 (1884); State v. Morrison, 210 N. C. 117, 120, 185 S. E. 674, 676 (1936).
"Whether a statute be a public or a private one, if the terms in which it is couched
be so vague as to convey no definite meaning to those whose duty it is to execute it,
either ministerially or judicially, it is necessarily inoperative. The law must remain
as it was, unless that which professes to change it, be itself intelligible."
'IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§191(1)-191(13).
2 Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions (1941) 19 N. C. L. Rv. 127.
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In order to frame the new law su as to make it effective in meeting
actual needs, extensive conferences were held of persons engaged in
adoption work, among them representatives of the state association of
superintendents of public welfare, the state association of clerks of court,
and the Childrens Home Society of North Carolina located at Greens-
boro; members of the faculty of the sociology department of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina, welfare workers, persons and organizations
interested in child welfare, and perhaps most important of all, the
director of the division of child welfare of, the state board of charities
and public welfare, who took the lead in sponsoring the legislation
approved by these groups, which was embodied in C. 281.
Perhaps the most serious defect in the adoption law of the state
was the requirement introduced by recent decisions of the state supreme
court that the natural parents of the child must consent to the particular
adoption by the particular adoptive parents.3 Welfare workers and
agencies engaged in bringing about adoptions agreed that this require-
ment not only thwarted the existing policy of not acquainting the natural
parents with the identity of the adoptive parents and vice versa, but
made it virtually impossible to carry forward the work of placing chil-
dren and having them legally adopted, because adoptive parents do not
want any link with the child's unhappy origin. This defect is cured by
C. 281, Section 2, which provides that when the parent, parents or guard-
ian in writing surrenders the child to a licensed child-placing agency or
the county superintendent of public welfare and in writing consents to
adoption by any persons to be designated by such officer or agency, such
a consent shall be sufficient.4 Section 1 carries out the objective of Sec-
tion 2 by providing that the party consenting as above shall not be a
necessary party of record in the adoption proceeding. If he were a
necessary party, then the objective of severing the child from all con-
nection with its original environment by not acquainting the natural
parent or parents with the identity of the adoptive parents would be
defeated.
A second major defect in the adoption law of the state lay in the
fact that an adoption could be completed, the adoptive parents and child
could live as parents and child for the lives of the parents, and on the
leath of a parent his relatives could go into court and have the adoption
set aside if they could find any jurisdictional error in the adoption pro-
ceedings, to the end that the relatives might inherit the property of the
deceased adoptive parent.5 Their search for some defect in the adop-
1id. at 136, 137, 143-145.
'Section 2 makes some further amendments including a requirement that the
court within two years of th6 interlocutory order either complete the adoption or
dismiss the proceeding.5Hanft, supra note 2, at 134, 136-142.
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tion proceedings enabling them to have it set aside was mightily aided
by the North Carolina rule to the effect that in an adoption proceeding
all jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the record. 6 Section
3 remedies the situation by providing that no party to a completed
adoption proceeding nor anyone claiming' under such party may later
question the validity of the proceeding by reason of any defect therein,
jurisdictional or otherwise. Thus a relative claiming under an adoptive
parent, a party to the proceeding, would be precluded from questioning
it. The result is bolstered by a provision that no adoption may be later
attacked by reason of a defect in it where the attacker was not injured
by the defect. To illustrate: if the defect is lack of notice to a natural
parent, that defect could not be made the basis of attack by an heir of
the adoptive parent. Such heir was entitled to no notice.7 The relatives
of the adoptive parents seeking to undo the adoption are further dis-
armed, and adoptions are given strength and stability, by the provision
that an order granting letters of adoption shall have the force of, and
shall be entitled to all the presumptions attaching to, a judgment rend-
ered by a court of general jurisdiction in a common law action. This
provision reverses the above mentioned rule in this state that all juris-
dictional facts must appear on the face of the record. The position of
the adopted child is still further strengthened against the relatives who
seek to inherit by undoing the adoption by the provision of Section 4
that no defect, jurisdictional or otherwise, in an adoption proceeding
shall prevent inheritance by the child who after the adoption has con-
tinuously lived as the adopted child of the adoptive parents.
There is some overlapping of purpose in these various provisions;
that is to say, relatives of deceased adoptive parents seeking to overturn
an adoption might be defeated under any one of several of the new
provisions. However, each embodies a separate rule which is estab-
lished law in some other jurisdictions, and each has its own field to
cover, although in some instances the fields may overlap. Thus ob-
viously such a rule as that giving the adoption the force of a judgment
in common law action has uses not confined to attacks on adoptions by
relatives of deceased adoptive parents, but would apply as against any
attacker.
Another defect in North Carolina adoption law was the conflict in
the decisions in cases where the natural parents surrendered the child
and later changed their minds.8 Here the amendments make various
provisions, the applicable one 'depending on the state of affairs. If the
natural parent or parents surrender the child for adoption to a duly
licensed child-placing agency or the county welfare superintendent as
Old. at 134, 142, 143.
7 Id. at 142. 8 Id. at 147-149.
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provided in Section 2, then that section makes the attendant consent to
adoption irrevocable. But if the surrender for adoption is to others than
the licensed agency or county superintendent, and the child is taken by
prospective adoptive parents in reliance on the surrender and kept for
six months or more, the surrender is irrevocable by Section 3. The
idea is that after such a period new ties are formed which should not
be broken at the will of the surrendering party. Where the adoption
is complete, then by Section 6 the adoptive parents shall not thereafter
be deprived of the child by anyone at all save in the same fashion as
any other parents may be deprived of their children, and for the same
causes. Here the purpose is to give the adoptive parents in case of a
valid adoption the same status as any other parents.
The same principle is embodied in Section 4 which gives the child
adopted for life the same status as any other child; that is, he fills the
legal position of a legitimate child born to the adoptive parents. He
ceases to be legally the child of the natural parents, save for one ex-
ception; he may inherit from his natural family and they from him
where otherwise the property would go to the state of North Carolina.
Thus for inheritance and all other purposes the child is transplanted into
the adoptive family as completely as if he had been born there. This
changes extensively the law of the state.9
By Section 5 abandonments are no longer to be determined by the
adoption court, but by the juvenile court, when the child is of such age
as to be within its jurisdiction. Where the juvenile court has declared
the parents or guardian unfit to have custody of the child, or has de-
clared the child to be abandoned,10 the unfit or abandoning parents or
guardian are not necessary parties to the adoption nor is their consent
required. Here the purpose is to concentrate abandonment proceed-
ings in the juvenile court, and to rest the consequences for adoption pur-
poses on the juvenile court proceedings. This changes the law whereby
the adoption court could find abandonment for adoption purposes but
was confined in finding abandoment to the terms of a narrowly construed
provision in the adoption statute." However, where the child's age is
such that he is beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.' 2 abandon-
ment may be determined by the adoption court, but there is no longer
any requirement that the abandonment be "wilful". Adoptions are
ordinarily handled by the superior court clerk, but when the child is of
age beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and abandonment is
Id. at 149-151.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5039.
1 Hanft, .supra note 2, at 145-147.
1' The exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile courts extends to children
,uder sixteen years of age. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5039.
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denied, the clerk is to transfer the case to the civil issue docket for trial
at the next term of the superior court.
There may be cases in which adoptions take place although a natural
parent neither consents in any fashion nor is made a party to the adop-
tion, and in which he has not forfeited his rights in any way such as
abandonment. In such event the natural parent, by Section 3, may have
the adoption vacated provided he bring action to vacate within one year
of actual notice of the adoption, and provided he failed to appear in the
adoption proceedings because he did not know of such proceedings. The
effect of this provision is simply to oblige the natural parent to assert
his rights promptly. In cases such as those where a parent justifiably
absent finds that without his consent his children have been adopted by
others he should be enabled to vacate the adoption. He should not, how-
ever, be permitted to do nothing for years after he knows what has
happened, thus allowing the new ties to strengthen and the care of the
adoptive parents to continue, and then have the adoption vacated.
Save for the provisions of Section 4 expanding the inheritance and
other rights of children adopted for life,' 3 the provisions of the act are
by Section 8 made retroactive so as to apply to past as well as future
adoptions, with the proviso that pending litigation be not affected. No
adoption hitherto had is to be avoided for procedural defects, and all
adoptions substantially in accord with the 1935 adoption statute are
validated.14
A companion measure to C. 281 is C. 308, the purpose of which is
to eliminate the alternative of taking certain steps in adoptions in domes-
tic relations courts, in order to leave but one statutory adoption pro-
cedure in the state.
ATTORNEYS
State Bar.
C. 344 amends the State Bar Act' in three particulars. It provides
for a second vice-president, regulates the issuance of a new license to
practice law to a person whose license, of which he was previously de-
prived in disciplinary proceedings, has been restored, and establishes a
class of inactive members who will not have to pay dues. The second
amendment applies even where the license was granted in the first in-
stance by the supreme court. It is not clear, however, under Section 15
of the original act,2 whether suspension or only disbarment operates to
" The bulk of the section expands the rights of all such adopted children. The
last sentence confers inheritance rights on a child in a certain type of situation, and
this provision is retroactive.
" Cf. Hanft, supra note 2, at 136.
N. C. CoDE ANq. (Michie, 1939) §215 (2, 8 and 10).
'Id. §215 (15).
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"deprive" the attorney of his license so as to require issuance of a new
one after restoration.S Nor is the third amendment clear as to where
the council may draw the line. It provides :4 "Inactive members shall
be all persons found by the Council to be not engaged in the practice of
law and not holding themselves out as practicing attorneys and not oc-
cupying any public or private positions in which they may be called upon
to give legal advice or counsel or to examine the law or to pass upon the
legal effect of any act, document or law." Of course, a lawyer who is
now exclusively engaged in farming or in the retail grocery business is
inactive and freed from dues. Conversely, a member of the legal staff
of a government department or of the law department of a business
house, should be treated as an active member and called upon to pay
dues. But what about lawyers functioning as insurance adjusters or as
officers of banks, building and loan associations and trust companies,6
whose services are primarily non-legal and administrative in character
though performed in connection with legal documents and transactions?
And what about law teachers? Does the amendment exclude from the
inactive classification all who "may be called upon" for services which
in any degree involve the exercise of legal skills, however incidental to
lay functions? The law teachers will want to be regarded as active
members. But the council, in setting up the new categories, will probably
have more to gain, in the long run, if it restricts the compulsory active
classification to those primarily engaged in legal work.6
Unauthorized Practice.
C. 177 adds to the existing prohibition 7 of the practice of law by
court clerks, registers of deeds, sheriffs, justices of the peace and county
commissioners, a definition of what constitutes such practice. This
definition, perhaps, adds nothing to the standards of the general statutes a
'The council regards both suspension and disbarment as depriving the lawyer
of his license. Report of the proceedings of the July, 1940, council meeting in 19
N. C. L. Rxv. 113 (1940). ' C. 344 §3.
'Specified incidental activities of trust companies are excluded from the defini-
tion of what constitutes the practice of law by N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§199 (a and b). One of these activities is "offering wills for probate in common
form." The council, however, believes that "Trust officers doing probate work for
trust companies furnish a typical illustration" of "attorneys who are full-time
employees in work substantially legal in character, for which their law training,
and license have given them special qualifications" and who should pay dues.
Report of the proceedings of the October, 1940, council meeting, in 19 N. C. L.
R-v. 116 (1940). . See note 5, supra.
7 N. C. CODE ANN. (.Michie, 1939) §198.
'Id. §§199 (a and b), 215(20). Under §199 criminal prosecutions and injunc-
tion proceedings are confined to violations of that act and could not be brought
against offenders of §198. The State Bar, however, under §215(20) is not so.
restricted.
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and decisions9 relating to unauthorized practice. By specification, how-
ever, it does emphasize the ban on the types of legal work which some of
the officers named have been doing, such as the preparation of mortgages
and fiduciaries' reports and the giving of legal advice. The conduct of
litigation is not mentioned. Is a licensed attorney who holds one of the
offices mentioned prohibited by this section from practicing law? Or
does it apply only to such officers as are laymen? The full-time demands
of most of the offices would prevent even the attorney-incumbent from
doing anything else. But county commissioners and justices of the peace
are part-time offices. Yet an amendment' 0 of this section was thought
necessary in 1935 to enable an attorney-justice of the peace in Madison
County to practice law.
AUTOMOBILES
Only two minor changes were made by the legislature in the laws
governing the operation of motor vehicles.' (1) C. 83 strikes out sub-
sections (b) and (d) of the section providing that vehicles must stop
at certain highway intersections.2 This eliminates provisions specifying
the style, size, height, and distance from the intersection of stop signs.
The deletion is wise, as the provision repealed was too detailed a re-
striction on the discretion of road governing authorities, state and local,
to provide stop signs adaptable to varying conditions of safety at dif-
ferent intersections. The parts of the section which remain provide
adequately for stop signs while leaving room for the exercise of such
discretion. (2) C. 347 added to the speed restrictions in the motor
vehicle, laws3 a new paragraph providing a lawful speed of forty miles
an hour for three-quarter-ton trucks and forty-five miles an hour for
one-half-ton or pick-up trucks.
In addition, the assembly adopted Resolution 32, providing for a
commission to study the laws of other states pertaining to the periodic
inspection of motor vehicles. It is to be hoped that this commission will
recommend some adequate legislation and that the 1943 assembly will
attempt seriously to meet the problem created by unsafe vehicles on
the highways.
' Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, 209 N. C. 624, 184 S. E. 540 (1936); The
Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy (1940) 5 LAw & Co NTEMP. PROD. 1-174.1oN. C. Pub. L. 1935, c. 214.
1 Laws affecting motor vehicle license taxes are discussed at p. 514, infra.
'N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 407, §120; N. C. ConE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2621(305).
Subsection (b) deals with the style, size, etc. of the signs and subsection (d)
provided that failure to stop for such signs should be only evidence of negligence,
not negligence per se. Elimination of this latter provision does not change the
meaning of the rest of the section, because the remaining provision affecting stop
signs includes a similar provision as to the effect of failure to stop.
qN. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 407, §103(b); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)§2621(288) (b) 3.
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A glance here at the motor vehicle bills which did not pass seems
justified because it gives some idea of the importance of the legislation
pressing for consideration in this field and also some idea of the insig-
nificance of the two actual amendments which were adopted. (1) In
1931 the legislature passed a safety responsibility statute4 which has
failed to provide either greater safety on the highways or increased
financial responsibility of negligent drivers. This result, or lack of re-
sult, was to be anticipated. 5 H. B. 360 would have repealed and re-
placed this statute with a substitute going much farther in providing
for the financial responsibility of motor vehicle owners and operators.
It was indefinitely postponed in the House. (2) S. B. 288, reported
unfavorably by the senate committee on insurance, would have reduced
license plate fees to 75% of the present level and required the 25%
saving to be paid to. the state for the purpose of providing state-issued
liability insurance. State insurance upon such a large group would
probably have secured a substantial amount of protection at compara-
tively low cost. (3) Several bills (H. B. 24 and 56, S. B. 33 and 56)
would have amended the present law, 6 which is not satisfactory, con-
cerning revocation of driver's license upon conviction of drunken driv-
ing. (4) S. B. 25 would have required all busses and trucks to be
equipped with governors to prevent speed in excess of fifty miles an
hour. The wisdom of this is somewhat doubtful, as increased speed is
essential to avoiding danger in some emergencies, although the desira-
bility of restricting speed generally is acknowledged. (5) S. B. 91, re-
ported unfavorably by the committee on roads, would have required
inspection of motor vehicles every six months. As indicated above, the
legislature did authorize a commission to study such legislation and
report in 1943. (6) Bills were introduced to regulate the weight and
load of trucks (S. B. 212 and 313), to provide for their use of highways
(H. B. 564), and to limit the capacity of gasoline and oil trucks (H. B.
82). (7) Finally, H. B. 558 would have given North Carolina a so-
called "guest" statute, limiting the liability of owners and operators of
motor vehicles to their gratuitous guests to cases of "gross negligence
or willful and wanton disregard of safety." .This would have brought
the state into line with an increasing number of other states.7
'N. C. Pub. L. 1931, c. 116; N. C. CODE ANN. ('Iichie, 1939) §§2621(112)-(126).
' See discussion of the 1931 statute in (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 384.
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4506. See also, as to driving under in-
fluence of liquor or drugs, §§2621(286), (286a) and (325).
" For discussion of a proposed "guest" statute for North Carolina, see (1930)
9 N. C. L. REv. 47.
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BANKS
Transferee Bank's Succession to Fiduciary Powers.
Chapter 207 of the Public Laws of 19311 provided that, if a bank or
trust company should merge or consolidate with another bank or trust
company doing business in this state, the fiduciary rights, powers, duties
and liabilities of the merging bank should, upon the consolidation or
merger, become vested in and devolve upon the consolidated or merged
institution. C. 80 amends the act of 1931 to provide for the same result
as to the fiduciary powers if a bank or trust company sells or transfers
its assets and liabilities to any other bank or trust company doing busi-
ness in North Carolina. C. 79 amends C. S. 4145 to help effectuate the
same purpose. This seems to be but a logical extension of the former
law.
BUILDING CODE
In 1933 the legislature created a "Building Code Council" by an act
which clearly contemplated that the main business of the council was
to draw up a building code for the state; but no express powers to dlraw
up such a code were set out in the act.' Neither was there any clear
statement as to the status of such a code after approval by the council,
but it was implied that the code would become effective as a standard
of construction throughout the state, subject to modification for indi-
vidual cases. Very likely the act attempted an improper delegation of
legislative power, for the only language which could be called a stand-
ard established by the legislature to govern the council in setting up the
code was a vague reference to "such reasonable rules and regulations
• . . hereafter adopted" by the council.2  None the less a code was
approved by the council and published in 1936, under the title "North
Carolina Building Code".3
An act of the 1941 session of the legislature, C. 280, amending the
1933 statute, ratifies and adopts this code, without setting it out in full
but simply by clear reference. It is common practice to carry terms and
provisions from one statute into another by reference alone, without
repeating them in extenso; and this has been held proper and effective
'N. C. Cona ANN. (Michie, 1939) §217(p).
IN. C. COD ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§7494(1)-(7).
1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7494(3). That an act with such vague
limitations on the rules to be established by the administrative agency is an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power, see RorrscHArrAEF , CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1939) 75; Schecter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55
Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947 (1935).
' The introduction to this publication stated that the 1933 law "authorized the
Council, in cooperation with the Insurance Commission of the state, to prepare and
adopt a Building Code"; see p. IV, North Carolina Building Code, being Bulletin
No. 10, Engineering Experiment Station, Raleigh (1936).
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even though the reference is to a foreign statute,4 or an invalid statute
of the local jurisdiction.5 Here the reference is to non-statutory material;
but as long as it is quite clearly identified, as in this case, no reason
appears for doubting the validity of the enactment. The establishment
of a statutory form for a fire insurance policy has been effected by an
act which simply required the "use of the form known as the New York
standard".
This act, then, puts the North Carolina Building Code on a better
foundation. The Insurance Commissioner, the State Board of Health,
and local officials are in charge of enforcement. The council is con-
tinued and, according to the act, given certain powers to modify the
code, with the approval of the commissioner. Such changes must not
establish more stringent regulations than those already incorporated in
the code. With these limitations, the council is authorized, in the lan-
guage of the statute,
"to establish reasonable and suitable classifications of buildings, both as
to use and occupancy; to 'determine general building restrictions as to
location, height and floor areas; to promulgate rules for the lighting and
ventilation of buildings; means of egress therefrom; construction thereof
and precautions to be taken during such construction; materials, loads
and stresses of construction; chimneys and heating appliances and el-
evators; plumbing, heating, electrical control and protection; and to
adopt such other rules and regulations as may be reasonably necessary
to effectuate the purposes of this Act."
The purpose of the act as set out in the original statute is "to protect
life, health, and property".7 The quoted language is in such general
terms, and definite standards are so conspicuously absent, that improper
delegation of legislative power is again suggested. An administrative
tribunal in charge of the building code may be given authority to deter-
mine what are proper equivalents for the standards established in the
code.8 But here the council is not so limited; though it is denied power
to alter the standards set up in the code to more stringent regulations,
it is authorized, according to the act, to reduce those standards. Since
those standards arq now fixed by statute, it may be said that this is an
attempt to give the council authority to amend a statute, which is re-
garded as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.9 Possibly
an exception would be claimed on the ground that the amending power
'Ex parte Burke, 190 Cal. 326, 212 Pac. 193 (1923).
State ex rel. McIntyre v. McEachern, 231 Ala. 609, 160 So. 36 (1936).
'Scottish Union Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Title Co., 28 Ariz. 22, 235 Pac. 137 (1925).
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7494(2).8 Bogen v. Clemnmer, 125 Ohio St. 186, 180 N. E. 710 (1932).
'McKenney v. Farnsworth, 121 Me. 450, 118 Atl. 237 (1922); People v. C.
Klinck: Co., 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. E. 278, Ann. Cas. 1916 D. 1051 (1915) ; RoTr-
SCHAEFFER, CONSTITuTrFAL LAW (1939) 78.
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here is merely lodged in that body which, in practical effect, set up the
code in the first place; and a court with leanings in that direction might
also say that, since the only change could be in the direction of less strin-
gent regulations, no harm could come from upholding the power of the
council. These arguments, however, are quite inconsistent with the rule
against delegation of legislative power.
Under the 1933 act, when an individual property owner sought
interpretation of, or relief from, provisions of the building code, the
proceedings to be followed were :10
1. Determination by the Insurance Commissioner, in the first
instance.
2. Review by the chairman and two members of the council.11
3. Return of the recommendations of the chairman and council mem-
bers, with advisory force only, to the Insurance Commissioner, and
decision by him on his own responsibility.
4. Appeal to the superior court.
The amendment leaves intact the section setting out the above procedure,
and adds a new section which provides that any person desiring to raise
a question under the building code shall be entitled to:
1. A full hearing, after reasonable notice, and determination of the
matters in controversy by the Insurance Commissioner (or, if the ques-
tion raised relates to plumbing, by the State Board of Health).
2. In case of an adverse decision by the commissioner, the indi-
vidual may "either before or after appeal to the Building Council" as
provided in the 1933 Act, secure a trial de novo in an injunction pro-
ceeding against the commissioner in Wake County Superior Court, with
the commissioner's ruling deemed prima fade correct and the burden of
proof on the individual attacking it ;12 or the individual may assert any
other appropriate legal remedy, any intent to limit his remedy to the
injunction proceeding being expressly negatived. Although the pro-
cedural section in the original act has not been repealed, for most prac-
tical purposes, it may now be regarded as dead. The clear requirements
in the new act for reasonable notice and a hearing before the commis-
sioner will probably be treated as conditions precedent to his exercise
of powers under the 1933 statute as well as under the amendment. And
few litigants will prefer the procedure outlined in the 1933 law, where,
after decision by the commissioner, they get an advisory recommendation
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7494(6).
"This review permitted ".where the amount in question shall exceed $1000,"
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7494(6),--a limitation of uncertain scope.
"There is no reference in the act to the possibility of an injunction against the
State Board of Health, in case the adverse determination was by it; but this was
certainly an inadvertent omission, and the statute would probably be interpreted
as making the injunction proceeding available against the board as well as the
commissioner.
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from the council and are then sent back for another decision by the
commissioner, who has already held adversely to their contention in the
first instance.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Service of. Process on Nonresidents Doing Business in the State.
C. 256, the most important new civil procedure law, provides that
every nonresident individual conducting a business in this state through
an agent or other representative, or who is a member of a partnership,
firm, or unincorporated organization or association, or beneficiary or
shareholder in a business trust, doing business in this state, shall be
subject to process of our courts in actions or proceedings arising out
of or connected with the business in this state, and the process may be
served upon the agent or representative." Within five days after service
on the agent, the plaintiff or his attorney must send, by registered mail,
to the nonresident individual at his last address, if known, a copy of the
summons and complaint, together vith "a statement calling attention to
the provisions hereof and of the expiration of the time to answer or
demur." Such service "shall bind such individual as fully and effec-
tually as if it had been mad& upon him personally." To this last lan-
guage the draftsman should have added "within this state". In its
absence, a court wishing to avoid the larger constitutional questions at
stake might say that the statute only provides a new substitute for per-
sonal service on the defendant outside the state.2 However, the statute
as a whole seems clearly to intend that the service authorized shall be
the equivalent of personal service inside the state and it should be so
construed.
It was once apparently settled that such service on an agent could
not support a personal judgment against a nonresident individual or
'The exact language of this part of the statute is that service may be had upon
the "agent, employee, trustee, or other representative or upon any person in this
State receiving or collecting money with respect to such business, or upon any
member of such partnership, firm, organization or association residing in this State
or upon any person residing irX this State who is authorized to act or contract for
or collect or receive money on behalf of such partnership, firm, organization, asso-
ciation or business trust with respect to its business in this State." Does some of
this language intend to authorize service on persons who are not, in fact, regular
agents or representatives of the defendants, or is it intended only to describe one
type of agent or representative who may be served? The former possibility should
clearly be rejected, because if the statute undertakes to authorize service when
no agency actually exists its validity is immediately drawn into question.
'In Butter.worth v. Hill, 114 U. S. 128, 5 Sup. Ct. 796, 29 L. ed. 119 (1885),
the Court held that the defendant only admitted service with the same effect as if
served by an officer where -he was located when, outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, he stipulated, "I hereby accept service . . . to have the same effect as
if duly served on me by a proper officer." But see the contrary holding on the
language, "I hereby admit due personal service upon me," in Jones v. Merrill, 113
Mich. 433, 71 N. W. 838 (1897).
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partner, because the state, being unable to exclude the individual from
carrying on business within its borders, could not impose conditions
upon the doing of that business.3 However, the nonresident motorist
statutes, providing that service on a state official should bind such mo-
torists in actions growing out of their vehicles' use in the state, were held
constitutional ;4 and then the United States Supreme Court recognized
the right to bind a nonresident individual by service on his agent, at
least when the action arose in connection with his operation in the state
of the forum of a business of a character subject to regulation by the
state, such as the sale of securities. 5 There is no compelling reason why
the validity of this type of service should depend upon the character of
the business, however, particularly in a day and time when some degree
of susceptibility to public regulation inevitably attaches to any kind of
business which man's ingenuity can devise. There seems every reason
to believe that state decisions upholding general statutes of this charac-
ter6 represent a viewpoint which will become virtually universal.
Assuming the general validity of such statutes, there are two fur-
ther arguments which might be directed against this one. (1) It fails
to specify in express terms that the agent must still be an agent when
served with process;7 (2) it applies to nonresidents only, and North
Carolina has no general statutory provision authorizing any 'similar
substituted service on residents. The first of these can be very easily
met by construing the statute to authorize service on the agent only
when he is still acting as such at the time of service; and this, in fact,
is by far the most reasonable construction of the language used. As for
the second, it should not render the law invalid, as the dividing line
drawn is based on residence as distinguished from citizenship ;8 and,
'Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919).
' Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632, 71 L. ed. 1091 (1927) cf.
Yocum v. Oklahoma Tire and Supply Co., 191 Ark. 1126, 89 S. W. (2d) 919
(1936).
Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 Sup. Ct. 553, 79 L. ed.
1097 (1935) ; cf.- N. C. Pub. L. 1927, c. 149, §24; Riley v. Sweat, 11f Fla. 362, 149
So. 48 (1933).
'Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700 (1932);
Stoner v. Higginson, 316 Pa. 481, 175 Ad. 527 (1934). In both of these cases the
business involved sale of securities, but that was not the controlling factor in either
decision. There are other (and more) state cases to the contrary. For instance,
Knox Bros. v. E. W. Wagner & Co., 141 Tenn. 355, 209 S. W. 638 (1919) ; An-
drews Bros. v. McClanahan, 220 Ky. 504, 295 S. W. 457 (1927). These cases rely
largely on Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct..97, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919),
the decision in which was greatly confined if not overruled by Henry L. Doherty &
Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 Sup. Ct. 553, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935). See also
State ex rel. Cook v. District Court, 102 Mont. 424, 58 P. (2d) 273 (1936).7 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919), was
distinguished in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 5., Sup. Ct.
553, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935), because, among other things, the agent served was no
longer an agent when served.
'Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry., 2 9 U. S. 377, 49 Sup. Ct 355, 73 L.
ed. 747 (1929).
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further, it is to be assumed that ordinarily the resident can be found
for personal service, whereas the nonresident ordinarily cannot, and this
alone should justify reasonable difference in treatment. Finally, the
fact that in particular cases the nonresident individual may be found in
the state should not make mandatory inclusion of a provision that such
service may be had on the nonresident only if, in fact, he cannot be
located in the state. However, a plaintiff's attorney invoking the statute
could do his case no harm by getting into the record the fact that per-
sonal service within the state could not, after due diligence, be effected.
It seems doubtful that due process notions required inclusion of the
provision for registered mail. notice.9 But, since it has been included, it
will probably be dangerous, in the absence of a general appearance by
the defendant, for any judgment to be taken after service is had under
the statute without filing an affidavit showing compliance with the pro-
vision. And if no mailing is had because no address is known (which
should be a rare case, as ordinarily it could be obtained from the agent)
that fact should probably be made to appear by affidavit2 °
Assignment of Judgment.
C. 61 provides: "No assignment of judgment shall be valid at law
to pass any property as against creditors or purchasers for a valuable
consideration from the donor, bargainor, or assignor, but from the
entry of such assignment on the margih of the judgment docket opposite
the said judgment, signed by the owner of said judgment, or his attor-
ney under power of attorney or his attorney of record, and witnessed by
the Clerk or the Deputy Clerk of the" Superior Court of the county in
which said judgment is docketed." This act clearly stems from the de-
cision in In re Wallace: Jennings & Sons, Inc. v. Howard,1 to the effect
that, as between successive assignees of a judgment, the first assign-
' It. is true that some such procedure has been held necessary in connection with
the nonresident motorist statutes. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct.
259, 72 L. ed. 446 (1928). However, under those statutes service is made upon a
state official and such service, standing alone, furnishes no reasonable guarantee
that the defendant will receive actual notice. However, when service is made on the
defendant's agent or representative, failure of the defendant to receive actual notice
would be the fault of such agent. There seem no more reason to require registered
mail notice here than to require such notice to be mailed to the principal office of
a foreign corporation when the latter is served by serving its agent or employee.
The service upheld in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 Sup.
Ct. 553, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1925), was made under a statute which required no such
notice and, so far as appears, none was given.
1" Compare the notice provisions of the Pennsylvania statute involved in Stoner
v. Higginson, 316 Pa. 481, 175 Ad. 527 (1934), and of the recent New York statute
(New York Civil Practice Act §229-b) commented on in (1940) 40 CoL. L. REV.
1105, (1940) 10 FORDHAm L. REv. 126, (1940) 53 H.v. L. Rav. 1061. And see
Prashker, Serzice of Summons on Non-Resident ratural Persons Doing Business
in New York (1940) 15 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 1.
1212 N. C. 490, 193 S. E. 819 (1937).
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ment in point of time prevailed, though the second was first recorded
on the judgment docket. The principal difficulty it prevents is deter-
mination of the judgments to which it applies. Section 2 provides:
"This Act shall not affect any suit, action or proceeding now pending
in the courts of this State." Section 4 provides: "This Act shall be in
full force and effect from and after July 1, 1941." There is not space
here for a thorough discussion of all the possibilities which these two
sections suggest. Suffice it to say that the most logical meaning seems
to be: (a) section 2 is intended to refer only to actions involving the
validity of assignments of judgments, and is not intended to exempt
from the act judgments rendered in all law suits "now" pending; (b)
the "now" pending in section 2 probably must be taken as referring to
the effective date of the act as prescribed by section 4-July 1, 1941;
(c) probably, as to assignments of judgments made prior to July 1,
1941, the statute will apply, unless their validity is involved in litigation
then pending, and if they are not recorded prior to that date they may
lose the priority they would have had under the former law; (d) if the
same judgment has been twice assigned prior to July 1, 1941, and both
assignments are recorded prior te that date, then the one prior in point
of time would probably retain priority, regardless of whether it is also
the first recorded.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW*
Constitutional Atnendent-Reorganization of State
Board of Education.
Our constitution places control of the free public schools of the
state in a State Board of Education, made up of the Governor, Lieu-
tenant-Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, State Auditor,
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Attorney General, making
the regulations of the board subject to amendment or repeal by the gen-
eral assembly.' This ex officio board has been criticized on the ground
that it is made up almost entirely of men who are on the board of
education solely because of their success in other than educational fields,
and not because they have given any indication of being the most com-
petent men available for handling our school system.2 Possibly because
the state officers on this board, other than the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, have non-educational duties which take up most of their
time, the legislature has, for some years, shown a tendency to meet the
* See also discussion of C. 261 at p. 473, infra.
'The organization and powers of the present board are set out in N. C. CoNsT.
art. IX §§8-13.
'See Public Education in North Carolina, a report by the State Educational
Commission (1920) p. 86; Report on a Survey of the Organization and Adminis-
tration of the State Government of North Carolina by the Institute for Govern-
ment Research of the Brookings Institution (1930) p. 162.
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growing needs of the school system by granting powers to newly cre-
ated boards or commissions, rather than relying on the constitutional
State Board of Education. Thus we have had since 1917 a State Board
for Vocational Education,3 since 1933 a State School Commission, 4 and
since 1935 a State Board of Commercial Education5 and a State Text-
book Commission.0 The School Commission, which is by far the most
important of these, is the administrative agency created to supervise
distribution and expenditure of the state appropriations which support
the state-wide eight months' school term. It succeeded the State Board
of Equalization, which had been established to handle distribution of state
school funds when they were primarily supplemental to local funds.7
The biennial "School Machinery Acts" since 1933 have given the Com-
mission additional duties which might have seemed to lie within the
field of the constitutional State Board of Education.8
Most of the state boards of education in this country are made up
largely of gubernatorial appointees ;9 and the constitution suggested by
the North Carolina Constitutional Commission of 1932 included a pro-
vision for such a board, to be composed of six members appointed by
the governor, subject to confirmation by the legislature, and the Super-
intendent of Public Instruction as chairman. 10 In order to unify the
various boards created by the legislatures, and escape the resulting
scattered administration, the Governor's Commission on Education in
1938 recommended that the 1932 suggestion for reorganization of the
state board be submitted to the voters for adoption as a constitutional
amendment."
The present law (C. 151), in its original form, followed very closely
the 1932 and 1938 suggestions. Amendments approved by the legisla-
' N. C. Pub. L. 1917, c. 95; the board is now operating under a later statute
found in N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§5695-5729.
'Established by N. C. Pub. L. 1933, c. 562, and continued in the biennial
"School Machinery Act" adopted by each legislative session until 1939, when a
permanent act was adopted, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§5780 (122)-(156),
under which the State School Commission is now operating.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§5780(m 1)-(m 10).
'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§5754(1)-(16).
'See N. C. Pub. L. 1927, c. 256; N. C. Pub. L. 1929, c. 245; N. C. Pub. L. 1931,
c. 430.
'See N. C. Pub. L. 1935, c. 455 ; N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 394.
'Frederic, State Persmnel Administration with Special Reference to Depart-
vnents of Education, being staff study number 3 prepared for the President's Ad-
visory Committee on Education (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1939) pp.
20-22.
'°Report of the North. Carolina Constitutional Commission (1932) pp. 32-33.
" Report and Recommendations of the Governor's Commission on Education
(1938) pp. 28-31. The tendency in this state toward the creation of numerous
agencies to administer the educational system was commented on in Cocking and
Gilmore, Organization and Administration of Public Education, staff study number
2 prepared for the President's Advisory Committee on Education (U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1938) p. 68.
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ture, however, enlarge the proposed board somewhat, and make it very
similar to the present State School Commission. The amendment to be
voted on would create a board composed of the Lieutenant Governor,
the State Treasurer, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and
twelve members appointed by the Governor, with the confirmation of the
legislature, one from each of the congressional districts. After the origi-
nal organization, half the board is to be appointed every two years for
a four-year term, so as to avoid a complete turnover in any one year.
It is provided that a majority of the members are to be business men,
not connected with the teaching profession. The board is to elect its
own chairman, but the Superintendent of Public Instruction is desig-
nated its secretary. A comptroller is to be appointed by the board with
the approval of the Governor, to have charge, under the direction of
the board, of its fiscal affairs.
There is some uncertainty about the powers and functions of the
board. It is charged, in the opening sentence, with the "general super-
vision and administration" of the school system; but the language
inserted by amendment provides that the Superintendent of Public in-
struction "shall have general supervision of the public schools. .. ."
Probably this similarity of phrase will not interfere seriously with the
realization of the intent which is almost necessarily implied from the
inherent nature of the two; i.e., the intent that the board, made up of.
several members meeting intermittently, is to be the policy forming or
legislative group, while the individual superintendent is to be the full-
time executive.
Following a provision that the new organization is to succeed to all
the powers of the old board, there is a grant of specific powers in the
following words: "The State Board of Education shall have power to
divide the state into . . . school districts; to regulate the grade, salary
and qualifications of teachers; to provide for the selection and adoption
of textbooks . . . ; to apportion and equalize the public school funds
over the state; and generally to supervise and administer the free public
school system of the state and make all needful rules and regulations in
relation thereto. All the powers enumerated in this section shall be
exercised in conformity with this constitution and subject to such laws
as may be enacted from time to time by the General Assembly."
Two questions may arise as to the effect of the quoted language.
First, are the powers so "subject to . . . laws . . . enacted" by the
legislature that the legislature may limit or withdraw one of the powers
specifically allocated to this board by the preceding statement, and con-
fer it upon some other administrative body? The answer is probably
in the negative. In order to give substantial effect, not a merely tern-
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porary effect, to the specific grant of powers, the concluding statement
would very likely be treated as general language inapplicable to limit
the specific grant of powers in the preceding sentence, except so far as
to give the legislature general supervision over the manner of exercising
those powers (which might, in effect, include direct legislative exercise
of the powers). This final sentence illustrates the difficulty that often
arises when an administrative tribunal is set up by a constitutional pro-
vision. Unless some supervisory power is lodged in the legislature, the
administrative tribunal is placed above the legislature; while to give the
legislature unlimited control would be to place the legislature above the
constitution. Both extremes are probably to be avoided unless the lan-
guage is very clear in support of one or the other.12
The second question is as to the effect the amendment would have
on the several boards and commissions which have been functioning in
the past. The initiative for this proposal came from the 1938 Report of
the Governor's Commission on Education, and was plainly motivated
by the belief that such an amendment would eliminate the many boards
set up by the legislature to handle various matters connected with the
school system.13 It is said that the debate on the amendment in the leg-
islature was based on -the assumption that its adoption meant the end
of the existing multiple-board system. There is, however, no express
repeal of the statutes establishing these agencies.' 4 In so far as the
powers specifically granted in the proposed amendment are clearly in-
consistent with the powers granted by any particular statute to another
board the amendment will involve a repeal of the statute by implication;
but the application of this test will require a careful comparison of the
grant of powers in the several statutes in question with that in the
amendment.
. The amendment is so worded that, if adopted, it will vest no power
in the new board until April 1, 1943, thus giving time for appointment
of the new board.
Civil Liberties-Subversive Activities.'
C. 37 adds North Carolina to the growing list of more than twenty
states which have adopted "sedition" statutes. 2 The title, "An act to
12 For an example of a clear provision giving the legislature authority to alter
the specific grants of power, see the concluding section in the article on municipal
corporations, N. C. CoNsT. art. VII. §13.
1" See note 11, supra. 14 See notes 3-6, supra.
'There is a great deal of law review material in this field. In fact, the Bill
of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association has seen fit to introduce
a new publication, THE BILL OF RiGHTs REvzEw, to which reference should be made.
See also Million, Political Crimes (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 164 and 293; Legis.,
State Control of Political Thought (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 390; Note, Recent
Federal Legislation against Subversive Influences (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 159.
'For a list of these statutes, see (1936) 84 U. or PA. L. Ray. 390, 393. n. 27
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curtail and punish subversive activities," is much broader in scope than
the text of the act which punishes only one type of subversive activity,
as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person, by word of mouth or
writing, wilfully and deliberately to advocate, advise or teach a doctrine
that the Government of the United States, the State of North Carolina
or any political subdivision thereof shall be overthrown or overturned
by force or violence or by any other unlawful means. It shall be un-
lawful for any public building in the State, owned by the State of North
Carolina, any political sub-division thereof, or by any department or
agency of the State or any institution supported in whole or in part
by State funds, to be used by any person for the purpose of advocating,
advising or teaching a doctrine that the Government of the United
States, the State of North Carolina or any political subdivision thereof
should be overthrown by force, violence or other unlawful means."
That this statute, in providing for the punishment of any person
who is guilty of the prohibited utterances, is constitutional seems to be
clear. In the leading case of Gitlow v. New York,' it was settled that
"freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental
personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states."14 However,
it is also fundamental that this freedom of speech and of the press does
not confer any absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility,
and that a state may, in the exercise of the police power, punish utter-
ances which openly advocate the overthrow of the constitutional form
of government of the United States and of the several states by violence
or other unlawful means. "In short, this freedom does not deprive a
state of the primary and essential right of self preservation." 5
There is no dissent from these general propositions, but the applica-
tion of sedition statutes to the facts of particular cases has given rise to
differences of opinion under the "clear and present danger" doctrine.6
Thus in the Gitlow case, the majority held that the statute itself deter-
mines that such utterances are so inimical to the general welfare and
involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished under
the police power. Therefore, the "clear and present danger" rule has
no application, and it would be no defense to show that there was no
likelihood of resulting evil or that the force advocated was not imme-
diately sufficient to bring about the substantive evil-the overthrow of
the government. In other words, once an utterance of the prohibited
'268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925).
268 U. S. 652. 666. 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 630. 69 L. ed. 1138, 1145.
268 U. S. 652, 668. 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 630. 69 L. ed. 1138, 1146.
'See opinion of the Court by Holmes, J. in Schenck v. United States, 249
U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247. 63 L. ed. 470 (1919).
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language is found there is a finding of danger sufficient to preclude
further investigation by the court.
The dissenting judges in the Gitlow case argue that "The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that [the state] has a right to
prevent." 7 Justice Holmes concludes that the "Communist Manifesto"
published and circulated by the defendant "had no chance of starting a
present conflagration."8
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court returned to the stand-
ard of the Schenck case,9 i.e., "the clear and present danger" test, in
its decision in the well-known case of Herndon v. Lowry,10 but the de-
cision does not go that far and is perfectly consistent with the Gitlow
case. For in the Herndon case the error lay in the application of a
statute which as construed by the Georgia court, "does not furnish a
sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt. . . . Nor is any specified
conduct or utterance of the accused made an offense. . . . The law, as
thus construed, licenses the jury to create its own standard in each
case.""
1
These objections to the Georgia statute have no application to the
North Carolina act. The first sentence of C. 37 requires wilfull and
deliberate advocacy of a doctrine that the government of the United
States, etc. shall be overthrown by force, violence or other unlawful
means. The offense is not indefinite or uncertain. The defendant must
advocate, wilfully and deliberately, resort to force. The utterances pun-
ished involve a danger of substantive evil so that the rule of the Gitlow
case applies. It is true that the words "other unlawful means" would
not be clear standing alone, but when combined with "force or violence",
they would seem to import the use of coercion or fraud. And for all
practical purposes, the words "force or violence" would suffice. The
second sentence of C. 37 is more doubtful. The general assembly prob-
ably intended to punish those in charge of public buildings for permitting
the prohibited use of such buildings, but the ambiguous language might
be restrictively construed as only directed against the user. This part
of the act includes buildings in private institutions which receive any
financial support from the state.
Although there is doubt as to the application of the second sentence
of C. 37, it is clear that the person who is guilty of making the prohibited
7 268 U. S. 652, 672, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 632, 69 L. ed. 1138, 1148, quoting from
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 249, 63 L. ed. 470,473.4 268 U. S. 652, 673, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 632, 69 L. ed. 1138, 1149.
See note 6, supra.10301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732, 81 L. ed. 1066 (1937).
11301 U. S. 242, 261-63, 57 Sup. Ct. 732, 741, 81 L. ed. 1006, 1077 (1937).
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utterances involving advocacy of force or violence may not escape pun-
ishment by an appeal to the Constitution.
CORPORATIONS-STOCK TRANSFER
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, passed as, C. 353, is much more
than a set of regulations for stock transfer offices and agents, whose
business in North Carolina is of rather unimpressive amount.1 The act
introduces doctrines of negotiability into the field, of stock dealings2 and
in doing so makes noteworthy changes in the local law. No North
Carolina case has been found in which a bona fide purchaser from a
thief of a stock certificate assigned in blank has been denied protection
against the original owner,3 but the inferences from the opinion of
Connor, J., in Green v. Forsyth Furniture Lines, Inc.A are dearly that
way. We will now be expected to give effect to Section 5 by sustaining
the bona fide purchaser even from a thief.5
A more certain break with the past occurs where attachment of
shares is involved. The new act, in Sections 13 and 242, provides no
attachment or levy upon the shares shall be valid unless the stock cer-
tificate is seized by the officer or surrendered to the issuing corporation
or its transfer by the holder is enjoined. Peculiar local doctrines an-
nounced in Parks-Cramer Co. v. Southern Express Co.6 as to the juris-
diction of North Carolina courts over foreign owned shares in domes-
ticated foreign corporations are thus definitely and expressly replaced.
In the cited case the fact that the certificate was not to be found in the
state was considered immaterial. The correct analogy was thought to
be the garnishment cases where presence of the debtor suffices for juris-
diction over the garnished debt. 7 As stock certificates now take on the
character of negotiable instruments, the analogy, as the above-mentioned
provisions of the new act indicate, is more properly to a debtor who
has evidenced his obligation by a promissory note or trade acceptance
1 The business here is unimpressive because few of the largest corporations
with business headquarters in North Carolina (i.e., those which have more shares
outstanding to be traded in and are likely to have more transfers per share because
of active trading) maintain local stock transfer offices. MooDY's MANUAL OF
INDUSTRIALS (1940); MOODY, PUBLIC UTILITIES (1940). Of Reynolds, Cannon,
Adams-Millis, Duke Power, Tidewater Power, Carolina Power, the last only re-
ports a North Carolina transfer office.
' See 6 U. L. A. 10. Commissioner's note.
'That was the prevailing view in other states. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936)
524.
'198 N. C. 104, 150 S. E. 713 (1929).
Peckinpaugh v. Noble, 238 Mich., 464, 213 N. W. 859, 52 A. L. R. 941 (1927).
185 N. C. 428, 117 S. E. 505 (1923), (1925) 3 N. C. L. REy. 103.
'Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S.,215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625, 49 L. ed. 1023 (1904) (indi-
vidual) ; Chi. R. I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797, 43 L. ed.
1144 (1899) (corporation). So as to debtor foreign corporation carrying on busi-
ness in the state of the forum. Louisville & Nash. R. R. v Deer, 200 U. S. 176,
26 Sup. Ct. 207, 50 L. ed. 426 (1906).
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and the jurisdiction to attach will fail till the paper can be impounded
or its transfer effectivdly enjoined.8
"Effectively" is deliberately used here although the law contains no
such word. It must be clear from many unfair trade, labor and other
miscellaneous cases9 that injunctions can be and are sometimes violated.
It will be small comfort to a corporation required to issue new shares
in an attachment proceeding to be assured that the holder of the old
shares has been told he must not transfer them to an innocent purchaser
or that a copy of the order has been served on the transfer office unless
it knows that the judicial order is going to be respected. That is, unless
the corporation will be protected by the provision of Section 13 that
"except where a certificate is lost or destroyed, such corporation shall
not be compelled to issue a new certificate for the stock until the old
certificate is surrendered to it." If this gives the corporation the pro-
tection it purports to give, then what is the status of an attachment
implemented only by an injunction against the holder? Does it lose all
practical value unless followed by surrender of the certificate? And,
taking the provision at face value, if the enjoined holder claims the
certificate is lost or destroyed, can the court order issue of a new cer-
tificate, with or without compliance with the provisions generally gov-
erning replacements for lost and -destroyed certificates?1o The courts
before whom attachments come should reckon well with the possibility
that injunctions do not afford complete protection, and there is some
evidence elsewhere that they do.1
Reasonable charter restrictions on the transfer of shares were recog-
nized as valid in the Iredell Telephone case.12  There the restraint on
' See Bank of Jasper v. First Nat. Bk. of Rome, 258 U. S. 112, 42 Sup. Ct. 202,
66 L. ed. 490 (1922). The rules in North Carolina permitted garnishment of a debt
represented by an outstanding negotiable instrument, though the debtor garnished
could disclose this fact and demand that bond be posted to protect him against pos-
sible future liability to a bona fide holder of the instrument. McINTOsH, NoRT
CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1929) §821. Apparently,
however, this had not been extended to corporate stock cases, though the decision
in Blackley v. Candler. 169 N. C. 16, 84 S. E. 1039 (1915), is consistent with it
and indicates a general willingness on the part of the court to attribute to stock
certificates some, at least, of the characteristics of negotiability. The case is not
cited by the later decision in Parks-Cramer Co. v. Southern Express Co.. 185 N. C.
428, 117 S. E. 505 (1923).
The new law, in Section 22, defines "certificate" in such a way that it is held
that the act does not apply, in the case of stock in a foreign corporation, unless the
state of incorporation has adopted the act or one embodying similar rules. Note
(1937) 85 U. PA. L. RV. 522, 526. This seems to leave the probably unconsti-
tutional rule of the Parks-Crainer case in force as to- shares in corporations incor-
porated in states having neither this act nor any act recognizing doctrines of
negotiability in respect of corporate shares.
9 See many cases cited in American Digest, Injunctions, §216 el seq.
" For discussion of those provisions see the text below.
"' Elgart v. Mintz. 16 N. J. Misc. 289, 199 Atd. 68 (1938), "effective" injunction
-though the court there seems to refer to legal rather than practical effcctiveness.
"
2 Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., 182 N. C. 308, 108 S. E. 744 (1921).
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sale to outsiders was recited on the stock certificate as well as in the
charter but the supreme court seems to have considered the charter
provision the really essential one. Stockholders are on notice of and
bound by "congenital characteristics". Under the new legislation, how-
ever, any transfer restrictions as well as the extent of any corporate
lien on the shares must be stated on the certificate to be effective.' 3
Knowledge of the restriction seemingly .will not take the place of the
printed statement.
It has been elsewhere suggested' 4 that the uniform act will, by im-
plication, change the generally accepted rule which prevents stockholders'
suits by new stockholders for old wrongs which the former owner of
the shares condoned.' 5 For this argument the somewhat imperfect
analogy is to purchasers of negotiable instruments without notice of the
maker's or drawer's defenses. With stock certificates now given the
characteristics of negotiable instruments, an uninformed purchaser of
shares whose former owner participated or acquiesced in injury to the
corporation should stand- as an innocent purchaser entitled to sue. So
goes the argument. The, disability does not run with the shares.
Whether our own cases ever have held that it did so run into the hands
of an innocent purchaser is not easy to say. Little can be learned on
that from the supposed leading local case on stockholder's suits.'6 After
seemingly adopting the fe.deral rule that no stockholder's representative
suit can be brought by one who was not a stockholder, when the injury
was done, the case later says that the shares must have been bought
"in good faith and not for mere vexatious purposes"Y.7 But whatever
the law has been, the problem is more complex than one merely of inno-
cent purchase. There may be reasons of policy for refusing to allow
any purchaser of shares after the injury to be the one to sue on the
corporation's behalf for redress. Granting plaintiff's innocence he may
still be one who has acquired his interest at a price which reflects the
injury and so does not present a very appealing case where others more
harmed are silent. On the other hand, since the recovery goes to the
corporation, there may be reason for allowing any stockholder to start
the action. The distinction, however, between innocent purchasers of
"guilty shares" and purchasers with knowledge is one which has many
friends and the suggested interpretation of the act to that end tends to
bring the law into line with the views of well-known commentators-ls
13 Sec. 15.
2' Note (1939) 23 MINN. L. REv. 484, 487.
15 13 FLETCHER, CYC. CORPORATIONS (perm. ed.) §§5866, 5980.
"' Moore v. Silver Valley Mining Co., 104 N. C. 534, 10 S. E. 679 (1889).
7 Id. at 545.
2 MORAWETZ, CORPORATIONS (1886) §267; STEEs, CORPORATIONS (1936)
§679; cf. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) §626.
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The uniform act was passed without significant amendment. The
nearest approach to such a thing is the proviso appended to Section 17
on lost and destroyed certificates, which, after setting out the steps
necessary in such cases to obtain a new certificate by suit, then expressly
continues alive the present code section which authorizes voluntary
issuance of new certificates by the corporations."0 In the case of suit a
bond must be given "with sufficient surety to be approved by the court".
In the case of voluntary re-issue the indemnity may be any amount or
none at all in the discretion of the directors. Whether it is good to allow
directors to place this risk on the corporation or whether by so doing
they would incur personal liability is probably not very important. At
any rate, it is a problem which antedates the new law. But the "no
bond" provision perhaps makes possible a practical way of dealing with
one troublesome situation of rather frequent occurrence, i.e., the case
of loss or destruction of an unindorsed certificate for shares whose
small value and lack of dividend makes the expense of a surety bond
prohibitive. Particularly is this true since there seems no legal end to
the obligation. That is, since there is no .maturity date to stock, no
statute of limitations would ordinarily run against a transferee of the
lost shares as it would (in the absence of lunacy, infancy or other dis-
ability on the part of the claimant) in the case of a lost and transferred
bill or note. The loser of shares technically would have an unending
obligation to protect the company. Directors' discretion might here
temper justice with mercy.
COURTS-SUPERIOR COURTS
Concurrent Jurisdiction.
C. 265 makes two changes in the statute1 granting concurrent juris-
diction in cases where original jurisdiction of criminal actions has been
taken from the superior court and vested exclusively in inferior courts:
(1) The counties of Forsyth and Mecklenburg are withdrawn from and
29 other counties are added to the list of counties in which the statute is
not to be applicable, making 33 thus excepted. (2) It purports presently
to divest not only such exclusive jurisdiction heretofore granted but also
such as may hereafter be granted to inferior courts in criminal cases and
concludes: "The provisions of this section shall remain in full force and
effect, unless expressly repealed by some subsequent act of the general
assembly, and shall not be repealed by implication or by general repeal-
ing clauses in any act of the general assembly conferring exclusive juris-
diction on inferior courts in misdemeanor cases which may hereafter be
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1162.
1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1437.
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enacted!' The change first noted is not unconstitutional2 as a "local,
private or special act or resolution relating to the establishment of courts
inferior to the superior court."3 But the second change is a futile at-
tempt to control the effects of later, legislation except as a more or less
persuasive caution to subsequent general assemblies, and as a factor of
judicial construction in cases where the conflict between the present and
a later law is ambiguous. 4
Organization.
Four measures contemplate greater flexibility in the organization of
the facilities and personnel of the superior court. (1) Res. 21 authorizes
a commission to study the need for increasing "and/or" changing the
geographical arrangement of the judicial districts. (2) C. 261 submits,
for the fourth time in fourteen years, a constitutional amendment to
divorce solicitorial districts from judicial districts and to permit the
general assembly to. increase or decrease the number of solicitorial dis-
tricts, as conditions may warrant. (3) C. 51 increases the number of
special judges from six to eight. And (4) C. 51 and C. 52 give to the
special and emergency judges, during the term assigned, the same powers
as the judge regularly holding the courts of the district.
The study of the conditions in the twenty-one judicial districts is
prompted by the congestion of judicial business in the urban centers,
such as Buncombe, Forsyth, Guilford and Mecklenburg counties, a
situation only partly met by special terms, and by lightened dockets in
some of the other areas. Efforts this year to create two new districts,
and to reorganize the sittings in Guilford, accentuated the desirability
of a state-wide survey of the relation of the districts to the amount and
character of litigation.
For many years, the expansion of the regular judicial personnel has
been blocked by Art. IV, §23 of the constitution, requiring the election
of a solicitor in each judicial district without regard to the fact that the
state needs far more judges than prosecutors. This has been partly re-
sponsible for the employment of the special5 and emergency (retired)
judges,6 free from the district and rotation requirements applicable to
'it re Harris, 183 N. C. 633, 112 S E. 425 (1922) ; State v. Home, 191 N. C.
375, 131 S. E. 753 (1926); State v. Everhardt, 203 N. C. 610, 166 S. E. 738(1932); Spruill, The Proposed Constitution and Special, Private and Local Leg-
islation in North Carolina (1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 140, 142.3 N. C. Coxsr., art. II. §29.
Mongeon v. New York, 55 N. Y. 613 (1874) ; Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis.
623 (1861); cf. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World v. Woodmen of the
World, 73 Colo. 57, 213 Pac. 579 (1923) and Kornegay v. Goldsboro, 180 N. C.
441, 105 S. E. 187 (1920).




the regular judges, and for the establishment of various types of local
courts inferior to the superior court. The constitutional amendment
which would relieve this bottleneck and permit the development of the
judicial and solicitorial services along independent lines, differs from
its ill-fated 1927,7 19298 and 19319 predecessors in only two respects.
It adds what was formerly implied: "... which (solicitorial districts)
need not correspond to, or be the same as, the judicial districts of the
state." And the ballot is to state the question more clearly. The amend-
ment is substantially in accord with the 193"3 proposal for revision of the
constitution. 10 The electorate ratified all 5 of the amendments submitted
in 193511 relating to the supreme court, to taxation' and to debt limita-
tions, and both of the amendments submitted in 1937,12 relating to
sheriffs and to the state department of justice. 'It is to be hoped that the
solicitorial amendment will now be approved.
The increase in the number of special judges is justified by the mal-
adjustments noted above, by the inflexibility of the legislatively fixed
system of regular terms (See infra, Teri s) and by the increased de-
mands for superior court facilities in Buncombe and Forsyth counties
as a result of the recent abolition of their respective county courts.18
Now that the special and emergency judges have the same power and
authority, in open court and in chambers, during the term assigned,14 as
the judge regularly holding the courts of the district, most of the diffi-
culties over the question as to which of the various classes of superior
court judges may act in a given situation'5 have been alleviated. For
an act of 193916 put the resident judge upon the same basis as the
regular judge as to jurisdiction out of term. This 1939 act has enabled
the resident judges to give continuity of administration to such matters
as receiverships and estates, but it has burdened them with an increas-
ing volume of chambers business to be handled while home for the
week-end, in between terms of court held in distant districts.
7 N. C. Pub. L. 1927, c. 99.1 N. C. Pub. L. 1929, c. 140. 'N. C. Pub. L. 1931, c. 367.
10 The Report of the North Carolina Constitutional Commission (1932) 11 N. C.
L. REv. 5, 7, 27; N. C. Pub. L. 1933, c. 383, art. IV, §10; A Survey of Statu-
tory Changes in N. C. in 1933 (1933) 11 N. C. L. REV. 191, 209.
" N. C. Pub. L. 1935, cc. 248, 444; A Survey of Statutory Changes in N. C.
in 1935 (1935) 13 N. C. L. REV. 355, 365.
"N. C. Pub. L. 1937, cc. 241, 447.
13 See Efird v. Board of Commissioners, 219 N. C. 96, 12 S. E. (2d) 889 (1941).
Cc. 51, 52. Apparently, Ipock v. N. C. Joint Stock Land Bank, 206 N. C.
-91, 175 S. E. 127 (1934) is unaffected. That case held that an emergency judge,
not holding court in the county, was without authority to confirm certain orders
of the clerk.
-5 For example, it was necessary to add a section to the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act, indicating which judges would have jurisdiction. N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §628(j).
10 Now N. C. CoDE ANN-v. (Michie, 1939) §1438. For an example of the former
incapacity of the resident judge, see State v. Ray, 97 N. C. 510, 1 S. E. 876 (1887).
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Terms.
C. 367 overhauls the legislative schedule of superior court terms, for
the next two years, in 27 out of the 100 counties in the state. The re-
mainder are fixed by the current statute.17 A limited degree of adjust-
ability is provided by C. 367 in four ways: In Mecklenburg, the board
of county commissioners may add certain terms. In Hyde and Wilkes
the board may drop certain -terms. In Buncombe and Madison, the board
may determine whether given terms are to deal with civil or criminal
cases. And in Buncombe, Cumberland, Gaston, Sampson and Warren,
particular civil matters may be taken up at criminal terms. This is
prohibited in Mecklenburg.
To provide for greater adjustability of terms, an amendment of
193718 set up a court calendar commission, to be. composed of the chief
justice of the supreme court and four superior court judges to be ap-
pointed by the governor. This commission was empowered to revise the
schedule of courts for any county or district and to increase or decrease
the number of terms therein from time to time as the commission might
deem advisable. Although duly appointed, the commission has never met.
It is understood that this is due to a belief that the amendment is un-
constitutional. No valid objection could be made, however, on the
ground of supposed dual-office holding, for the members would surely
be commissioners for a special purpose within the proviso to Art. XIV,
§7 of the constitution. Their new duties in judicial administration are
but incidental to the more effective functioning of the courts over which
they regularly preside.' 9 Perhaps, however, the objection is that the
amendment of 1937 constitutes an improper delegation of legislative
power. For Art. IV, §10 of the constitution provides: "... there shall
be held a superior court in each county at least twice in each year to
continue for such time in each county as may be prescribed by law." The
1937 amendment lays down no standard or policy to guide the commis-
sion but leaves it free to revise the schedule of terms or to increase or
decrease the number as it believes advisable. But in the nature of the
situation, only changes in the public *need for court service could cause a
commission so constituted to order changes in a legislative schedule
fixed so far in advance.20 The legislature has prescribed the general
7 . C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1443.
" N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 408; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1443.
"' Or, to put it another way, the statute merely imposed additional powers and
duties upon the members of the commission, ex officio, without creating any new of-
flees. Compare McCullers v. Board of Commissioners, 158 N. C. 75, 73 S. E. 816
(1911) ; State ex re/, Grimes v. Holmes, 207 N. C. 293, 176 S. E. 746 (1934) and
Brigman v. Bailey, 213 N. C. 119, 195 S. E. 617 (1938).
"' Compare Durham Provision Co. v. Daves, 190 N. C. 7, 128 S. E. 593 (1925);
Efird v. Board of Commissioners, 219 N. C. 96, 1Z S. E. (2d) 889 (1941) and
the powers (noted in the first paragraph of the text, supra, under Terms) granted
1941]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
schedule and wisely left interim adjustments of detail to the sound dis-
cretion of a committee of the judges. It is submitted that the calendar
commission is not unconstitutional.
Perhaps the time has come to abandon the inconvenient, outmoded
system of a series of brief, rigid, legislatively determined court terms
and to provide either that the courts shall always be open for business2 '
or that the court year shall be divided into two long terms22 and then
leave the regulation of sittings, recesses and adjournments to the judges
in charge.2 3 Doubtless, a constitutional amendment would be wise, if
not necessary.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Burglary Verdicts.
C. S. 4641 provides: "When the crime charged in the bill of indict-
ment is burglary in the first degree, the jury may render a verdict of
guilty of burglary in the second degree if they deem it proper so to do."
A year after this provisition was adopted the court was called upon to
decide whether the discretion thus given to the jury was subject to any
limitations. In State v. Fleming,' the court held that this statute did not
permit the jury to return a second degree verdict "independent of all
evidence. The jury are sworn to find the truth of the charge, and the
statute does not give them a discretion against the obligations of their
oaths."
Three years later the court tok an inconsistent position in holding, in
State v. Alston,2 that if the jury brought in a second degree verdict on
evidence which made the defendant guilty of first degree burglary or
nothing, the verdict, being favorable and not prejudicial to the de-
fendant, could not be disturbed, despite the jury's abuse of its discretion,
In State v. Johnson,8 the court faced squarely the inconsistency
which had developed. The evidence justified a verdict of first degree
burglary or nothing. Nevertheless, the jury returned to the courtroom
and asked if they might bring in a second degree verdict. The trial judge
ruled that they could not. The supreme court in a four to three decision
upheld this ruling.
to particular boards of county commissioners to make local adjustments. The
same policy is transferable to a state-wide committee acting for a state-wide cofirt.
But see In re H. B. No. 537, 113 Tex. 367, 256 S. W. 573 (1923).
1 As in CAI roRnA CODE CIV. PRoC. (Deering, 1937) §§73, 74, 142. See State
v. Jackman, 31 Nev. 511, 104 Pac. 13 (1909).
As in the Supreme Court of North Carolina. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1939) §1408; Amendments to Rules, 203 N. C. 866 (1932).
' See PouND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS (1940) 167, 175, 197, 252-253.
107 N. C. 905, 909, 12 S. E. 131, 132 (1890).
113 N. C. 666, 18 S. E. 69Z (1893).
S218 N. C. 604, 12 S. E. (2d) 278 (1940).
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Counsel for the defendant in the Joh'nson case piloted through
the general assembly C. 7, requiring the judge to instruct the jury that
they may bring in a second degree verdict, "if they deem it proper,"
even though the evidence justifies a first degree verdict only.
Burglary and Arson Verdicts.
C. S. 4233 provides that "any person convicted, according to due
course of law, of the crime of burglary in the first degree shall suffer
death.. ." C. S. 4238 provides that "any person convicted, according
to due course of law, of the crime of arson shall suffer death." C. 215
qualifies the foregoing sections by providing that "if the jury shall so
recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life."
False Reports to Police Radio Stations.
C. 363 makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the
county jail for not over one year, or by fine of not over $500, or both, to
"wilfully make or cause to be made to a police radio broadcasting station
any false, misleading or unfounded report, for the purpose of interfer-
ing with the operation thereof, or to hinder or obstruct any peace officer
in the performance of his duty...."
Some such enactment was essential to accurate and efficient opera-
tion of the state-wide police radio system set up under 1935 legislation1
and of the various local police radio stations. However, it seems to
require too much proof of collateral matters. It punishes wilfully false
reports only when made "for the purpose of" interferiig with the opera-
tion of the radio or of obstructing justice. Proof of such purpose, in-
sofar as it is not covered by the term "wilful," is thus essential for
conviction. It would seem that a wilfully false report is a hindrance to
efficient radio operation, regardless of any collateral purpose. In opera-
tion, however, it seems not unlikely that any "wilfully" false report will
automatically be found to have been made for the unlawful purpose, so
that the prolixity of the statute is more verbal than real.
Dispositioyn of Seized Liquor.
C. 310 makes several changes in C. S. 3411 (L), regulating disposi-
tion of liquor seized under search warrants: (1) Formerly, upon ac-
quittal, the liquor was returnable to the person acquitted; now it must
be returned to the established owner. (2) Formerly, upon conviction,
or on default of appearance, the statute directed destruction of the liquor
but set no time limit; now, in such cases, the liquor must be destroyed
within ten days after the conviction or default. (3) Formerly tax-paid
liquor so seized "may" be turned over to the county commissioners;
'IN. C. CoD. ANx. (Michie, 1939) §3846(rrr).
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now it "shall" be. (4) Formerly it was not clearly mandatory that such
tax-paid liquor be given to hospitals for medicinal purposes or sold to
ABC stores and the proceeds placed in the school fund, nor was any
time set for such disposition, nor was destruction, in terms, required if
no other course had been followed; now the county commissioners are
required, within 90 days from receipt, to turn it over to hospitals for
medicinal purposes, or sell it to ABC stores and put the money in the
county school fund, or to destroy the liquor.
Embezzlement by Bailees.
C. S. 4268, as last amended in 1939,' made felonious the crime of
embezzlement when committed by (among others) "any person exercis-
ing a public trust or holding a public office, or any guardian, administra-
tor, executor, trustee, or any receiver, or any other ficudiary ..
Bailees were not listed. C. 31 adds "bailees" to the list.
On the surface it might seem that this is superfluous; that bailees are
covered by the phrase, "or any other fiduciary." However, embezzle-
ment statutes are strictly construed,2 and as late as 1937 the court held
that receivers could not be convicted under this statute, because at that
time they were not clearly named.8 The criticism of C. 31 lies, there-
fore, not in the fact that on the surface it seems to state the obvious, but
rather in the fact that it does not do enough. North Carolina still needs
a general "catch-all" to cover embezzlement by all persons who in any
way may be entrusted with the property or funds of others. Without
such a catch-all, it seems only a question of time before State v. White-
hurst4 will see its undesirable counterpart.
Jurisdiction of Larceny and Receiving Cases
C. 178 raises from twenty dollars to fifty dollars the dividing line
drawn by C. S. 4251 between larceny the misdemeanor and larceny the
felony; likewise, for receiving stolen goods. It amends C. S. 4251 so
that now larceny or receiving stolen goods, when either involves property
valued at fifty dollars or less (instead of twenty dollars) is a mis-
demeanor, punishable in the discretion of the court.
C. S. 4252 is similarly amended, so that now the superior court's
exclusive original jurisdiction over larceny and receiving stolen goods
is over offenses involving property valued in excess of fifty dollars
instead of twenty dollars.
'By N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 1.
'Note (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rav. 174.
' State v. Whitehurst, 212 N. C. 300, 193 S. E. 657 (1937). At the time this
case was decided, the statute did not expressly mention either "receiver" or "any
other fiduciary". Even with the addition of the latter phrase, however, whether
bailees were included was probably open to doubt.
'212 N. C. 300, 193 S. E. 657 (1937), cited supra note 3.
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Search Warrants for Gambling and Lottery Devices.
C. S. 4259 sets up a procedure for issuing and executing search war-
rants for stolen property, counterfeit money, or counterfeiter's tools.
Gambling and lottery devices were not a proper subject of such a search.
C. 53 enlarges C. S. 4259 to permit similar warrants when the suspected
property is "any and all personal property and all tickets, books, papers
and documents used in connection with and operation of lotteries or any
gaming or gambling."
Indecent Exposure.
C. 273 amends C. S. 4348 (a), the indecent exposure statute, to make
guilty of a misdemeanor any person who shall "wilfully make any inde-
cent public exposure of the private parts of his or her person in any
public place or highway. . . ." This raises a new question, namely, the
legality of undressing in a public bath-house-which presumably is not
an offense contemplated by the framers. Unsettled, however, remains
the question raised by the first part of sec. 4348 (a), whether a husband
and wife may in North Carolina lawfully disrobe before each other.
(The provision referred to makes guilty of a misdemeanor a "person
who in any place wilfully exposes his person, or private parts thereof,
in the presence of one or more persons of the opposite sex whose person,
or the private parts thereof, are similarly exposed.") It seems highly
unlikely that this question will ever be settled.
Dog Poisoning.
The dog, "man's best friend" in the story-books, has been no favorite
of the law. Because of his "base nature," a dog was not the subject of
larceny at common law,1 although for wanton injury an action would
lie.2
The dog is, however, not entirely a filius nullius. As indicated above,
wanton injury to a dog is a tort to the master. And the common law
larceny rule has been partly modified by C. S. 4263, making it a mis-
demeanor to steal a dog on which the current license tax has been paid.
C. 181 is the latest bit of progress. It outlaws promiscuous dog (or cat)
poisoning by making it a misdemeanor to put ". . . strychnine, other
poisonous compounds or ground glass on any beef or other foodstuffs
of any kind in any public square, street, lane, alley or on any lot in any
village, town or city or on any public road, open field or yard in the
country." The violator is also made liable in danger to "the person
injured thereby." Insect, worm, and rat poisoning are excepted.
1 State v. Holder, 81 N. C. 527 (1879).
2 See Mowery v. Salisbury, 82 N. C. 175, 177 (1880).
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ELECTIONS
Election laws received legislative attention only at minor points.
C. 305 raised the pay of chairman of county boards of elections from
$3.00 to $5.00 per day while employed in performing their duties.
C. 304 authorizes payment of $5.00 per day for registrars and $4.00 per
day for judges of elections while attending official meetings relating to
their duties-in primaries and general elections. C. 222 substitutes 6:30
a.m. and 6:30 p.m. for sunrise and sunset as the time for opening and
.closing polls in all primaries and elections. C. 346 enables soldiers and
sailors to vote by absentee ballot in primaries for the duration of the
Federal Selective Service Act of 1940. The former absentee ballot law
began under similar circumstances; but it is unlikely, in view of past
experiences, that this will prove an entering wedge for further exten-
sions. Finally, C. 248 provides that when the absentee voter is a member
of the armed forces, the signature of any commissioned officer "of the
voter," as witness to the execution of any certificate required to be




C. S. 1706 is amended by C. 254 to give the power of eminent do-
main to franchised motor vehicle carriers or union bus station com-
panies, organized by authority of the Utilities Commissioner, for the
purpose of constructing and operating union bus stations in cities hav-
ing a population of 60,000 or over. To the bus companies which have
taken their place in the modem transportation scheme as common car-
riers operating for the use and benefit of the public, the power of emi-
nent domain granted by this statute should come as a welcome solution
to a hitherto troublesome problem-that of obtaining suitable sites for
the location of union terminals whereby the convenience of the travelling
public may best be served. However, if the companies trouble to read
the 1940 census returns, they will find that, momentarily at least, the
extent of this legislative assistance is geographically somewhat cir-
cumscribed.
GUARDIAN AND WARD
C. S. 2151 permits the father, who is the natural guardian of his
-child, to dispose of "the custody and tuition" of any of his unmarried
minor children to a guardian appointed by the deed or will of the father,
properly executed according to the statute. Under certain circumstances
designated by the statute the mother of the child also may appoint a
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guardian to have custody of the child during its minority. The statute
provides that every such guardian shall have the same powers and rights
and be subject to the same liabilities and regulations as other guardians.
C. 26 amends this section by adding a proviso to the effect that if the
will or deed so specifies, the guardian named shall be permitted to
qualify and serve without giving bond unless the clerk having jurisdic-
tion over the guardianship shall "adjudge that the interest of such minor
or. incompetent (italics supplied) would be best served by requiring such
guardian to give bond".
C. S. 2151 provides for the appointment of the guardian "for such
time as the children may remain under twenty-one years of age, or for
any less time" and says nothing about incompetents as such; hence the
meaning of "or incompetent" in the amending proviso is not clear and
the phrase seems irrelevant in its setting. C. S. 2151 itself is not clear,
as to what kind of guardian is to be appointed. It provides that the
parent may dispose of "the custody and tuition of his infant children"
to a person appointed by the deed or will. Does the person designated
become a general guardian, i.e. a guardian of both the ward's person and
property? Or does he become a personal guardian, i.e. guardian only
of the ward's person? It seems probable that the latter was intended. If
this is so, there would seem to be very little necessity for his giving bond
unless the estate guardian of the child should entrust certain funds to
him as personal guardian to be spent in behalf of the child. To this
extent the amending proviso of C. 26 makes some sense.
That the statutes of North Carolina relating to guardianship need
to be revised and entirely re-written is painfully obvious to those who
attempt to interpret and apply them. The statutes especially do not
draw a clear line of demarcation between general, personal, and estate
guardians and the various duties and obligations that devolve upon each
type. Nor are all the present statutes relating to guardianships gathered
together in one place; many of them are scattered throughout the Con-
solidated Statutes. The Commission on the Revision of the Laws of
North Carolina Relating to Estates has redrafted the law embracing
guardianships1 and has attempted to clarify the law pertaining to this
important fiduciary relationship. So far, however, the legislature has
given but little consideration to the matter.
HOUSING
Rural Housing Law.
C. 78 amends the "Housing Authorities Law" by adding provisions
for rural housing. For many years we have been informed through var-
ISee the second (1939) Report of the Commission, Chapter IV.
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ious surveys and studies about the unsatisfactory condition of housing
in rural areas, but it is only recently that public responsibility for rural
housing has become the basis for improvement. In 1935, North Caro-
lina adopted the "Housing Authorities Law"' in order that the state
might participate in the program of slum clearance and low cost hous-
ing being promoted by the federal government under the New Deal. By
this statute, a housing authority might be set up within the area of ten
miles surrounding cities of more than fifteen thousand population,2
reduced in 1938 to five thousand.3 This legislation was primarily for
urban areas and all of the housing authorities set up under the North
Carolina act have been municipal authorities. In 1939, the United States
Housing Authority formulated plans for rural rehousing, and by March
1, 1940, housing authorities had been established in sixty-four counties
in the United States. These county authorities had requested federal
assistance in undertaking rural housing developments, and ninety per
cent of the cost will be financed by loans from the U. S. H. A. The av-
erage rent of rural houses under these projects is around five dollars a
month.
C. 78 adds to the existing Housing Authorities Act a number of sec-
tions designed to enable North Carolina counties to come under it so
that low cost housing may be extended to rural areas. Section 3 (Defi-
nitions) is amended by adding a new subsection 18, as follows:
"(18) 'Farmers of low income' shall mean persons or families who
at the time of their admission to occupancy in a dwelling of the author-
ity: (1) live under unsafe or unsanitary housing conditions; (2) derive
their principal income from operating or working upon a farm; and
(3) had an aggregate average annual net income for the three years
preceding their admission that was less than the amount that shall be
determined by the authority to be necessary, within its area of opera-
tion, to enable them, without financial assistance, to obtain decent, safe
and sanitary housing, without overcrowding."
Seven new sections are added to make the provisions of the original
act adaptable to rural areas. County housing authorities can be estab-
lished by the county commissioners upon a petition signed by twenty-five
residents of the county. Such an authority consists of five members, and
provisions as to term of office and -duties are similar to those in the
original act for municipal authorities. There is also a provision permit-
'N. C. Pub. L. 1935, c. 456; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§6243(1)'to
6243(29). For short history and description of the act, see (1935) 13 N. C. L.
REv. 378, 380.
A housing authority established under this act was held to be a public or
municipal corporation within the meaning of the North Carolina Constitution
and its property thus exempt from taxation. Wells v. Housing Authority, 213
N. C. 744, 197 S. E. 693 (1938). 2 N. C. Pub. L., c. 456, §3(2).
'N. C. Pub. L. Extra Sess. 1938, c. 2, §14.
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ting two or more contiguous counties to establish a regional housing
authority; and a recent news item indicates a possibility that such an
authority might be formed by the six counties of the new tenth con-
gressional district-Catawba, Mecklenburg, Lincoln, Burke, Avery and
Mitchell. 4
The new act imposes a population requirement of sixty thousand
before either a single county or a group of counties may establish a
housing authority. If the assembly really wanted to promote rural
housing for low-income farmers, it should have omitted any population
requirement. The greatest need for rural housing is in the smaller
counties. In Mississippi there were twenty-six county authorities on
March 1, 1940, out of sixty-four in the entire United States.5 One
reason for this undoubtedly is that the Mississippi statute defines "city"
to mean any city and "county" to mean any county,6 without population
requirements. By contrast, the North Carolina law will tend to restrict
the establishment of rural authorities to counties in which the larger
cities are located. Eighty-nine counties have less than sixty thousand
population and hence are barred from establishing authorities acting
alone. And despite the recent news item mentioned above, it seems
probable that the difficulty of obtaining concerted action from govern-
ing authorities in several counties may easily prevent the regional au-
thority alternative from being altogether a satisfactory one. Further,
the power to establish municipal authorities within ten miles of a city
or town of over five thousand population also fails to solve the problem,
as these are not likely to be established primarily for the benefit of
rural residents.
In one provision of the new act, Section 25 of the old law, specifying
when housing bonds are legal investments and legal security for public
deposits, is rewritten. The original section required that housing bonds
be secured by a first pledge of the revenues of the housing authority or
a first mortgage on its property not exceeding two thirds of the value.
This is omitted and the only security now required is "a pledge of
annual contributions to be paid by the United States Government or any.
agency thereof." All such bonds are declared legal investments for the
state and all public officers, municipal corporations, public bodies, banks,
building and loan associations, insurance companies, executors, admin-
istrators, guardians, trustees and fiduciaries; and they are likewise de-
clared to be authorized security for all public deposits. However,
investors of other people's funds should beware, for a proviso is added
'Greensboro Daily News, April 6, 1941, under date line of "Newton, April 5."
' Satterfield, Mississippi Leads South in Rural Housing (1940) 29 NAT. MuNic.
REv. 311.
' MIss. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1938) §1574; Laws of Miss. 1938, c. 338.
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that nothing in the act "shall be construed as relieving any person, firm
or corporation from any duty of exercising reasonable care in selecting
securities."
Other Housing Laws.
C. 62 is a general validating act as to any housing authorities estab-
lished in North Carolina and as to all of their acts, including all con-
tracts, bonds, notes, obligatfons and undertakings "notwithstanding any
want of statutory authority or any defect or irregularity therein." Since
such validating acts are not designed to impair but rather to strengthen
the obligation of existing contracts, they would appear to be consti-
tutional.
C. 63 recognizes the acute shortage of safe and sanitary dwellings
available to workers in national defense activities and attempts to utilize
the existing Housing Authorities Law to meet this emergency. Section
2 provides: "Any housing authority may undertake the development and
administration of projects to assure the availability of safe and sanitary
dwellings for persons engaged in National Defense activities whom the
housing authority determines would not otherwise be able to secure
safe and sanitary dwellings within the vicinity thereof, but no housing
authority shall initiate the development of any such project pursuant
to this Act after December 31, 1943."
The test thus provided for selection of tenants as "persons engaged
in National Defense activities .. .not otherwise . ..able to secure
safe and sanitary dwellings within the vicinity thereof," should be com-
pared with the following definition in Section 8. "'Persons engaged in
National Defense activities', as used in this Act, shall include: Enlisted
men in the military and naval services of the United States and em-
ployees of the War and Navy Departments assigned to duty at military
or naval reservations, posts or bases; and workers engaged or to be
engaged in industries connected with and essential to the National De-
fense Program; and shall include the families of the aforesaid persons
who are living with them."
It thus appears that housing authorities may provide low cost lious-
ing for persons in defense activities not because they lack actual income,
but because of the emergency housing shortage. That this is the real
intention of the new law is made more certain by: (a) the provision of
Section 3 authorizing outright sale to the government by an authority,
for National Defense housing, of a project completed for tenants of
low income but not yet occupied by them; and (b) the provision of
.Section 2 that restrictions on selection of tenants in the original law (one
of which restricts tenants to those whose annual income does not exceed
five times the annual rent) shall not apply to these defense housing
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projects. Trouble may eventually be caused by the provision of Section
2 that after the National Defense period is passed, the projects owned
by the authorities shall be administered in accordance with the original
act, as no machinery is provided for the readjustment this may make
necessary. However, it seems probable that several legislatures will
have an opportunity to mend any holes in this before any occasion for
putting it into effect arises.
It might have been wiser for the general assembly to pass some emer-
gency legislation to put a stop to profiteering in the renting of rooms
and houses to persons engaged in defense activities, but the present
legislation is desirable to the extent that it may provide safe and sani-
tary dwellings for such persons who cannot otherwise secure decent
living quarters during this emergency. How far it will succeed in ac-
complishing this desirable purpose is a practical question depending to
a large extent on the degree of cooperation between existing housing
authorities and the federal government. The act contemplates the clos-
est cooperation, and housing authorities may act as agents for the fed-
eral government in developing or administering housing projects for
persons engaged in National Defense activities.
C. 140 is an amendment of the 1939 statute7 which authorized mu-
nicipalities having more than 25,000 population to repair, close or de-
molish dwellings which are unfit for human habitation. This is the
authorization for slum clearance -which goes hand in hand with the
Housing Authorities Law. The present amendment reduces the popu-
lation requirement to 5,000, thus conforming it to that in the present
Housing Authorities Law.
INDIGENT PERSONS
C. S. 1339 permits the commissioners of a county to sell or rent the
property ("any estate") of an indigent person in order to reimburse or
indemnify the county for any sums spent by the county for the main-
tenance and support of such indigent person. The procedure for the
disposition of such property is declared to be that fixed by C. S. 2291
and 2292, relating to the sales of estates of insane persons and other
incompetents. By those sections the clerk of court, upon the report of
the guardian of the incompetent person, issues an order for the sale,
mortgage or lease of the property. C. 24 amends C. S. 1339 by adding
thereto a provision that when an indigent person has no guardian or the
guardian refuses or neglects to act, then the county maintaining or sup-
porting such person may bring, in its own name, a special proceeding
'N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 287; N. C. COD AxN. (Michie, 1939) §§2776(1) to(10). See discussion of this slum clearance statute in (1939) 17 N. C. L. REV.
367.
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against the person owning the property to sell, mortgage, or rent his
personal property or real estate to pay for his maintenance and support.
Other persons "having an interest in the property sought to be sold"
may be made parties.
The new law, in allowing the county to proceed to reimburse itself
where there is, no guardian or is one who refuses to act, does fill a gap
that existed under the old law and hence serves a useful purpose. How-
ever, it gives rise, in effect, to two variant procedures, both of which
have the same objective. A better solution of the problem would seem
to lie in the drafting and passage of a new statute which would provide
for a single simple procedure before the clerk by the guardian or by the
county, as the exigencies of the case require. This action would not
necessarily be a special proceeding; such a proceeding tends to be ex-
pensive to the estate concerned.
While C. 24 provides that the county may bring an action to sell,
mortgage or rent the personal property or real estate of the indigent
person, the original Section 1339 provides only that the county commis-
sioners upon order of the clerk may sell or rent the "estate" of such
person. These inconsistencies, resulting from piece-meal legislative
patching, further emphasize the need for a new well-integrated statute
to clarify the matter.
INSANE PERSONS AND INCOMPETENTS
Venue, Petition for Restoration to Sanity.
C. S. 2287 provides that the petition for the restoration to sanity
or sobriety of an incompetent, so that he may be allowed to manage his
property, may be filed before the clerk of the superior court of the
county of the incompetent's residence. C. 145 amends this section by
adding "or before the clerk of the Superior Court of the county wherein
such person is confined or held". It provides, however, that if the in-
competent has a guardian, the hearing must be held in the county where
the guardianship is pending and the guardian must be made a party.
The amendment seems to mean that, unless a guardian has been ap-
pointed, the petition may be initiated in the county where he is confined
and the hearing may also be held in-that county. This jurisdictional
alternative seems to have been provided as a matter of convenience to
the petitioning incompetent, since under C. S. 2287 he himself may file
the petition. By allowing the hearing to be held where petitioner is
confined instead of in the county of his residence he does not have to
be removed with the possibility of being returned to the place of his
confinement if his competency is found not to have been restored.
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Incarceration of Dangerously Insane.
C. S. 6190 and 6191 provide that, if a respectable citizen makes an
affidavit to the effect that he believes a certain person is insane and a
fit subject for admission to an asylum, unless the person who has the
custody of such insane person will agree to bring him before the clerk
without a warrant the clerk shall issue an order to the sheriff to bring
the insane person before the clerk for a hearing. By C. 179 a new sec-
tion, 6191 (a), has been added to the law to the effect that if the affi-
davit required to be filed by C. S. 6190 states that the insane person's
condition is such as to endanger either himself or others, or if the sheriff
or other person serving the warrant believes that the insane person is
dangerous to himself or others, the clerk may order the person allegedly
insane to be incarcerated in the county jail until he be judicially declared
insane or sane, as the case may be. Here we find statutory sanction for
what may have been a legally questionable practice before the statute
was passed.
INSURANCE
Hospital Insurance-Regulation of Non-Profit Hospital
Service Corporations.
One form of insurance business which has grown extensively in this
and other states within the last few years is that in which the insurer
contracts to secure hospital service for its policy-holders as needed.'
New York has had a statute regulating this type of business since 1934.2
About half the states had some form of enactment on the subject by last
year. C. 338 establishes a regulatory code in this field for North
Carolina.
The new law, which applies only to the non-profit corporations
engaged in the business, puts them under the supervision of the Com-
missioners of Insurance without subjecting them generally to. the in-
surance laws of the state, only those laws specifically designating such
corporations being deemed applicable to them. Their certificates of in-
corporation, contracts with policy-holders and rates are all subject to
'A question may be raised as to whether such corporations are engaged in an
insurance business, or whether they are simply selling services. They have not
heretofore been regarded as insurance corporations subject to supervision by the
Insurance Commissioner in this state. An organization somewhat similar to these
was held not to be engaged in the insurance business in Hall D'Ath v. British Prov-
ident Association for Hospital and Additional Service, 48 Times Law Reports
240 (Ch. 1932) ; in that case the court relied largely on the charitable aspects of
the enterprise. The business is one which needs responsible supervision in the
interests of solvency and reasonable protection, and it seems wise to have it placed
under the regulation of the state insurance authority.
'N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 595, §1; the present N. Y. statute is N. Y. INs. LAw
§§250-259.
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the Commissioner's approval. Certain rules are laid down as to the
terms of the policy-holders' or subscribers' contracts, such as that no
contract shall be issued for a term longer than twelve months, or for a
period beginning more than one year after the date of the contract; but
"Any such contract may provide that it shall be automatically renewed
for a similar period unless there shall have been one month's prior
written notice of termination by either the subscriber or the corpora-
tion." The quoted statement, which is taken from the New York Act,
leaves room for uncertainty as to whether only one such renewal period
may be provided for, or whether the contract may stipulate for unlim-
ited renewals in absence of notice.
Some of the commoner devices to protect the policy-holder are in-
cluded, such as requiring exceptions to be as plainly displayed in the
printed contract as the benefits. But, where the New York law prohibits
avoidance of the contract for misrepresentation in the application unless
a copy of the application is attached to the contract,4 there is no such
provision here; an express statement is included that the application
need not be attached to the certificate given to the subscriber stating the
terms of the contract.
Solvency of the corporation is given some protection by requiring
proper reserves for administrative liabilities, and reserves deemed
adequate by the Commissioner of Insurance for "unpaid hospital bills,
and unearned membership dues", and by the further provision that a
"special contingent surplus or reserve" be built up out of gross income
at fixed rates until it equals three times the organization's average
monthly expenditures for hospital claims and administrative and selling
expenses. If the commissioner finds "special conditions" warrant an
increase or decrease in the schedule of reserves required, he may make
such modification, according to the language of the act. No limitation
upon the commissioner's discretion in this regard, nor any standard
under which it is to be exercised, is set up. The attempt, then, is to
authorize administrative departure from a legislative requirement, with-
out specifying in any way the circumstances justifying such departure,
and without prescribing any new standards which are to control after
the departure is made; and this provision is apparently unconstitutional
for that reason.5 Annual reports to the commissioner, and authority
in him to examine into the affairs of the corporation at any time, are
provided for. Selling and administration costs and salaries of officers
are made "subject to inspection by the commissioner"; but there is no
'N. Y. INS. LAW §253-1.
'N. Y. INs. LAW §253-3 (e).
McKenney v. Farnsworth, 121 Me. 450, 118 Ad. 237 (1922); People v. Klinck
Co., 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. E. 278, Ann. Cas. 1916 D 1051 (1915); ROrrSCHAEFFER,
CONSTITUTiONAL LAW (1939) 78.
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limit fixed for such expenses,6 nor is any express power given the com-
missioner to take any remedial steps if excessive amounts are being
thus expended, unless the abuse is so extreme as to constitute fraud or
operation of the organization for profit, either of which is cause for
dissolution under the act.
The power of the commissioner to deal with a threatened insolvency
is set out in this language: "If, at any time, a corporation organized
under the provisions of this Act is financially unable to comply with the
provisions of this Act or to comply with any of the provisions of any
of the hospital contracts or subscribers' contracts issued by said cor-
poration in pursuance of this Act, the Commissioner of Insurance shall
have the right without Court action, to transfer all its assets, liabilities,
and obligations, to any other corporation, whether organized under the
provisions of this Act, or not, under such contract of reinsurance with
such transferee corporation, that he deems to the best interest of the
corporation, its members and creditors, whose assets, obligations and
liabilities are transferred. This action on the part of the Insurance
Commissioner is without prejudice to the rights of the corporations
whose assets, liabilities and obligations are so transferred, to institute
other and proper. legal remedies, and to question the action so taken by
the Insurance Commissioner as herein provided. Provided, however,
that the action taken by the Insurance Commissioner herein shall not
be effected [sic] pending a final determination by the Courts with ref-
erence thereto." The opening sentence suggests an intent that the
transfer by the commissioner should be effective at once, without pro-
viding for any hearing, judicial or otherwise, or for notice or finding
of any sort; but the final clause apparently contradicts all this and
makes the whole transaction await a final determination by the courts.
All hospital-service organizations regulated under the act are de-
clared to be charitable corporations and entitled to the same tax-
exemptions now or hereafter granted to such corporations, but are
required to pay an annual franchise or privilege tax of one-third of one
per cent of their collections from membership dues, in place of all other
local and state taxes.7
Corporations organized outside this state are expressly forbidden
to operate as hospital service corporations within the state. The power
of a state to exclude foreign corporations, not engaged in interstate com-
merce nor operating under federal law, is frequently declared as a basis
The New York statute formerly made selling expenses "subject to the ap-
proval" of the state insurance officer; N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 595, §1; the provision
now forbids use of over 30% of gross income for selling and administration ex-
penses, except in the first two years of the corporate existence; N. Y. Ins. Law
§255.
'See the discussion of this under "Local Property Taxes-Exemptions," at
p. 520, infra.
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for enforcing a statute imposing severe conditions upon them; and a
direct exclusion statute has also been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court,8 so the similar provision here is probably valid.
Insurable Interest Originating in Contract Between Partners or
Stockholders for Sale of Interest in Business to Survivor.
The field of insurable interest in the life of a business associate is
given a reasonable extension in C. 201. The act declares that where
two persons are co-partners, or stockholders in the same corporation, a
contract between them that on the death of one, his stock or interest
shall be purchased by the survivor, gives the contracting purchaser an
insurable interest in the other's life. There is language which might be
taken to mean that the statute would not be applicable unless the arrange-
ment was completely mutual, that is, unless the contract obligated which-
ever of the two parties survived to buy out the other. But where the
agreement is merely a promise by one to purchase if the other prede-
ceases him, the common sense of the situation does not indicate any
less reason for recognizing the contracting purchaser's insurable interest
in the other's life, and the wording of the statute does not clearly exclude
such an application.
In the absence of a statute it would seem that every partner has an
insurable interest in his co-partner's life, and this is said to be the
general rule." But in this state it has been said that a partner has an
insurable interest in his co-partner's life only under special conditions,
as where the latter is indebted to the former, for capital advanced or
otherwise, or if the latter was to furnish some special skill or ability in
advancement of the enterprise. 2 Mere ownership of stock in the same
corporation probably does not, in absence of statute, create an insurable
interest between the two stockholders.3  Such an interest may be based
on contractual relationship, however ;4 and the existence of a contract,
by which one comes under an immediately enforcible obligation on the
death of another, such as an obligation to purchase stock or a partnership
interest, might well be said to create a legitimate insurable interest by
the ordinary common law rules.
' National Council of the Junior Order v. State Council of Virginia, 203 U. S.
151, 162, 27 Sup. Ct. 46, 48, 51 L. ed. 132, 137 (1906).
"VANCE, INstURAxcE (1930) 163; 2 APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW ANID PRACTICE(1941) 254.
'Powell v. Dewey, 123 N. C. 103, 31 S. E. 381 (1898).
'In Tate v. Commercial Bldg. Ass'n, 97 Va. 74, 33 S. E. 382, 45 L. R. A. 243
(1899), it was held that a corporation had no insurable interest in the life of its
stockholder.
"VANCE, INSURANCE (1930) 163. By dictum the court in Trinity College v.
Travelers Insurance Co., 113 N. C. 244, 18 S. E. 175, 22 L. R. A. 291 (1893),
recognized an insurable interest, where the continuance of the insured life would,
because of some contractual relation, result in advantage to the named beneficiary.
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There is one limitation which probably should be imposed to prevent
dangerous wagering agreements. The amount of the insurance should
not be allowed to be disproportionate to the value of the commercial
interest involved, which, in the situation covered in the statute, probably
means it should not be disproportionate to the price agreed upon for
the sale of the interest. Such a limitation is usually applied to creditor's
life insurance, the only type based on contractual transactions which is
at all common.5 This statute simply declares the existence of an in-
surable interest in the situation described, without suggestion as to any
limit on the extent of the interest, but possibly the court would not feel
that the statute required it to recognize an unlimited insurable interest.
Extending Powers of Fraternal Benefit Societies.
The distinction between fraternal benefit societies and "old-line" life
insurance companies has been reduced considerably by legislative whit-
tling.' This year the legislature, in C. 74, continued this movement,
as to all fraternal benefit societies authorized to do business in the state
which maintain, on the certificates hereafter issued, the reserves required
by one of three designated tables of mortality, with an interest assump-
tion of 354% or less annually. Heretofore fraternal insurance has been
issuable only after a medical examination, and only on the lives of mem-
bers who had to be at least sixteen years old,2 while an ordinary life
insurance company could issue policies up to $5,000 without medical
examination, and apparently without any minimum age limit.3 The
new statute provides that fraternals meeting its reserve requirements
may issue policies for $5,000 or less without medical examination, on
the lives of members or their children under sixteen years of age. A
more important change in policy toward fraternals seemsto have been
effected by one of the general clauses in the statute, possibly without
any realization by the legislature of what it was doing. The class of
beneficiaries who can take under a fraternal policy has been more or
less narrowly limited by statute, in this as in most other states.4 In
1937 the class of permissible beneficiaries was extended to include, in
addition to relatives and dependents, the insured's estate or a trustee.!
The new statute provides that fraternal organizations authorized to
'VANCE, INSURANCE (1930) 57. For a case where a similar limitation was used
to defeat recovery on a policy taken out on a "partner's" life in an amount greatly
in excess of the "partner's" value to the enterprise, see Sun Life Assurance Co. v.
Allen, 270 Mich. 272, 259 N. W. 281 (1935).
See N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6508, the last paragraph of which was
added by N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 178, discussed in 15 N. C. L. REV. 357.I N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6506.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6460.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6508.
N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 178; see note 1, supra.
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operate in the state and meeting the reserve requirements mentioned,
may issue certificates "payable to such beneficiaries as may be authorized
by the society". The phrase last quoted certainly would mean that no
beneficiary could be named except such as were permitted by the law
of the state of incorporation of the society, for the society could not
"authorize" a contract beyond the limits permissible in its charter or
domiciliary law. This, however, seems to be the only remaining stat-
utory limitation on the society's discretion in the matter. There may
be some question as to whether the act would allow, on a certificate
heretofore issued, a change to a beneficiary heretofore forbidden. It has
been held in this state that a statute which narrows the class of ben-
eficiaries is effective to bar a change to a beneficiary who was within
the permissible group when the certificate was issued, but not within
the permissible group named in the statute.6 The argument that the
application of such a statute to earlier issued certificates would inter-
fere with vested rights or impair the obligation of a contract, is not
available here, since the present statute extends rather than narrows
the group of permissible beneficiaries. Probably this law would be ap-
plied to prior contracts with less hesitation than was the earlier one,
unless there is language in the statute itself which points to another
conclusion. The statute is applicable only if certain reserves are main-
tained "on all certificates hereafter issued", and this does offer some
ground for argument that the act was not intended to have any applica-
tion to certificates issued before it was passed. Whether the inference
from this language is strong enough to overcome the probable inclination
of the courts to allow a broad effect to be given to the statute is doubtful.
Societies limiting their membership to employees in a hazardous in-
dustry, and the laws applicable to such societies, are expressly excluded
from the effects of the act.
INTOXICATING LIQUOR
Fortified Wines.
C. 339, roughly speaking, prohibits after July 1, sale of wines con-
taining more than 14% alcohol by volume anywhere except in ABC
stores and except that "hotels, grade A restaurants, drug stores and
grocery stores" in wet counties may sell "sweet wines" having an alco-
holic content of from 14% to 20%. Since, however, the law was
passed on a draftsman's holiday, and since such a brief statement as-
sumes many points technically at issue on the wording of the statute,
some of the questions raised by the law should be discussed.
'Andrews v. Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Masons, 189 N. C 697, 128
S. E. 4 (1925).
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(1) Effective date. The act contains two effective dates, an incon-
sistency reportedly due to a clerical error in the senate. Section 7 says
it takes effect July 1, 1941, as applied to "sale of fortified wines"; whole-
salers have 15 days to deplete stocks in dry counties. Section 8, how-
ever, says the act takes effect May 1, as also does Section 4. This incon-
sistency was ultimately resolved by Governor Broughton and others
concerned in favor of July 1.
(2) What are "fortified wines" and where may they be sold? Sec-
tion B avows a purpose to prevent sale of "fortified wines" anywhere
save in ABC stores; Section 2 says it is unlawful for any one except
ABC stores to sell "fortified wines as defined herein"; and Section 1
defines "fortified wines" as meaning "any wine or alcoholic beverage
made by fermentation of grapes, fruit and berries and fortified by the
addition of brandy or alcohol or having an alcoholic content of more than
fourteen per cent of absolute alcohol, reckoned by volume." Section
4(b) says the Turlington Act, as amended,- applies to fortified wines
"except as otherwise provided by law."
On this statement, it would seem that only ABC stores could sell
wines above 14% alcohol by volume, since they come within the defini-
tion of "fortified wines" in Section 1. However, Section 6 allows sale,
in wet counties, of so-called "sweet wines" in hotels, grade A restau-
rants, drug stores and grocery stores, under ABC regulations. These
"sweet wines" are defined in Section 6 as fermented wines "to which
nothing but pure brandy has been added" and having not less than 14%
nor over 20% alcohol by volume. Clearly these "sweet wines" come
within the "fortified wines" definition of Section 1, so that a question at
once arises whether, because of Sections 1 and 4(h), the Turlington Act
nullifies Section 6. Such is hardly probable, but if so, the summary in
the first paragraph, above; will have to be modified.
These two conflicting definitions seem to be simply a dodge to pre-
tend to outlaw "fortified wines" except when sold through ABC stores
while actually allowing their sale, in wet counties, under another name.
This becomes obvious when we realize that brandy and not the much
more expensive grain alcohol is the usual fortifying ingredient!
(3) What are "grocery stores" and "grade A restaurants" for pur-
poses of the act? That both these definitions may give trouble seems
apparent.
(4) Can "fortified wines" be bottled in the state? It seems doubtful
since the Turlington Act applies generally to "fortified wines" and since
bottling of "sweet wines" is not specifically authorized in C. 339.
(5) Are mail orders of fortified wines from ABC stores to dry
counties authorized? Section 2 prohibits such purchases "in quantities
' N. C. CODE AN. (Michie, 1939) §§3411(a)-3411(cc).
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not in excess of one gallon at any one time." (Italics added.) It further
provides that "upon the request of any chief of police or sheriff any
Alcoholic Beverage Control Agent shall furnish the names of any per-
sons ordering such wines, and the date and amount of such orders."
From these confusing provisions conflicting inferences may be drawn.
However, since the law seems clearly to say that quantities of less than
one gallon shall not be bought by mail or express order, it seems doubt-
ful, to say the least, that our court would hold that, contrary to the usual
attempts to permit limited purchases, quantities of more than one gallon
may be so bought.
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
Bonds.
C. 298 of the Public-Local Laws of 1941 requires that each justice
of the peace in the counties of Beaufort, Bertie, Buncombe, Cabarrus,
Durham, Mecklenburg, New Hanover and Swain post a "good and
sufficient" $1,000 bond for "the, faithful performance of the duties of
the office" and for the payment of "all moneys received by him to the
proper officer, person, firm or corporation entitled to receive same."
Each person hereafter appointed' or elected as a justice of the peace in
these eight counties is to give such a bond as a part of his qualification
for office. Otherwise, he is forbidden to serve. Those now in office were
to deliver the bond prior to April 12, 1941, but the appropriate board
of county commissioners was authorized to pay the premium on the
surety bonds until the expiration of the respective terms of office of the
justices of the peace now serving. Presumably, newly appointed or
elected justices who fail to give bond are to be disqualified. But the act
does not quite say that. There are no sanctions to compel those now in
office to put up the bonds. The boards of county commissioners are only
authorized to pay the premiums thereon. And the act is ambiguous as to
whether surety bonds are required or as to whether personal bonds will
suffice.
Recently compiled figures2 show that in the state as a whole, there
are 1,855 qualified justices of the peace, that of these 907 tried no
criminal case in 1940, 120 tried one each, 610 tried a few each and that
218, or 12% of the justices, did 783 of the criminal work. If these
data reliably indicate the total situation, proportionately true in the
eight counties here concerned, the $1,000 bonds, if furnished, probably
'The 1941 General Assembly, by C. 318 of the Public Laws, ratified three days
after C. 298 of the Public-Local Laws, appointed 2 justices in Beaufort, 28 in Bertie,
none in Buncombe, 3 in Cabarrus, 2 in Durham, 3 in Mecklenburg, 1 in New Han-
over, and none in Swain. See infra, Legislative Appointments.
'Winslow, Book Review (1941), 19 N. C. L. Rav. 272, 273, summarizing a
study by W. S. Swain.
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will provide more than adequate protection against default on the part
of 88% of the justices. But for the others, compared with the aggregate
volume of their receipts, the coverage is too low.
Nevertheless, the measure is a step in the right direction. Eleven
provisions3 for criminal prosecution have failed. Perhaps, if this ex-
periment with bonds succeeds, we may look forward to provisions for
audits.
Legislative Appointments.
Although the Bar Association's bill, H. B. 287, to restrict the selec-
tion of justices of the peace to local popular election and to eliminate
legislative and gubernatorial appointments again failed of enactment, this
general assembly in C. 318, appointed only 502, as compared with 765
in 1939 and 1,282 in 1937. Moreover, none was appointed in 38 counties,
as compared with none in 23 counties in 1939 and none in 6 in 1937.
Twenty-nine counties were given only 1 to 3 new justices, as compared
with 21 in 1939 and 23 in 1937. The average per county, where appoint-
ments were made, was 8, as compared with. 10 in 1939 and 14 in 1937.
Nine counties were given more than 20 appointments, as compared with
9 in 1939 and 27 in 1937. And the highest number for any one county
was 36, as compared with 50 in 1939 and 59 in 1937. Apparently, the
Bar Association's campaign has had some effect.
LABOR LAW'
"Labor legislation now is just as it was two years ago.2 No changes
were made in the law as enacted in 1939. While no backward steps were
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§1315, 1323, 1326, 1327, 1329, 4384, 4385,
4386, 4398, 4399, 4631.
'The text which follows this caption is quoted from the March, 1941, issue of
NORTn CAROLINA LABOR AND INDUSTRY (Vol. VIII, No. 3, p. 2), published by the
North Carolina Department of Labor, Raleigh, N. C.
The following footnotes are added by the editors of the RaviEw to explain the
quoted text and provide needed citations and references.
' There were, of course, some new laws which affect labor directly, such as the
more or less routine amendments to the Unemployment Compensation Act, and
there were also laws affecting specific groups of employees such as those relating
to state employees. However, exclusive of the later-mentioned conciliation law,
probably the closest thing to "labor legislation", in the sense in which the editorial
writer was using that phrase, is C. 255, which amends the trademark law, N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§3971, 3973, and 3980. The law, as amended, permits
the registration of union labels and provides for their legal protection. Section
3980 provides the usual remedies of injunction against and damages for unlawful
use, manufacture, sale, disposal or display of articles protected by the trademark
and applies to existing articles. The amendment to this section provides that "no
restraining order or injunction granted to any association or union of workingmen
to prevent violation of this article shall have the effect of impounding or pre-
venting the free flow into the channels of commerce of any goods, -wires, merchan-
dise or products already manufactured or in process of manufacture . . . unless
the owner or manufacturer ... has permitted the affixing of such label, trademark
or design with the actual knowledge that it was being used or affixed in violation
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taken, as was proposed in some of the bills introduced,' no progress was
made in bringing the State's labor laws up to a point for favorable
comparison with those of the more progressive states, or in keeping
with the progressive views now held in the nation.
"Citizens interested in labor legislation were not surprised, nor were
they greatly disappointed, that the 1939 General Assembly did not enact
legislation applying to intrastate activities the same regulations which
the so-called 'Wage and Hour' laws extend to interstate operations.
These new national laws had just been enacted and were being attacked
as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of the United States had not,
at that time, held them constitutional. When the 1941 session met,
however, all doubts had been removed and the Fair Labor Standards
Act was the law of the land.4
of the provisions of this article." Such a discrimination in favor of violators of
union labels and trademarks would not seem to be justified. Under it, injunctions
against unlawful use of union labels and trademarks will practically apply only
to goods to be manufactured in the future.
' The editorial writer here probably had reference to several bills which sought
unsuccessfully to add further exceptions to the state maximum hour law (N. C.
Pub. L. 1937, c. 409). S. B. 329 would have increased the work day to 12 hours
and the work week to 60 hours in mercantile establishments, and S. B. 316 would
have excepted cafes and restaurants from the 1937 law completely.
Whether the editorial writer had it in mind or not, organized labor also
definitely regarded H. B. 204 as an anti-labor bill. This bill, known as the
"Sabotage Prevention Act," was one of the model acts drafted by a Federal-State
Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense. For an explana-
tion and defense of the act by the man who drafted it, see Warner, The Model
Sabotage Prevention Act (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 602. For adverse criticism see
Pressman, Leider and Cammer, Sabotage and National Defense (1941) 54 HAnv.
L. REv. 632.
In North Carolina the bill passed the house in substitute form but was reported
unfavorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee No. 1. The bill was drafted to
punish sabotage, including defective workmanship, interfering with National De-
fense. Severe punishment was imposed upon conviction of any person who "in-
tentionally destroys, impairs, injures, interferes with or tampers with real or
personal property with reasonable grounds to believe that such act will hinder,
delay or interefere with the preparation of the United States or of any of the
states for defense or for war." (Sections 2 and 3.)
In the present world crisis, there can be no great objection to the punishment
of "intentional" sabotage as defined above. It should be pointed out that most
states have criminal trespass statutes which are adequate to protect both real and
personal property against sabotage. See N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§4301,
4317 and 4331. In addition, federal authorities can step in to prevent sabotage in
the national defense program.
Othen sections of the bill may be regarded by labor as more objectionable.
Section 7 authorizes the posting of premises, and Section 8 provides that company
guards and watchmen may detain and investigate all persons coming upon such
posted premises. Section 9 authorizes the closing of streets adjacent to national
defense activities, which as we know, may include nearly every kind of manufac-
turing, transportation and public utility enterprise. The use of such "closed"
streets is prohibited to all persons who do not have a written permit. From
labor's viewpoint, this would prevent even peaceful picketing, a right now clearly
recognized by statute and judicial decision. It is easy to tak away valuable civil
rights in time of crisis like the present, and labor is justified in being on guard
to preserve hard-earned gains against subversive legislation.
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., - U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. ed.
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"Governor 1-oey's Fair Labor Standards Committee, authorized by
the 1939 session, did not fully agree on its recommendations. A minority
report made recommendations which would place North Carolina intra-
state operations under wage and hour regulations somewhat similar to
Federal regulations of interstate activities. 5 While it seemed that the
time was ripe for such labor enactments for this State, since the Federal
laws had been operative for more than two years, few labor leaders felt
that the proposals would become the law.
"There was hope, however, that the majority report, which recom-
mended continuation of the present labor laws, but removed from them
many exemptions and exceptions which in large measure nullified the
law's intent, would be enacted at the 1941' session. Encouragement was
given to this hope when Governor Broughton, in a speech in New Bern,
expressed himself in favor of adoption of laws embodying the proposals
in this majority report.
"These proposals,0 however, were allowed to die and our laws re-
main the same. Even the act to provide for conciliation of any labor
-disputes that might arise in the State is ineffective,7 because no appro-
priation was made to put it into operation.
"Apathy, lack of realization of the importance of this legislation to
the working people of the State, was doubtless responsible for the fail-
ure. Even opposition, which might have brought out the value of the
proposed legislation was not sufficient to provoke a fight. Traditionally,
North Carolinians are slow to take important steps, but her industrial
Adv. Ops. 395 (1941), holding the federal Wage and Hour Act constitutional and
overruling the famous child labor case, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38
Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (1918).
S. B. 121 incorporated the proposals of the minority report with requirements
of a minimum wage of 25c per hour and maximum hours of' 10 per day and 48
per week for men and 9 per day and 48 per week for women. It was reported
unfavorably by the Senate Committee on Manufacturing, Labor and Commerce.
S. B. 78 would have gone further and conformed the state to the federal law, pro.
viding for minimum wages to begin at 25c and go to 40c per hour and for max.
imum hours to begin at 44 and go to 40 per week with the daily maximum remain.
ing at 8 hours. This bill was postponed indefinitely in the Senate.
I S. $3. 127 and H. B. 304 were identical bills introduced the same day and
likewise reported unfavorably on the same, though a later, day. They incorporated
the majority report and had the support of the Governor. They retained the major
provisions of the 1937 maximum hour law (N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 409), which
fixed a maximum work week of 48 hours for women and 55 hours for men.
IC. 362. The act is also defective in not setting up adequate machinery for
the effective concilistion of labor disputes. The conciliator is to use his best
efforts, by mediation, to bring about a settlement. If he fails, that ends the matter
as far as the statute is concerned. Participation of the parties is entirely voluntary,
and a single conciliator is at a disadvantage. A section of' the act providing for
a mediation board after the conciliator failed was stricken out before the bill
became law. This would appear to be a mistake in view of the recent successes
of the National Mediation Board as compared with the efforts of the conciliators
of the U. S. Department of Labor.
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In the case of Rhodes, Inc. v. City of Raleigh,' the North Carolina
Supreme Court held the Raleigh parking meter ordinance unconstitu-
tional. The court held that there was no statute which conferred upon
the city the necessary authority to enact ordinances imposing a parking
fee or charge for a parking space; that there was no substantial relation
between the meter charge and the prevention of parking for an unreason-
able length of time; that the meter charge was not a proper inspection
fee; that the power to regulate parking did not authorize the imposition
of a tax upon the privilege sought to be regulated; and that the ordi-
nance violated a statute restricting municipal license fees on operating
motor vehicles to $1.00.
C. 153 is an enabling act authorizing cities of over 20,000 population
to enact parking meter ordinances. Section 2 specifically provides that
nothing contained in existing statutes relative to the license fee of $1.002
shall be construed as affecting parking meters. This eliminates the last-
mentioned of the supreme court's objections. Section 1 provides ex-
press legislative authority for the enactment of parking meter ordinances,
so that all of the other objections are provided for except the conclusion
of the court that there is no substantial relation between the meter charge
and the prevention of parking for an unreasonable length of time.
Whether the court will change its viewpoint and agree with the legis-
lative declaration that "congestion of vehicular traffic is such that public
convenience and safety demand such regulation," must await the first
case under the new statute. It might be pointed out that a decided
majority of the -parking meter decisions have upheld the meter fee as a
reasonable means of regulating parking.3 C. 153 constitutes sufficient
legislative authority upon which the supreme court may uphold parking
meter ordinances.
Rural Fire Protection.
C. 188 extends the area within which cities are autnorized to furnish
fire protection from two to twelve miles beyond the city limits, the terms
1217 N. C. 627, 9 S. E. (2d) 389 (1940). See Note, Constitutional Law-Va-
lidity of Parking Meter Ordinances (1940) 19 N. C. L. REv. 70, containing cita-
tions to all parking meter decisions.
IN. C. CoDE ANt. (Michie, 1939) §2621(247). The new statute refers to Pub.
Laws 1921, c. 2, §29, which has been superseded by the code section just cited,
See Note (1940) 19 N. C. L. Rzv. 70, 71, n. 6, for citation of cases upholding
parking meter ordinances. The new statute limits the permissible charge in North
Carolina to 5c per hour.
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to be fixed within the discretion of the governing body. C. 116,among
other things, authorizes sanitary districts adjoining and contiguous to
cities with a population of 50,000 or more, to establish fire departments
or to contract with cities and counties to furnish fire protection. These
laws are entering wedges for further extensions of rural fire protection.
Possibly trouble may eventually arise by virtue of the fact that C. 188
provides that the city governing body is "authorized to agree to furnish
and to furnish protection against fire," without specifying that such
service, though rendered solely on a contract basis, is still a govern-
mental function in the exercise of which the city is immune from suit
on tort claims. By contrast, C. 116 expressly provides that the sanitary
district and any unit it contracts with shall "enjoy all privileges and
immunities ... now granted to other governmental units in exercising
the governmental functions of ... fire protection." Further, if the city
fails to furnish "protection" after entering into an agreement, will the
property owners have an enforceable claim? A resident of the city would
not have a claim, but his fire protection rights are not based on contract.
Very probably the city would not be held liable either to a person
hit by a fire truck going to a rural fire or to a property owner who loses
his home because the truck fails to answer his call. However, the city
can certainly protect itself against the latter type of liability, at least, by
proper provisions in the contract.
PARTNERSHIP
Uniform Partnership Act.
This act (C. 374) accomplishes more by filling gaps and codifying
existing law than it does by way of change. Its definition of partner-
ship' is somewhat simpler than those found in the North Carolina cases, 2
but when taken together with the rules for determining the existence
of a partnership,3 it seems to lead to about the same results as those
now being reached by the court. Some of the older pronouncements'
and decisions, however, are discredited by this legislation, if they have
not already been by recent cases. Sharing the net returns or profits as
a conclusive proof of partnership and so of an obligation to share the
losses4 is a rule which has gone by the board. Instead we now have only a
prima facie case of partnership where such sharing is shown and even
that inference is absent when the profits are received in payment of
1§6 (1).
'Day v. Stevens, 88 N. C. 83, 43 Am. Rep. 73Z (1883); Gorham v. Cotton, 174
N. C. 727, 94 S. E. 450 (1917), quoting from texts. In Snow Hill Banking & Tr.
Co. v. Odom Drug Co., 188 N. C. 672, 125 S. E. 394, 37 A. L. R. 1101 (1924)
Hoke, J., observed that defining is difficult and that the earlier definitions were
"correct as to the facts therein presented."
3 §7. ' Cox v. Delano, 14 N. C. 89 (1831).
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certain obligations such as debts, wages, rent, etc.5 The old arbitrary
certainty is gone and a new more reasonable uncertainty substituted, for
it still may be found that what is claimed to be (for instance) a loan is
instead an investment in the business as partner, and litigation over the
remaining controlling factors will continue unabated." Indeed the law
'§7(4). In North Carolina the exact adjustment of this statute to our local
practice is technically somewhat puzzling. The statute speaks of profit sharing as
being "prima facie evidence" of partnership. There is some question as to whether
this means, if no explanation is offered, that the jury should be instructed that:(a) if it finds that profit sharing exists, it shall find that a partnership exists;
or (b) if it finds that profit sharing exists, it inuy find that a partnership exists.
Kootz v. Tuvian, 118 N. C. 393, 24 S. E. 776, (1896), seems to point in the
direction of the first of these interpretations. On the other hand, some cases dealing
with comparable situations seem to favor the latter type of instruction. See White
v. Hines, 182 N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31 (1921).
The second part of the same statutory provision, that, "no such inference shall
be drawn" if the profits were received as rent, etc. would be consistent with either
construction.
The last quoted phrase does seem, however, to indicate clearly that if the
defendant offers explanatory evidence and if on all the evidence (including such
matters as the "creditor's" or "landlord's" or "employer's" -participation in the
management, etc.) the profits are found to have been received as payment of a
debt or rent or wages, then there is no partnership. In fact the language of the
statute seems to mean that if defendant's explanatory evidence could lead only to
the conclusion that the profit sharing was for rent, etc. then the only jury question
is whether such evidence should be believed. Whether or not the court could go
even further and, on the basis of defendant's explanatory evidence, non-suit the
plaintiff is considerably more doubtful. Compare Wilkinson v. Coppersmith, 218
N. C. 173, 10. S. E. (2d) 670 (1940) on the substantive law rule which is sought
to be administered by the procedure here discussed.
In nearly every case in which a partnership has been held to exist the contention
was apparently made that the person in question was either creditor, employer or
landlord and that the share of the profits he received was in payment of a debt, or
wages or rent. Loan or debt: Cox v. Delano, 14 N. C. 89 (1831); Motley v.
Jones, 38 N. C. 144 (1843) ; So. Fertilizer Co. v. Reams, 105 N. C. 283, 11 S. E. 467(1890); Snow Hill Banking & Trust Co. v. Odom Drug Co., 188 N. C. 672, 125
S. E. 394 (1924). Rent: Lewis v. Wilkins, 62 N. C. 303 (1868). Salary or wages:
Holt v. Kernodle, 23 N. C. 199 (1840); Sawyer v. First Nat. Bk. of Elizabeth
City, 114 N. C. 13, 18 S. E. 949 (1894) ; Mitchell v. Eliz. Riv. Lbr. Co., 174 N. C.
119, 93 S. E. 464 (1917) (pay for services as independent contractor); Han-
cock v. Southgate, 186 N. C. 278, 119 S. E. 364 (1923).
As to profits received as rent we have had since 1869 a statutory provision(probably not repealed by the Uniform Act §44 since only inconsistent legislation
is affected) -which, though not stated in the form of presumptions or inferences,
seems to establish the same rule, i.e., "No lessor of property, Hierely by reason that
he is to receive as rent ... a share of the proceeds or net profits .. . shall be held
a partner. . . " (Italics supplied.) N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2341. The
statute was overlooked in two early cases, Reynolds Bros. v. Pool, 84 N. C. 37(1881) and Curtis v. Cash, 84 N. C. 41 (1881), but after explanations of this slip,
two years later -was applied to cases of sharing the gross produce 'without any
account of expenditures"--a thing not evidently covered by the statute of 1869
unless by the word "proceeds", but which is specifically dealt with in the Uniform
'Act, §7(3). Day v. Stevens, 88 N. C. 83 (1883); Belcher v. Grimsley, 88 N. C.
88 (1883). Similar situation and summary application in Lawrence v. Weeks, 107
N. C. 119, 12 S. E. 120 (1890); State v. Keith, 126 N. C. 1114, 36 S. E. 169(1900), though in this last case furnishing team and feed might be regarded as
paying part of expenses and to make a case of net rather than gross profits.
Southern Can Co. v. Sayler, 152 Md. 303, 136 Atl. 624 (1927), "As a result of
an examination of many cases, one is certain to reach the conclusion that no one
fact or circumstance can be taken as an unfailing criterion as to the existence of a
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under this statute as well as without it seems to have arrived at a state
much like that of independent contractor-a sort of goulash or chop suey
of factors whose individual percentage of weight in the final product is
unprescribed and unascertainable from sampling.7
Another anomalous dQctrine closely akin to the one above discussed,
which we once seemed to recognize but which had1 already become ob-
solescent under our more recent decisions and is now expressly de-
stroyed, is that of partnership liability to third persons when there is
neither a partnership between the alleged partners themselves nor a
holding out of such relationship by the one sought to be charged.8 This
liability, too, was based solely on the fact of sharing profits. Being held
a partner as to third persons, like being held a principal when you have
not actually engaged an agent, is now, however, entirely a matter of
equitable estoppel. 9
The uniform act introduces new doctrines as to partnership realty.
First of all, where the conveyance is to "the partnership" in the partner-
ship name, title vests in the individuals as "tenants in partnership", a
new form of tenancy fitted especially to this style of ownership.10 The
former holdings that under such a conveyance legal or equitable title
vested in the members as tenants in, common" are now superseded and
the nature of the new tenancy is to be determined by the act itself. A
conveyance by one partner in the partnership name12 of property so held
now operates to pass legal title without sealed or writtern authority such
as has been heretofore required.1 3  Some of the uncertainties about
record title, due to differences in the partnership name and those of the
partners, which have long given trouble 14 are likely to be removed by
the practice which this provision establishes.
In the past there have been some difficulties about individual part-
ner's rights in the partnership property. The problem has usually arisen.
partnership." And see San Joaquin Lt. & Pow. Corp. v. Costaloupes, 96 Cal. App.
322, 274 Pac. 84 (1929) under somewhat similar California act.
RESTATESENT, AGENCY §220. See also Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Con-
tractors (1930) 28 MicH. L. Rav. 365; Steffen, Independent Contractor and the
Good Life (1935) 2 U. oF CrI. L. REv. 501; Douglas, Vicarious Liability and
Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 584.8 Holt v. Kernodle, 23 N. C. 199 (1840) ; Motley v. Jones, 38 N. C. 144 (1843),
semble. §16. 10 §25.
" Walker v. Miller, 139 N. C. 448, 52 S. E. 125 (1905). Sometimes held to bejoint tenants. See Trotter, Uniform Partnership Act (1921) 27 W. VA. L. QuAR.
28, 40. But ownership by partners has had points of difference from either of these
tenancies, Gmnmomz, PARTNERSHIP (1911) 170, and so in reality we may always
have had "tenancy in partnership" without the label.
" Robinson v. Daughtry, 171 N. C. 200, 88 S. E. 252 (1916) where apparently
it is thought only an equitable interest vested in the partners by the conveyance to
them in the partnership name, though in Walker v. Miller, 139 N. C. 448, 52 S. E.
125 (1905), H. G. Connor, J. seemed to prefer the view that legal title had passed
to them. 13§9(3).
" GrLMo, PARTNERSHIP (1911) 149-153.
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when the partner unaertook to assign either his entire interest or some
specific item of the partnership assets or when one of his individual
creditors sought to enforce the personal debt out of partnership prop-
erty.' 5 An assignment of a partner's entire interest has been considered
sufficient to dissolve the partnership,' 6 since it would introduce a new-
comer into the firm, probably without approval of the other members,
or would give the assignee the power to disrupt the business by steps
to enforce.his claims and interests. Now under the new act such an
assignment leaves the firm intact and denies to the assignee the rights
of a partner to interfere in the management or the use of its property.'7
What he gets is a right to the share of the profits from time to time
and where the partnership is at will or comes to the end of its agreed
life, a right to have dissolution decreed in a judicial proceeding.18 A
creditor of the individual partner gets much the same rights under a
"charging order" issued by the court which gives him judgment.19 In
case of dissolution an assignee receives, of course, the share to which
the assigning partner would have been entitled.20  North Carolina would
have heretofore allowed a creditor-assignee who stood by till dissolution
only this same share.2 1 In such a case, therefore, the act produces no
change, though it is probable that the assignee could have taken
earlier and more significant steps to enforce his claims under our com-
mon law than the act now allows.22
When it comes to the assignment by a partner of a single item of
firm property as his own23 the troublesome problems of the past, centered
around the rights of the assignee to, interfere with partnership use of
the assigned article,24 have been solved by obliteration. Specific prop-
erty may not be dealt with as the property of a single partner .2  It
may only be assigned or attached as a partnership asset, i.e., the rights
of all partners must be passed or appropriated together.26
Probably the most important and certainly the most definite change
brought about in North Carolina law by the new act is in reference to
1 MEcHEm, ELEmENTS OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920) §§146-148; BURDICK,
PARTNERSHIP (3d ed. 1917) 269; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) 153-165; cf.
LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP (9th ed. 1924) 448, 694.
1" Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U. S. 328, 334, 18 Sup. Ct. 135, 138 (1897) ; Bank
of the State of N. C. v. Fowle, 57 N. C. 8, 10 (1858), semble, "if the assignee insist
upon his rights."
17 §27. 28 §32(2).
9 §28. 20 §27 (2).
" Bank of the State of N. C. v. Fowle, 57 N. C. 8 (1858); Daniel v. Crowell,
125 N. C. 519, 34 S. E. 684 (1899).
" Bank of the State of N. C. v. Fowle, 57 N. C. 8 (1858).
"- If a single partner has authority or apparent authority he can, of course,
transfer the interests of the whole firm, i.e., of all the partners by his act. §§9-10.
-' See commissioners' note to §27(2-b and c) 7 U. L. A. 33-39; CRANE, PART-
NERSHIP (1938) 153-165.2 Recent case, 19 MINN. L. REV. 252. Mortgage on part of property for indi-
vidual debt void under uniform act. " §25(2) (b) and (c).
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the rights of firm creditors against the individual partners. If a partner-
ship were treated as a separate entity like a corporation there would, of
course, be no personal liability for partnership debts. Heretofore we
have stood, with a minority of the states, at about the opposite pole
from this. By construction of an old procedural statute 7 we early held
that partnership liability was joint and several and hence that the gen-
eral doctrines of marshalling assets are not a part of North Carolina
law. Partnership creditors were accordingly allowed to share in indi-
vidual assets on a par with individual creditors. 28  That doctrine later
became statutory law by express recognition in Section 2 of the old
limited partnership act,29 but being inconsistent with the provisions of
the uniform act relative to distribution 0 must give way under the
repealing clause.
It should be noted in addition that the act makes partnership liability
on contract obligations joint only, though for torts and breaches of trust
the liability is joint and several.3 1 Our procedural statute provides for
suit of the partners severally on joint obligations3 2 and so by literal
interpretation would still be in force unmodified by the change in the
substantive law which the act introduces even though the procedural
statute was the basis of our courts' declaring all partnership obligations
to be joint and several. Whether the act has any effect at all on the
procedural sections noted is a question requiring further detailed study.
Uniform Limited Partnership Act
Except for a saving clause as to existing limited partnerships, the
former Limited Partnership Law1 is expressly repealed by the Uniform
Limited Parnership Act. In consequence, our express exclusion of lim-
ited partnerships from the field of banking and insurance2 seems with-
drawn, for the new act puts limited and general partnerships on a par
in this respect3 and general partnerships seem to be recognized as fit
organizations to do a banking or insurance business in this state.4 At
11 N. C. Pub. L. 1797, c. 475, §2.
2" Hassell v. Griffin, 55 N. C. 113 (1855).
N. C. CODE ANN. (1939, Michie) §3259.
20 Sec. 40(h) provides that where all assets are in hands of court "partnership
creditors shall have priority on partnership property and separate creditors on indi-
vidual property". 31 §15.
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §459. See also §§497-498.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§3258-3276.
'Id. §3258.
§3. Limited partnership may carry on any business which general partner-
ship may. The Uniform Partnership Act (C. 374, dealing with general part-
nerships) seems to place no restriction on businesses to be conducted. See §§2
and 6(1). Many states have excepted banking and insurance from the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act and some have gone further in their list of exclusions.
ILL. RFV. STAT., C. 106Y2, §46 (brokerage and railroad operation).
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §216(a) (banks); §6261 (insurance). Most
of the regulatory provisions as to banks, e.g., §§217(c)-217(g), seem directed spe-
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the moment this point seems academic but with increasing restrictions on
the incorporation of banks, the possibility might some day be worth
canvassing.
In the past limited partnerships seem to have had little attraction for
North Carolina businessmen. It is significant that although we have had
a statute for about four fifths of a century, only one case" seems to have
squarely involved any of its provisions. This is a striking contrast to the
number of general partnership cases. Elsewhere this form of business
association seems likewise to be having relatively small use and, con-
sidering that under general partnership law one can loan money to a
general partnership and receive a share of the profits without becoming
a partner, it has been questioned whether there is real need for limited
partnerships at all.0 But sharing profits in payment of loans or interest
may result in general partnership responsibility because of the vague
character of the rules which determine that question 7 and one may find
it advantageous to become a limited partner with greater assurance about
the extent of the risks undertaken. The most useful commentary, there-
fore, which can be made on the new, liberalized act is not by way of a
catalogue of fairly obvious changes from the former act8 but by way of
suggestion as to what the liberalized act has to offer the investor who
wants a chance for speculative profits with limited risks-things which
have often been thought incompatible. One does not expect the financial
opportunities of wild cat oil production to go along with the security of
a letter carrier's job.
The corporate form of organization offers the most popular oppor-
tunity to combine these desiderata in a satisfactory degree, but corpora-
tions mean extra taxes.9 As already suggested one can loan money to
cifically to incorporated banks, although compare §222(a), and as to insurance
companies, §6274; and it might be contended that either a general or limited part-
nership might now set up in the banking business without the authorization of the
Commissioner of Banks otherwise required by §217(c), a thing certainly not in-
tended by the legislature.
' Davis v. Sanderlin, 119 N. C. 84, 25 S. E. 815 (1896). See also Gardner v.
Bank of Pinehurst, 35 F. Supp. 727 (W. D. N. C. 1940), construing the name-
disclosure section of the South Carolina Act. Compare the situation elsewhere as
reported in Brown, The Limited Partnership in Indiana (1930) 5 IND. L. J. 421,
seventy years, no appellate case.
I Crane, Are Limited Pariterships Necessaryf (1933) 17 MIxN. L. REV. 351.7 See comment on that subject under Uniform Partnership Act, supra, p. 000.
I The following table will probably aid one who desires to note the detailed
changes. [Larger numbers are the sections of the old act in N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939).1 In some instances the relationship is not very direct. 3258-
U.L.P.A. 3; 3259-1, 2(1), 4, 15; 3260-2; 3261-2(1), 2(1)b; 3262-2(1)aVI, 4;
3263-2(2); 3264-6; 3265, 3266-2(2); 3267-24(h), 30(2); 3268-8, 25; 3269-5;
3270-9(1), 26; 3271-2(1) a viii, ix, 10(2), 15, 16, 17(4) ; 3272-17(4) ; 3273-7, 10;
3274-7, 10(1)b; 3275-13(1), 23(1)a; 3276-25(5).
See Hansel, Limited versus General Partnership Organization for Close Cor-
porations (1938) 16 TAX MAG. 524. This seems rather to be a comparison between
limited partnerships and corporations.
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a general partnership in return for a share in the profits. As a creditor,
for his own protection, he can stipulate for a faint voice in the manage-
ment including the power to say, "no", not so faintly, to risky policies.' 0
But there is always the risk that he will be found to have spoken affirm-
atively and too loudly." It is hard to be sure where the barbed wire
fence lies in all the tangled growth of presumptions and inferences.
How, then, about joining the firm as limited partner and getting certain
definite rights to participate, chiefly in the way of having reports and
getting information? 12 The old traps and pitfalls and penalties are
largely eliminated in the new statute. One gains limited liability not-
withstanding some technical defects in the certificate or its filing if there
was "substantial compliance in good faith".' 3  Of course there is a
slippery term here, too-the adjective "substantial"--and its presence
means some risk, but we have a background of corporation precedents
which will help in appraising that. 14
Moreover, in contradiction of the old law,15 personal responsibility,
even in case of a known false statement in the certificate, is now en-
forced only in favor of one who suffered loss from reliance on the
statement.16
But there is a more or less concealed barbed wire fence here, too.
The limited partner may exercise the rights given him but must not
10 Martin v. Peyton, 246 N. Y. 213, 158 N. E. 77 (1927).
San Joaquin Lt. & Pow. Corp. v. Costaloupes, 96 Cal. App. 322, 274 P. 84
(1929).
12 §10. Also the right to have dissolution and judicial winding up besides, of
course, receiving his share of profits and his capital back after creditors are paid.
Compare situation where because of a special agreement he was entitled to have his
investment back at the expense of the general partners even if there would be in-
sufficient assets to make him whole after paying creditors. Herrick v. Guild, 13
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 115 (App. Div. 1939).
1% §2(2); cf. Davis & Co. v. Sanderlin, 119 N. C. 84, 25 S. E. 815 (1896),
where the court felt obligated sua sponte to declare a partnership to be general
where the record failed to show statutory publication as required by the statute
which is now N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §3265. At the opposite extreme
from this attitude is that found in the leading case of In re Marcuse & Co., 281 Fed.
928 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922), affirmed as Giles v. Vette, 263 U. S. 553, 44 Sup. Ct. 157,
68 L. ed. 441 (1923) wherein brokers undertook to organize as a limited partnership
under an old law which was repealed and replaced by the Uniform Partnership Act
before the partnership came into being. It could not be treated as a firm organized
under the new act since the new act excluded brokerage firms. Nevertheless, both
the Circuit Court of Appeals, Evans, J., dissenting, and the Supreme Court, without
dissent, exonorated the special (not literally limited) partners on the ground
that they had not been held out as general partners (quite the contrary in fact,
for they were published as limited partners) and so there was neither intent to
be general partners nor representation on which others relied that they were such.
Furthermore §11 of the uniform act, which relieves from personal liability those
who in good faith but mistakenly think themselves to be limited partners, though
it was no part of the act under which they intended to organize, might be held
applicable to those partners who renounced their interest in the business and paid
back what profits they had already received as §11 required.
" 1 THOMPSON, CoPORAlONS (3d ed. 1927) §199.
'B N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §3264. .1 §6.
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"take part in the control of the business. '17 If he is content to hazard
his money, stick closely to the green which is marked for his activity
and stay entirely away from the rough he is personally safe. If he leaves
the charted area and takes the risk of participation in the management
he may the more readily forfeit his immunity because of the specific and
express rights which the act does confer on him,' 8 and the idea that
these were the maximum of rights intended.19 Otherwise the problem
is much like that of the interfering lender and a general partnership.
The few decisions on the point as to limited partners seem to have been
under earlier acts and shed little light on the problem.2 0
PROPERTY
Management of Property Subject to Contingent Remainders.
C. S. 1744 provides that lands, in which there is a vested interest
with a contingent remainder over either to persons not in being or to
those who have not yet satisfied the condition precedent to the vesting
of their interest, may, by proper proceedings in the superior court'be
sold or mortgaged for reinvestment or improvement purposes. C. 328
amends paragraph one of this section to permit such property also to be
leased, thus further permitting the management and alienation of prop-
erty in which contingent future interests are held. The new law also
amends paragraph 3 of C. S. 1744 to permit the clerk to issue all orders
concerning the sale, lease, or mortgage of such property, but fails to
repeat the word "lease" by way of amendment to the latter part of that
paragraph which provides that "no sale under this section shall be held
or mortgage given until the same has been approved by the resident
judge of the district, or the judge holding the courts of the district at
the time said order of sale is made." Whether the word lease was pur-
posely or inadvertently left out, the question arises as to whether or not
the order to lease must also be approved by the judge. At any rate the
statute is not clear and leaves the clerk in a dilemma as to the proper
procedure in case he orders the property to be leased. If we read the
legislative intent aright, it would seem that a lease should fall in the
same category as a sale or mortgage of the property.
' §7. On the recently increased importance of control, see Rowley, The Inflt-
ence of Control in the Determinatiot of Partnership Liability (1928) 26 MicH. L
REv. 290, using mostly cases of business trusts.
"8 See note 12, supra.
" Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 895. Section 7 reads, "A limited partner shall
not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the busi-
ness." It can be argued that "his rights and powers as a limited partner" refer
specifically to those named in §10 of the act even though those are there called
his "rights" only, not his "rights and powers".
2 U. L. A. 18-20; Ann. Digest, Partnership §§349-376.
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C. S. 1744 provides that the property may be mortgaged and that the
proceeds derived from the mortgage may be used for the improvement
of the property or for the removal of existing liens thereon as the court
may direct, and for no other purpose. C. 328 adds an amendment to
this particular part of the section in the following language: "The mort-
gagees shall not be held responsible for determining the validity of the
liens, debts and expenses where the court directs such liens, debts and
expenses to be paid." An interesting question might arise in connection
with this amendment. Suppose the land is mortgaged and the mortgagee
records his instrument; some taxes on the land are overlooked and are
not paid out of the mortgage loan. Would the mortgagee have a lien
on the land prior to the lien of the taxes in such a situation?
Revocation of Contingent Remainders.
C. S. 996 provides, in part, that the creator of a voluntary trust
estate in real or personal property for the benefit of a person in esse
with a future contingent interest to a person or persons not in esse or
not determinable until the happening of a future event may, at any time
before the vesting of the future estates, revoke the grant of the contin-
gent interests by a proper instrument to that effect. This section is
amended by C. 264 by the addition of a provision to the effect that the
creator "of a like interest for a valuable consideration (italics supplied)
may, with the joinder of the person from whom the consideration
moved, revoke said interest in like manner." In other words the amend-
ment makes possible the revocation of a trust, which has been created
on the basis of a valuable consideration, in favor of unascertained per-
sons or persons ascertained only upon the happening of some contin-
gent event. This amendment affecting trust estates effectuates a balance
with the first part of C. S. 996 which permits the grantors of future
interests in deeds to revoke the same, where they have been executed
upon a valuable consideration, with the joinder of the person from
whom the consideration moved.
Deeds of Trust and Mortgages.
The supreme court of the state decided in 1940 that when a deed oi
trust is given to secure indebtedness, and the trustee is the managing
officer of the secured creditor, who on foreclosure both acts as trustee
and acts for the creditor, then there is no disinterested third party
trustee and the security will be treated as a mortgage instead of a deed
of trust. One consequence is that the creditor, upon bidding in the
property, at foreclosure sale, obtains only a voidable title since that is
the result when a mortgagee bids in. The creditor as mortgagee on
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conveying the property to an innocent purchaser becomes liable for con-
version of the equity of redemption.1 Since the designation of an officer
or employee of the creditor as trustee had been a common practice, a
considerable number of financial institutions of the state have become
exposed to similar consequences by the court's decision. By C. 202 the
legislature acted to put a time limit on this threat by providing a lim-
itation period of one year after the ratification of the act for attacking
such foreclosure sales of real estate had before January 1, 1941. The
limitation is put on attacks on foreclosures based on the ground that the
trustee was an officer, director, attorney, agent or employee of the
secured creditor, or on the ground that the trustee and the creditor have
any common officers, directors, attorneys, agents or employees. The
act is not to enlarge the time for such attack, but is to be an additional
limitation. Thus if such a foreclosure were had sufficiently long ago
so that the usual limitation period on an attack will expire at a time
before the year specified in the act is ended, then the attack will be pre-
cluded at that earlier time..
The only other new act to be mentioned here is C. 115, amending
a statute providing for substitution of trustees in mortgages or security
deeds of trust.2 The amendment is designed to enable the holder of
another lien to have substituted for a mortgagee or trustee dead or
otherwise incompetent to act, a new trustee with power to defend fore-
closure actions. The typical situation met by the amendment appears
to be the one where a lienholder wants to foreclose, is faced with the
necessity of making the trustee in a security deed of trust on the same
property a party, but finds he is dead. Under the amendment the fore-
closing lienholder may have a new trustee substituted.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM
In 1939 the legislature set up a retirement system for local govern-
ment employees, optional for each local unit. This plan provided for a
fund, to be built up by deductions from salaries and contributions by
employer units, out of which pensions were to be paid to employees on
retirement.1 This year a similar system was enacted for all state em-
ployees by C. 25, as amended by C. 143.
Employees or teachers already in service at the date the retirement
system becomes operative, July 1, 1941, may elect not to become mem-
'Mills v. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 216 N. C. 664, 6 S. E. (2d) 549 (1940),
commented on (1940) 18 N. C. L. REv. 350.2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Miclie, 1939) §§2583(a)-2583(h), commented on (1931)
9 N. C. L. REv. 402, (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rav. 442.
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§3212(1)-(18), discussed in 17 N. C. L.
REV. 369.
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bers. With this exception, the acts apply to all full-time state employees,
whether "elected, appointed, or employed", including teachers in the
public schools and in any state educational institution. Each member
contributes 4 per cent of his salary deducted from each payment, except
that since no member is allowed to participate as to that part of his
annual salary in excess of $3,000, no deduction will be made from any
part of the salary in excess of that sum. The fund thus built up, plus
compound interest thereon, is used to provide an annuity payable to
the member on retirement. The state contributes sufficient funds to
provide a pension equal to the annuity earned at age sixty by the mem-
ber's own contributions. There is also a further payment by the state
on retirement of employees who were in state service before the system
was inaugurated. For each such employee the state will provide, in
addition to the pension and annuity retirement allowances described
above, a further pension equal to that which would have been earned
by both state and employee contributions had they been made in accord-
ance with this plan during the period between his entry into state serv-
ice and July 1, 1941. In other words, for each member the plan is made
fully retroactive, at state expense, to the date of his admission into state
service. All these benefits become payable on retirement, which may be
at sixty, if the member elects; retirement at sixty-five is necessary, ex-
cept that upon request by the employer the employee may remain until
seventy, or until seventy-two if employer and the trustees of the retire-
ment system both request it. In case a member becomes disabled after
ten years in state employment he will be entitled to a retirement allow-
ance made up of the annuity purchased -by his contributions, plus a pen-
sion provided by the state equal to 75 per cent of the pension which
would have been paid by the state if the member had continued in
state service without salary change to the age of sixty. In case of
termination of employment in state service, by death or otherwise,
prior to age sixty, the only liability of the system is to pay over the
employee's own contributions, plus the interest thereon.
A board of seven trustees is set up to administer the system, as a
corporation. 2 The State Treasurer is designated as chairman of the
I A literal interpretation of the act results in some confusion as to the relation
between the board of trustees and the system. Each is made, apparently, a separate
body corporate. Section 2 provides that the system "shall -have the power and
privileges of a corporation and shall be known as the 'Teachers' and State Em-
ployees' Retirement System of North Carolina', and by such name all of its busi-
ness shall be transacted, all of its funds invested, and all of its cash and securities
and other property held."
Section 6 places the administration of the system in the hands of a board of
trustees, which "shall be a body politic and corporate"; this latter provision is part
of a paragraph set out in quotation marks in the original bill and perhaps this
indicates that the paragraph was simply lifted bodily from another context. Section
7 declares the board of trustees to be "the trustee of the several funds" into which
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board; the Superintendent of Public Instruction is a member ex officio;
and five others--one teacher, one general state employee, and three who
are not state employees-are to be appointed by the governor and con-
firmed by the senate. Appointments are for four years, the terms being
staggered to preserve continuity of administration. All expenses of ad-
ministration are to be carried by the state (in addition to the state con-
tributions heretofore mentioned).
The funds and assets of the system, the rights of members therein,
and the "pension, annuity or retirement allowance itself" are declared
exempt from any state or municipal tax,3 and from execution. Members'
rights are non-assignable.
Having adopted a retirement system for state employees, the legis-
lature then, in C. 357, amended the 1939 act which set up an optional
retirement system for local government employees, by bringing it within
the control of the same board of trustees which is to administer the
state system. The Local Government Employees' Retirement System is
maintained as a separate unit, however, the administration expenses of
which are to be paid from contributions made by the local government
employers, with the help of a membership fee charged employees if
the trustees so elect.
Local government units generally are forbidden, by Section 9a of
the new act, to levy any tax or incur any debt for participation in the
system until approval of the local voters has been secured. But the
section is, by exceptions set out therein, made inapplicable to twelve
counties named, and to a number of municipalities. Since Section 18
of the 1939 act,4 which required submission to the electorate, is ex-
pressly repealed, the only method provided for these local governments
to adopt the plan is that set out in Section 3 of the 1939 act,3 which
allowed local governing bodies to determine on participation, and to
levy necessary taxes therefor, without any election. One of the excep-
tions in Section 9a expressly provides that Pasquotank County and the
municipalities therein may determine on participation in the manner
provided by Section 3 of the 1939 act; and although the other excep-
tions 'do not contain this express provision, it is difficult to ascribe any
different effect to them.
the assets of the system are divided. A similar conflict, on a literal interpretation,
appears again in Section 8, subsection (5), where, in paragraph (1) (a), members'
contributions are required to be paid by warrant "payable to the Teachers' and
State Employees' Retirement System of North Carolina," while, in paragraph 2(c)
employers' contributions are covered by the statement that the state auditor "shall
issue his warrant directing the State Treasurer to pay this sum to the Board of
Trustees. . . . Y'It is unlikely that these slight inconsistencies will cause any
serious trouble in the practical administration of the system.
' See the discussion of this under "Local Property Taxes-Exemptions," at
p. 520, ilfra.
'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §3212(18).
N. C. CoDE A N. (Michie, 1939) §3212(3).
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Whether local tax levies to provide the unit's contribution to the
system will be valid depends upon two provisions of the state constitu-
tion. (1) Section 6 of article V, applying only to counties, limits the
rate to 15c on each $100 of property value, unless the levy is for a
"special purpose" and has the "special approval" of the legislature.
Practically speaking, in the light of existing tax rates, this means that
few, if any, counties can levy taxes for a retirement system unless they
can be construed as "special purpose" taxes. The legislature has given
its special approval by expressly declaring the county levies to be for
such a special purpose, this having been done in Section 3 of the 1939
act, mentioned above, which section, in this respect, is apparently still
in force as to all counties. While there is some language in a recent case
indicating that regularly recurring expenditures are not ordinarily "spe-
cial purposes",6 that language is probably not controlling here. It seems
highly unlikely that by refusing to treat this as a "special purpose" our
court would, in effect, prohibit counties from joining the retirement
system.
(2) Section 7 of article 7, applying to counties and municipal cor-
porations, prohibits levy of any tax, without approval of the voters,
except for a "necessary expense". Obviously the problem raised by this
provision is of immediate importance only to the small group of units
which are nominally authorized to proceed without a vote, as the statute
requires the others to vote whether the constitution does or not. Our
courts have, in the main, tended toward a fairly liberal and occasionally
expanding interpretation of "necessary expense".7 It seems probable,
had all local units been authorized to participate in the system without
a vote, that this would have been held to be a "necessary expense". To
hold otherwise would be to give the judicial cold shoulder to the social
security program and question the validity of the policy under which
the national government compels private employers and employees to
participate in such a retirement system. However, has the legislature,
by requiring most units to hold an election, so indicated its own doubts
as to persuade the court to hold otherwise? The answer should be in
the negative. What constitutes a "necessary expense" is for the courts
to decide,8 and it should be decided without reference to restrictions
which, in the exercise of its undoubted power over the activities of local
8 Nantahala Power Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C. 698, 706, 197 S. E. 603, 608
(1938). However, the case itself recognizes some regularly recurring expenses
to legitimate "special purposes". For a discussion of "special purposes" within
this section, see Coates and Mitchell, Property and Poll Tax Limitations under the
North Carolina Constitution, Article V, Sections I and 6 (1940) 18 N. C. L. REV.
275 at p. 297.
' Coates and Mitchell, "Necessary Expenses" within the Meaning of Article
VII, Section 7, of the North Carolina Constitution (1940) 18 N. C. L. REv. 93.8ld. at 112.
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government, the legislature may choose to place upon even the power
to tax for such expenses. The only inquiry should be as to the power
of the assembly to discriminate between local units by excepting some
from the referendum requirements, but as the subject matter here seems
not to fall within the provisions of article II, Section 29 of the state con-
stitution prohibiting local legislation, the discrimination, while perhaps
questionable policy, would not seem to be unconstitutional.
The new statute, which is entitled and worded consistently through-
out as one to amend the 1939 law, closes with the following limitation,
added by amendment: "Sec. B. Notwithstanding anything else to the
contrary in this Act or in Chapter 390 of the Public Laws of 1939, the
provisions of this Act shall apply only to counties having a population
of more than 15,000 inhabitants by the last preceding United States
census and to municipalities." Since the above language does not limit
the application of the 1939 law, but only of "this act" (the 1941 amend-
ment), and since the 1939 act is not repealed, it now seems, by a literal
interpretation, that we have two local government employees' retirement
systems in existence-one under the law as amended in 1941 for coun-
ties having a population over 15,000 and for municipalities; and one
under the 1939 law, unamended, for all other local government units.
Since the limitation provides, however, that "this act" shall apply only
to counties having over 15,000, notwithstanding anything to the con-
trary in this act or in the 1939 act, certainly the intent to limit the ap-
plication of the 1939 act as well as this act is reasonably clear.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS-TWELFTH YEAR
A program for extension of the state educational system to provide
for twelve years of instruction in the free public schools has been
adopted in C. 158. According to the statute, during the school year
1941-1942, the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State School
Commission are to make plans for expansion of the present eleven year
curriculum' into a curriculum to cover twelve grades, and in 1942-1943
the additional year is to be established in school districts where it is
requested by the several local governing bodies. Since the expense of
the twelfth year is to be carried by the state as a whole, not allocated
to the local districts where the twelve year program is set up, it is prob-
able that most of the local boards will make the necessary request, so that
the act practically'assures general adoption over the whole state of the
twelve year program.
IN. C. CoDs ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5386 provides for eleven years of schooling,
seven years in the elementary school, four in the high school. Some local districts
have supported a twelfth year by special local taxes.
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RECORDING AND REGISTRY
Photostatic Recording.
C. 286 authorizes the board of county commissioners of any county
to provide for the photographic or photostatic recording of all instru-
ments filed in the office of the register of teeds, the office of the clerk
of court, and in other offices of the county where the board may deem
such recording feasible. The board is also authorized to make provision
for loose-leaf binders for such photostatic copies.
The statute paves the way for a state-wide practice of recordation
by way of photostatic copies of the original papers filed and marks an
advance over the presently used methods of making by hand or by
typewriter copies of the instruments for recordation purposes. When
instruments are thus copied, there is always present the possibility that
there will be errors of omission, of repetition, or of transposition. The
photostatic reproduction of the original instrument and the recordation
of such reproduction will eliminate the possibility of error, and the per-
son examining the records can be assured of their authenticity and
accuracy. It is to be hoped that those counties which can possibly af-
ford to install this new method of recordation will hasten to do so.
Plats and Subdivisions.
C. S. 3318 provides, in part, that "any person, firm, or corporation
owning land in this State may have a plat thereof recorded in the office of
the register of deeds of the county in which such land or any part thereof
is situated, upon proof upon oath by the surveyor making such plat
that the same is in all respects correct and was prepared from an actual
survey by him made, giving the date of such survey." C. 249 amends
this section by providing that if the surveyor making such plat is dead,
or where land has been sold and conveyed according to an unrecorded
plat, the plat may be recorded upon the oath of a duly licensed surveyor
that the map is in all respects correct and that it was actually checked
and verified by him, giving the date on which the same was verified and
checked.
STATUTES
The recodification of the North Carolina statute book, undertaken'
in 1939, is to be completed by the fall of 1942 and submitted to the
general assembly of 1943 in a special legislative edition. 2 To cooperate
with the attorney general and the division of legislative drafting and
codification of the state department of justice, the house and senate
'N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 315, §5; N. C. CoDE AN. (Michie, 1939) §7534(34);
commented uponlin (1939) 17 N. C. L. REv. 376-379.
2C. 35.
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committees on recodification are constituted an interim commission on
recodification,3 to "review and examine the recodification work and
consult with and advise the attorney general and the division in the
revision of the statutes, the preparation of annotations, index and sup-
plementary material, the specifications, form and publication of a legis-
lative edition of the proposed code for submission to the general assembly
of 1943, and in other problems incident to the completion of the recodi-
fication work." The legislative edition of 500 copies, for the printing of
which $7,500 has been appropriated, 4 is to be distributed, in advance of
the meeting of the general assembly, to the newly elected members of the
house and senate, to the judges of the supreme and superior courts, to
the administrative heads of the state departments, to the members of
the advisory committee which has worked with the attorney general
during the last two years and to the members of the commission on
codification. 5 Thus, three things are assured. The division will have
ample time for the satisfactory completion of its difficult task, with the
same thorough-going excellence of workmanship it has exercised during
the current biennium 0 In the solution of its many and intricate prob-
lems, the division will have the constant assistance, as the work pro-
gresses, of an experienced group of legislators. And the next general
assembly will have available when it meets the unhurried appraisal of
legislative, judicial and executive branches of the government.
TAXATION
Highway Fund Taxes.
Motor Vehicle Taxes. The motor vehicle license laws were amended:
(1) by C. 14, allowing private haulers to act as contract haulers in con-
nection with national defense projects (undefined), until Dec. 31, 1942,
without obtaining a contract hauler's license; (2) by C. 22, specifying
that the term "for hire" shall not include vehicles whose carrying of
property for others is limited to transporting "T.V.A. or A.A.A. phos-
phate and/or agricultural limestone in bulk which is furnished as a grant
of aid under the United States Agricultural Adjustment Administration"
(the apparent effect being to entitle such vehicles to private hauler's
license instead of the more expensive contract hauler's license) ; (3) by
C. 196, allowing classification as private, instead of contract, haulers of
trucks transporting logs, bark, pulp, and tannic acid wood from farms
and forests to the primary market (as compared with the former refer-
ence to "wood products cut and delivered from within a radius of 25
'Res. 33.
' C. 107, §1, III, 5(4). 'C. 35.
'See Adams, Recodification of the North Carolina Statutes (1940) 19 N. C. L.
REv. 27.
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miles of market") ; (4) C. 227, setting up, beginning in 1942, a special
"farmer" truck classification; and (5) by C. 99, as amended by C. 365,2
relating to licenses on vehicles temporarily within the state.
Taken together, these laws indicate an increasing tendency to com-
plicate our motor vehicle license laws with troublesome and perhaps
questionable classifications. This is particularly well illustrated by
C. 227. This authorizes issue of truck licenses at one-half the regular
rates when: (a) the applicant is a farmer engaged, on a farm of ten
acres or more, in producing farm products (meaning food crops, cattle,
hogs, poultry, dairy and other agricultural products "designed and to
be used for food purposes"); (b) he is not engaged in buying farm
products for resale; (c) the truck is engaged "exclusively in the carry-
ing or transportation of applicant's farm products, raised or produced
on his farm, and farm supplies, and not engaged in hauling for hire."
It seems reasonably obvious that the administrative authorities cannot
hope efficiently to establish the existence of these prerequisites before
issuing the licenses without prohibitive administrative cost. Further,
as the act itself recognizes, the problem is not ended with the issue of
the license. There must be regulations "providing for the recall, trans-
fer, exchange, or cancellation" (take your choice) of the special license
when the truck is "sold and/or transferred". Finally, it may be pointed
out that the financial saving involved, in return for this confusion, at
least for small farmers, is likely to be something less than fabulous, be-
cause: (a) the minimum rate under the new law is $10 as compared
with the minimum of $12 (for trucks of gross weight of two tons or
less) under the former law; and (b) the quarterly reduction of rates
on plates bought during the year is not applicable to "farmer" licenses.
The only other of these laws deserving special mention of any kind
is C. 99. In certain agricultural areas the farmers (though not the local
truckers) believe that intrastate use of trucks from outside the state is
necessary in order properly to handle seasonal crops without spoilage.
SC. 196 takes the form of rewriting N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 407, §2(r) (1). Ad-
ditions were made to that subsection by N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 275, and by C. 22
in 1941 (summarized above in the text). The rewritten subsection does not include
the provisions added by the intervening laws or refer to them in any way. How-
ever, it seems unlikely that there has been an implied repeal of those provisions.
C. 196 does not purport to rewrite the subsection "as amended" but, on the contrary,
takes the form of referring to and quoting in full the 1937 subsection and then
providing that it is "amended to read as follows". This leaves ample room for
construing C. 196 as intended to rewrite only so much of the subsection as was
originally enacted in 1937.2 C. 99 was amended, during its legislative progress, to provide that it should
not apply to passenger vehicles and station wagons. C. 365 strikes out this restric-
tive provision. The effect of including the language in C. 99 is very obscure; but
should the effect of striking it out be finally determined to be to impose a tax, then
C. 365 is invalid as not passed with the formalities required by N. C. CONST. art.
II, §14. However, in view of the reciprocity situation existing with respect to
private passenger vehicles, the question is unlikely to become of any real importance.
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This act is intended to permit this by allowing a vehicle owner who
wishes to operate in the state for thirty days to procure a license for
one-tenth the annual fee. (Or perhaps it is intended to see that some
tax will be collected when, in practice, none has been before.) The new
law exempts from its provisions Wake, Buncombe, Pender, New Han-
over, Lee, Catawba and Sampson counties. Since the license involved
is otherwise state-wide and is one issued by the state for use of its roads,
these county exemptions are, at the least, questionable from the policy
standpoint, and it seems virtually certain that they are invalid.3
Gasoline Taxes. The longest, if not the most important, amendment
to the gasoline tax laws is contained in C. 376. It redefines "motor fuel"
subject to the gallonage tax and provides detailed machinery for the col-
lection of the tax whenever vehicles are actually operated over the high-
ways on any fuel not within the regular definition. Other gasoline tax
laws are: (a) C. 119, exempting from the 6c per gallon tax the gasoline
used in the public school transportation system4 (the effect, when com-
pared with the previously existing situation, being to give the school
system, at the expense of the highway revenue, additional availability
for other purposes) ; (b) C. 15, lengthening by thirty days the statutory
time allowed in which to file applications for refund of taxes paid on
gasoline put to non-highway uses, but providing for deduction of 10%
of the claim as a penalty for late filing;5 (c) C. 16, authorizing exclusion
from the measure of the tax (or refund in certain cases) of gasoline lost
because of lightning, flood or windstorm ;6 and (d) C. 146, liberalizing
the tare allowance by substituting, for the former 1%, an allowance of
2% on the first 150,000 gallons handled monthly, 1I/2% on the next
100,000 gallons, and 1% on any balance.7
' State v. Warren, 211 N. C. 75, 189 S. E. 108 (1937). Conceivably, instead of
the exemptions being invalid, they might render the entire statute invalid. State v.
Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. (2d) 854 (1940).
'The act provides for either original exemption or refunds. Section 6 provides
that it shall be in effect on July 1, 1941, but does not specify that it shall affect
only sales made after that date. An argument could be made, therefore, that
refunds could be demanded for sales made prior to that time; but the odds are
considerable that the demand will not get the refund.
By providing "this Act shall not apply to any claim filed with the Commis-
sioner of Revenue prior to January 1, 1940," the act becomes retroactive to the
date mentioned. (provided claim was filed within 30 days after the period prescribed
in the original statute).
' This is also retroactive, covering losses from July 1, 1940.
This act and C. 16 amend the same section of the prior law-N. C. Pub. L
1931, c. 145, §24 (5). They fail to fit in the following particulars: (a) this act
rewrites language stated to be the last part of the subsection, though, actually,
C. 16 had already added further language at the end of the subsection; (b) C. 16
refers to the "1% allowed" and this act substitutes the sliding scale for that flat
figure. Presumably, however, since there is no substantial conflict of meaning,
this act will not be construed to repeal C. 16, and the reference to the allowance
in C. 16 will be construed as descriptive only and as modified by the subsequent
change in the percentage provision.
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State and Local Exemptions.
Rural Electrification Projects. Because of unwillingness or inability
to meet the requirements of the electric membership corporation laws,'
or the requirements of the Rural Electrification Authority created
thereby, some of the non-profit rural electrification enterprises in this
state were organized as ordinary cooperative associations. 2 They soon
found that they were subject to state and local taxes. The electric mem-
bership corporations approved by the R.E.A., on the other hand, were
granted the same tax exemptions as counties and cities on the theory
that they are public agencies entitled to be treated as municipal corpora-
tions for this purpose.3 C. 161, after reciting that the cooperatives are
to be reorganized under the R.E.A. law, provides that those which have
been so reorganized within six months after its ratification "shall not be
liable for any state or local taxes" accrued since passage of the R.E.A.
law and shall be entitled to refund of any such taxes paid during the
period of their cooperative existence subsequent to enactment of the
R.E.A. law. This is, in terms, a broader exemption than that granted
to the membership corporations under the R.E.A. law. However, the
language used cannot make it broader than the constitutional power
given to the assembly as interpreted by the court; and, under that
interpretation, even if these corporations can be treated as municipal
corporations, their property can be exempt only if used for a public
purpose. 4 Whether they can be treated as municipal corporations has
not been passed upon, but probably they can.5 If so, their property used
in their business is probably to be regarded as used for a public purpose
(like a municipal power system), though it is income-producing and
potentially in competition with private enterprise.6 The retroactive fea-
ture, however, presents a further complication which may give trouble.
Can the assembly not only say that such a corporation is a municipal
corporation, but also that it was one five years ago when it existed in a
different form?
C. 12 provides that electric membership corporations organized under
the laws of other states, desiring to extend their lines into this state
either to secure power or to serve customers, may "domesticate" in this
state and shall then enjoy all the "rights, privileges, benefits and im-
1 N. C. Pub. L. 1935, cc. 228 and 291, as amended.
2N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) c. 93, subchapter IV.
'N. C. Pub. L. 1935, c. 291, §14.
' Winston-Salem v. Forsyth County, 217 N. C. 704, 9 S. E. (2d) 381 (1940),
and cases therein cited. See Coates, The Battle of Exemptions (1941) 19 N. C. L.
Ra,. 154, 167 et seq.
'See Webb v. Port Commission, 205 N. C. 663, 172 S. E. 377 (1933) ; Wells v.
Housing Authority, 213 N. C. 744, 197 S. E. 693 (1938).
'Andrews v. Clay County, 200 N. C. 280, 156 S. E. 855 (1931). Compare the
discussion of C. 125 dealing with exemption of hospital property at p. 520, infra.
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munities" granted to such corporations under the laws of this state and
be subject to the "terms, provisions and conditions" of the R.E.A. law
to the same extent as corporations organized thereunder. The preamble
indicates that the primary reason for this statute is to grant tax ex-
emption. There are some questions of construction as to whether the
corporation would have to satisfy only the organization requirements
of the statute where it was organized, or whether it would have to qualify
independently under our statute. However, assuming that those ques-
tions could be satisfactorily decided, it still seems rather doubtful that
the corporation could be treated as a municipal corporation entitled to
tax exemptions if its sole operations here consisted of acquisition of
power to be delivered to nonresidents. The situation might be different
where the activities include furnishing electricity to residents.7
Hospital Service Corporations. Section 14 of C. 3381 provides that
every hospital service corporation subject to the chapter is a "charitable
and benevolent" corporation and all its property is exempt from all state
and local taxation; and "in lieu of all other taxes" a franchise tax of
one third of one per cent of gross dues collections is levied to defray the
expense of administering the chapter. These corporations are mutuals or
cooperatives and, in view of long standing policy of allowing exemptions
for certain mutuals and non-profit (though non-charitable) corporations
from such state taxes as the franchise and income taxes,2 probably this
provision is valid as to such taxes. However, as applied to property
taxes, the provision is open to grave doubt. The constitution does not
authorize exemption of the property of mutuals or cooperatives. And,
while it does authorize exemption of property held for charitable pur-
poses, it seems fairly evident that these corporations are not charitable in
any true sense of the word, and their property is thus not held for a
charitable purpose. They are non-profit in the sense that they are not
organized primarily to provide cash dividends to stockholders who invest
money; but they are run primarily for the direct, personal benefit of the
members, and, in the sense that charity implies a giving of something to
A commentary on the confusion existing in legislative policies as to taxes on
public projects is the fact that, while the 1941 assembly was engaged in expanding
the tax exemptions granted to public or quasi-public power enterprises, local in
scope but financed with federal funds, it also -was passing a law (C. 85) providing
for distribution, as between state and local governments, of the money to be paid
by the T. V. A. in lieu of taxes. Space limits prevent discussion of that chapter
here. The payments are made under 16 U. S. C. A. §831 (1). For an outline of
the problem of state and local taxation of federal enterprises, particularly as
applied to T. V. A., see Lilienthal and Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enter-
prises by the Federal Government (1941) 54 HIARv. L. REv. 545, 596.
1 For discussion of the main features of C. 338, see p. 487, supra.
2 N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 158, §§213, 314.
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others, there is no charity present here.3 If the use of "benevolent" in-
tends to imply something broader than "charitable," then it is not author-
ized by the constitution. There is no more reason to exempt the property
of these corporations than, to exempt the property of mutual fire insur-
ance companies or to exempt the $200 an individual may lay aside for
the purpose of paying his hospital bills if and when they arise. If it be
argued (with rather doubtful force) that this property is comparable to
that of the mutual electric membership corporations (see above), the
attempted exemption is still not comparable, because the assembly has
declared those corporations to be municipal, not charitable corporations.4
Property and Payments, State Employees' Retirement Fund. Section
9 of C. 251 provides: "The right of a person to a pension, or annuity, or
a retirement allowance, to the return of contributions, the pension,
annuity or retirement allowance itself, any optional benefit or any
other right accrued or accruing to any person under the provisions
of this Act, and the moneys in the various funds created by this Act,
are hereby exempt from any State or municipal tax." (Italics supplied.)
This may be permissible with respect to such state taxes as the income
tax (unless it eventually face trouble because of non-exemption for other
annuities), as the constitutional restrictions on exemptions probably do
not apply to such taxes. And, in so far as it applies to the property and
funds of the Retirement System, it is clearly valid. It is probably valid,
also, in exempting from property taxes the accrued rights of the mem-
bers, as, whatever the niceties of constitutional exemption theory may
be, the state does not now make and has never made any real effort to
tax the cash surrender value of life insurance or retirement insurance.
However, if, as seems probable, the italicized provisions intend to ex-
empt from property taxes, even after receipt by the beneficiary, the
payments made by the system, it is on very doubtful ground. A similar
exemption is granted in the federal laws dealing with federal payments
to war veterans, 2 but the validity of this depends upon the paramount
power of Congress over the subject matter, and it is not a valid prec-
edent for determining whether the action of the assembly falls within
Of course, even if the court accepts these corporations as charitable, any in-
come-producing property they own might still be taxable. See discussion of C. 125
at p. 520, infra.
'The only other possibility would be to uphold the exemption under the as-
sembly's classification power, but this is rather a remote possibility. See the dis-
cussion of C. 221 at p. 523. infra.
'38 U. S. C. A. §454(a). The exemption does not extend to property purchased
with the payments received. Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U. S. 354, 54 Sup. Ct. 138,
78 L. ed. 358 (1933). But it does extend to bank deposits made with the payments.
Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U. S. 245, 57 Sup. Ct. 443, 81 L. ed. 623 (1937). It has
been held not to prevent inclusion of the proceeds of a war risk insurance policy
in gross estate of the deceased veteran for federal estate tax purposes. U. S. Trust
Co. v. Helvering, 307 U. S. 57, 59 Sup. Ct. 692, 83 L. ed. 1104 (1939).
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the language of the state constitution. And apparently the attempted
exemption is not within that language.3 It is'interesting to note that
Congress has apparently not attempted to exempt from taxation the com-




(1) Hospital Property. C. 125 undertakes to clarify the situation
with respect to exemption of the property of hospitals. It provides ex-
emption for realty, actually used for hospital purposes, including nurses'
homes, when "held for or owned by hospitals organized and operated as
non-stock, non-profit, charitable institutions, without profit to the mem-
bers or their successors, notwithstanding that patients able to pay are
charged for services rendered", if all revenues or receipts are "used,
invested or held for" the purposes for which the hospital was organized.
If property is used partly for hospital and partly for commercial purposes,
only a proportionate part of the value of the land and building is to be
exempt. A like exemption is granted to the personal property of such
hospitals, the only differences being that the personalty provision omits ;
(a) the specific requirement that the property be used for hospital pur-
poses or nurses' homes; (b) the language "without profit to the members
or their successors"; and (c) reference to the proportionate exemption
in case of divided use. Both provisions apply to taxes for the year 1936
and subsequent years.
This chapter was clearly sired by the recent decision of the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Piedmont Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Guil-
ford County.2 Pointing out that the Machinery Act of 19393 provided
that bills for charity services rendered by "private" hospitals could be
credited on the taxes of such hospitals, the court reasoned that this
classified all hospitals not publicly controlled and maintained, and indi-
cated the legislative intent that, except to this limited extent, the real
property of such hospitals should not be exempt even when the particular
hospital was, in fact, a charitable institution. The decision is question-
able, to say the least, because it concedes that personal property owned
by the same hospital, to the extent used for charitable purposes, was
'There is a bare possibility that the exemption could be upheld under the
classification power, but this is doubtful. See the discussion of C.221 at p. 523,
infra.
' See 42 U. S. C. A. §407, which is a part of Title II of the Social Security Act,
dealing with "Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Benefits". The section
grants exemption from execution, but does not mention taxes.
'For a general review of the property tax exemption problem, see Coates, The
Battle of Exemptions (1941) 19 N. C. L. REv. 154. And for other new laws dealing
with such exemptions see, in this summary, "State and Local Tax Exemption" at
p. 517, supra. 2218 N. C. 673, 12 S. E. (2d) 265 (1940).
'N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 310, §602 (a).
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exempt under Section 601(5) of the Machinery Act, while never men-
tioning a virtually identical provision applying expressly to realty of
charitable hospitals in Section 600(5) of the act.4  However, whether
justified or not, the decision still clearly accounts for this new statute;
and to avoid any possible repetition of the decision, the new law ex-
pressly provides that Section 602(a), allowing the credit for charity
bills, shall not apply to public or charitable hospitals-i.e., it is left to
apply only to potentially profit-making private hospitals.
In so far as it exempts the property of charitable hospitals used for
hospital and allied purposes the new provision seems to be well within
the language of the state constitution permitting exemptions. 5 It also
seems to fall within the recently developed ideas of the supreme court.
The court has been holding that the legislature is powerless to exempt
income-producing property, regardless of how charitable, educational or
religious the owner might be, and regardless of whether the income is
used for charitable, etc., purposes.6 However, this seems to refer to
the use of property for ordinary rental or commercial purposes, in com-
petition with other lines of business. And there is, as yet at least, noth-
ing to indicate that the court will regard the operation of a non-profit
hospital as in that category, even though it can be and may actually be
in competition with private hospitals operated as profit-making enter-
prises. That a hospital operated on a non-profit basis, though receiving
rental for rooms from some of its patients, is a quasi-public enterprise
which the legislature may exempt seems not to have been doubted by
the court either in the Piedmont Hospital case or in the earlier case of
Hospital v. Rowan County.7 The situation seems to be roughly anal-
ogous to that of a municipal power plant, which is apparently exempt
from taxation as being used for a public purpose, even though it is in
' Section 600 (5) exempts "Real property belonging to, actually and exclusively
occupied by ... hospitals ... not conducted for profit, but entirely and completely
as charitable." Perhaps the court had in mind that this section was inapplicable
in the particular case because of the "exclusively occupied" requirement, since part
of the building was rented out for stores and offices. However, this seems unlikely,
because the entire opinion is based on the idea that all non-public hospital realty
was classified for treatment exclusively under section 602(a). Why the classifica-
tion did not equally relate to personal property, since section 602(a) allows charity
bills to be credited on taxes for personal as well as real property, is nowhere ex-
plained. Furthe, as far as the "exclusively occupied" language is concerned, sec-
tion 602(a) applies in terms only to property "strictly used for hospital purposes,"
and the court conceded, apparently, that it could apply to the portion of the building
used for a hospital. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that somehow the court
simply overlooked the provisions of section 600(5).
'Article V, §5 provides: "The General Assembly may exempt ... property held
for educational, scientific, literary, charitable or religious purposes."
'Odd Fellows v. Swain, 217 N. C. 632, 9 S E. (2d) 365 (1940) ; Harrison v.
Guilford County, 218 N. C. 718, 12 S. E. (2d) 269 (1940) ; Rockingham County v.
Elon College, 219 N. C. 342, S. E. (2d) (1941); Guilford College v. Guilford
County, 219 N. C. 347, S. E. (2d) (1941).
7205 N. C. 8, 169 S. E. 805 (1933)
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one sense a competitive business enterprise, and even though income-
producing municipal property not regarded as used for a public purpose
is held to be taxable by the majority of the court.8 And, if the ex-
emption is valid at all, there seems no reason to doubt the power of
the assembly to permit apportionment of the value for exemption pur-
poses when the use is divided. In fact, the Piedmont Hospital case
definitely implies that this can be done, as it apparently approved
similar apportionment under Section 602(a).
Since the Piedmont case allowed exemption for personal property
of the hospital "completely used for charitable and benevolent purposes",
the necessity for the new act as applied to personalty is not as apparent
as with respect to realty. The act, in terms, does not restrict the ex-
emption to property so used, but the whole tenor of the recent decisions
indicates that the court will so restrict it.9 Perhaps the idea is to get
away from a possible construction of the old language as meaning that
only beds used in wards where no charges are made are exempt, in
favor of a construction that all beds are exempt because used for the
purposes of the hospital and the hospital is charitable. However, if this
latter is valid, it should have been taken as the most reasonable mean-
ing for the old language, anyway.
Eventually the requirement that "all revenues or receipts of such
hospitals shall be used, invested, or held for the purposes for which
they are organized" may give trouble; but for the time being it should
probably be assumed to mean only that the hospital shall be charitable
when tested by its check stubs as well as when tested by its charter
provisions.
The retroactive application to 1936, since it exempts rather than
levies a tax,1° and since it does not, as a practical matter, work any
great change in the accepted status of the property, is probably permis-
sible. The purpose is not to require refunds, as in practice such prop-
erty was not regarded as taxable until the decision of the Piedmont
Hospital case (or, at the earliest, the decision in Odd Fellows v.
Swain1 ). The main purpose of the provision is to prevent the prop-
erty from being treated as discovered property and placed on the books
for five preceding years.12
8Andrews v. Clay County, 200 N. C. 280, 156 S. E. 855 (1931); Board of
Financial Control v. Henderson County, 208 N. C. 569, 181 S. E. 636 (1935);
Benson v. Johnston County, 209 N. C. 751, 185 S. E. 6 (1935) ; Warrenton v. War-
ren County, 215 N. C. 342, 2 S. E. (2d) 464 (1939); Winston-Salem v. Forsyth
County, 217 N. C. 704, 9 S. E. (2d) 381 (1940).
Cases cited notes 2 and 6, supra.
0 Cf. N. C. CoNs. (1936) art. I, §32: "No law taxing retrospectively sales,
purchases, or other acts previously done, ought to be passed."
11217 N. C. 632; 9 S. E. (2d) 365 (1940).
"See N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 310, §1109(3).
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(2) Farm Produce. C. 221 undertakes to exempt from taxation, for
the year following the year in which the products are grown, all farm
products owned by the original producer. The provision replaces the
former one allowing the producer to deduct from the value of his prod-
uce the amount of his indebtedness. 8
This exemption, being one of personal property which can exceed
$300 in value, seems clearly beyond the language of the exemption pro-
visions of the constitution.' 4 If valid at all, the legal justification must
be found in the classification power granted the assembly by the amend-
ment adopted in 1936.' 5 The recent charitable and educational prop-
erty cases, referred to above, seem to indicate that the majority of the
court is unwilling to construe the classification power as, in effect,
broadening of the exemption powers. However, in those cases, the court
may be said to have been dealing with a class of property owners, and not
a class of property. That is, the court may well regard two store build-
ings as falling within the same class of property (and taxation must be
uniform within the class), though the owner of one is a private indi-
vidual and the owner of the other is a church. Probably, in view of
what it has already said, the court would not permit different rates of
tax to be levied on the two store buildings, any more than it will permit
complete exemption of one. It has not yet been squarely faced by the
question: If the property selected is justifiably regarded as a class (in
which case, almost inevitably, restriction of the tax on it to a very nom-
inal rate would be valid), would the classification power justify its com-
plete exemption, even though the exemption provisions would not cover
it? The present statute may or may not present such a question, de-
pendent upon whether the court would recognize farm produce owned
by the producer as a distinct class of property, or would rule that the
class had to cover farm produce regardless of ownership. The latter
seems more probable, in view of the obvious analogy to the store build-
ing illustration used above. However, it seems entirely possible that
the exemption nominally granted by the new act will be given in prac-
tice without the question ever being presented in court, as has been the
case with the long-standing exemption for all growing crops.,
The reasons for enactment of the new statute are probably: (a) the
"' N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 310, §602(b). A by-product of this substitution seems
to have been to restrict the similar privilege of deducting debts from the value of
fertilizer or fertilizer materials to debts incurred to purchase the same, the
restrictive language being put into the new law by amendment before its final
passage.
" Article V, §5 provides: "The General Assembly may exempt . . . personal
property, to a value not exceedingi three hundred dollars."
See N. C. CoNsT. (1936) art. V, §3.
SN. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 310, §601(8). This exemption, not mentioned in the
constitution, attained its present form in N. C. Pub. L. 1931, c. 428, §306(8),
which, of course, antedates the classification power.
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feeling that farmers have so far received little, if any, benefit from the
classification power; and (b) the belief that shifting of the tax listing
date from April 1 to January 1 by the 1939 Machinery Act resulted,
despite local administrative efforts to minimize such consequences, in
increasing the total property required to be listed by farmers. The new
law, if valid, will leave farmers more fortunately situated than they were
prior to the change in the listing date; and if it remains in force will
probably prevent any very serious agitation for abandonment of the
January 1 date.
This act and the hospital exemption statute discussed above each
added a new subsection (11) to Section 601 of the Machinery Act.
This has elements of surface confusion, since the hospital act also incor-
porated a reference to subsection (11) in another subsection of Section
601. However, the court should have little difficulty in tracing the
origin of the provisions and determining any question which may arise
in accordance with the legislative intent as manifested in the separate
acts.
(3) Unsuccessful Exemption Efforts. Other attempts to exempt or
classify property for tax purposes were uniformly unsuccessful. S. B.
114 and H. B. 254 undertook to exempt 50% of the first $1,000 in value
of each owner-occupied home, but neither got beyond the house in which
introduced. Equally unsuccessful was H. B. 694, which, where land is
subject to a purchase money mortgage, would have assessed only the
equity of redemption to the owner-for-personal-or-family-use of a farm
or home, the remainder of the value to be assessed to the purchase-
money lienholder at full local rates, the intangibles tax not appyling.
Passed by the House, but allowed to expire in the Senate Calendar Com-
mittee, was H. B. 543, which would have declared all realty acquired by
local governmental units by tax foreclosure to be deemed held for the
"necessary public purpose of collecting taxes" for four years following
its acquisition, and exempt from the taxes of other units during such
period. 17
H. B. 745, which would have classified forest land and assessed
timber values at one-half actual values, never progressed beyond the
stage of an unfavorable committee report in the House.
Deferment of Revaluation.
North Carolina's system of real estate valuation for tax purposes
has, for some years, contemplated that all realty be revalued each fourth
year. In recent years this has been honored more in the breach than
in the observance, and the assembly, since 1933, has authorized re-
"'Cf. N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 310, §1719(u).
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valuation by horizontal, percentage increase or decrease in values as
well as by the more costly (though presumably more accurate) method
of actual reappraisal.1 These alternatives, however, proved inadequate
to meet the desires of many boards of county commissioners, who wished
to leave values unchanged for 1941, supposedly a revaluation or "quad-
rennial" year, either by actual revaluation or horizontal change. Accord-
ingly, C. 282 authorized county boards, in their discretion, to postpone
the revaluation in 1941 and also to defer it in 1942 and 1943. Nothing
is said about it, but presumably the valuation statutes applicable for
years other than quadrennial years will apply.to these years if defer-
ment is voted. Further, nothing is said expressly as to whether the
deferment may be made to the next revaluation year (1945) or merely
for one year. Since 1942 and 1943 are mentioned, the inference seems
to be that postponement is to be from year to year only, though reval-
uation could be had in 1942 or 1943 if not had in 1941. Postponement
in each of these years might leave 1944" scheduled as the revaluation
year, though this can easily be clarified by the 1943 assembly.
The act does not apply to Ashe, Rowan or Guilford2 counties. Fur-
ther, it provides that it shall not repeal House Bill 192 "passed at the
1941 session of the General Assembly". House Bill 192 provided that
boards of commissioners could, if they found no change in values, dis-
pense with revaluation in 1941 or subsequent quadrennial years. In
practice, this device had already been invoked by a number of boards,
and H. B. 192 undertook to validate such action. It was undoubtedly*
passed, as C. 282 recites; but at the last minute it was recalled from the
enrolling office by the Senate and killed. However, C. 282 itself does
undertake to validate "all proceedings and actions heretofore taken by
said board of county commissioners in any county in the State as to
postponement, or as to increases or reductions or by actual appraisal
thereof." The grammar of this provision is more doubtful than its mean-
ing, and the latter is none too clear. However, it should at least approve
deferments to the extent that the action taken involves only year to year
postponement, though it might, as pointed out above, leave open the
question of postponement from 1941 to 1945 without further action.
Collection and Foreclosure.
By contrast with 1939, when the collection and foreclosure statutes
were completely rewritten as article XVII of the Machinery Act, not a
single state-wide bill affecting collection and foreclosure was passed in
1941. There were, as usual, a number of local statutes tinkering with
1N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 310, §§300, 301.2 Guilford County is not expressly mentioned. but the language of section 132
clearly has reference to it.
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the collection laws, particularly with penalties; but all of the compar-
atively few general amendments fell by the wayside'
Specal Assessments.
C. 160 is this year's version of what has become the customary legis-
lation authorizing municipal authorities to extend special assessments
over a new period of ten years. It takes the form of substituting "1942"
for "1940" in N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2717(b), and this has
the effect of permitting such extension by resolution adopted prior to
July 1, 1942.
TAXATION-REVENUE ACT CHANGES
In 1939 the Revenue Act' waspassed as a permanent act and, there-
fore, only amendatory laws, chief of which was C. 50, were enacted at
the 1941 session. The ensuing discussion does not attempt to deal with
all the changes made. All of those mentioned were made by C. 50
unless the contrary is indicated.
Inheritance Taxes
The language providing for levy of the inheritance tax in accord-
ance with compromises reached in will contests, which appeared in the
Revenue Act for the first time in 1937,2 has been eliminated. The prob-
-able result sought by this repeal, continued in section 2, subsections (a)
and (b) of C. 50, is to have the tax levied in accordance with the state
of the probate records. That is, if the will is probated without oppo-
sition, or final judgment after caveat favors the propounder, then the
tax will be levied on the shares of those taking under the will, regardless
of any agreement they may make to pay for the withholding of a caveat
or an appeal or to buy off contestants in any other manner; and if the
final judgment favors the caveators, the tax will be levied on the shares
of those taking by intestate succession, regardless of any compromise
'The major offerings were: (1) S. B. 48, designed to permit elimination of
sale of tax sale certificates; (2) H. B. 94, to place a ten year statute of limitations
on foreclosure actions brought under C. S. 7990; (3) H. B. 263, to provide a
method for service of summons, in a foreclosure action, when a trustee in a deed
of trust cannot be located (Compare-discussion of C. 115 at p. 508) ; (4) H. B.
814, to impose penalties one month earlier than under the present law; and (5)
H. B. 923, to place a three year statute of limitations on the use of garnishment
to collect taxes.
* N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 158.
* N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 127, §1, First and Second. The provision was probably
suggested by the famous compromise agreement reached in connection with the
estate of the late Smith Reynolds. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 578, 182
S. E. 341 (1935).
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agreements they may have made on the side.3 The majority of courts
passing on this question, where the statutory situation is similar to that
now obtaining here, seem to have reached this result.4 It seems prob-
able that the North Carolina court would follow this view, particularly
since we have no statute which gives any special status to will compro-
mises,5 and since the statutory history here (of the insertion of the
compromise provision followed by.-its repeal) seems dearly to indicate
a legislative intent that the majority rule be followed.6
Apparently the change was prompted by fear that revenue authorities
would be unable to tell when compromises were made in good faith
to settle actual controversies and when made only or primarily to
reduce tax liability (by distributing money to more beneficiaries or
to closer relatives of the decedent) or for some other purpose not in-
volving an actual controversy. 7 The new rule may eliminate that worry,
but it will not completely eliminate all possibility of unsatisfactory re-
sults. The tax factor will still inevitably figure in the manner in which
compromises are made effective; and, in cases in which the estate is left
to charitable institutions, which make payments to the heirs to avoid a
contest, it seems unreasonable for the state to collect no tax. Perhaps,
by construing this, in effect, as an unwarranted attempt to assign a tax
exemption, our courts could make it an exception to the general rule,8
. " There is no intention here to suggest that the tax laws change in any way the
North Carolina rule against nonsuits in will contests. See In re Westfeldt, 188
N. C. 702, 125 S. E. 531 (1924); cf. Commercial National Bank v. Alexander, 188
N. C. 667, 125 S. E. 385 (1924). While the rule might prevent utilization of a
nonsuit as the device for putting a compromise into effect, it obviously does not
prevent the effective compromise of will cases. See Bailey v. McLain, 215 N. C.
150, 1 S. E. (2d) 372 (1939).
'See Note (1932) 78 A. L. R. 716.
'In some states those who take under a compromise are regarded as taking
under the will, and the federal courts have held that when this is so, the federal
death tax is to be levied in accordance with the compromise. Smith v. Com-
missioner, 78 F. (2d)'897 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935), criticised in (1936) 49 HAv. L.
REv. 844. Cf. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 59 Sup. Ct. 155, 83 L. ed. 119 (1938).
'Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 578, 182 S. E. 341 (1935) does not indicate
that our court, prior to inclusion of the reference to compromises in the 1937
Revenue Act, had adopted the minority rule of levying the tax in accordance with
the compromise. The tax agreed upon and approved by the court in that case was
simply an arbitrary amount. It was not the equivalent of a tax based on the theory
that the property passed under the will or on the theory that it passed by intestate
succession or on the theory that it passed under the compromise. Presumably, at
least with the court's approval, a similar compromise of the state's tax claim
could still be made. Bailey v. McLain, 215 N. C. 150, 1 S. E. (2d) 372 (1939),
further clearly indicates our court will accept the majority rule.
See the ruling of the Attorney General, reported in 604 (New) C. C. H.
Inher., Estate and Gift Tax Serv. (1937) 8245, to the effect that a distribution
agreement made "merely to meet the desire and convenience of the interested
parties" was not a settlement of a will contest within the meaning of the Revenue
Act.
, See (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 1164, commenting on Taylor v. Stokes, 40 Ga.
App. 295, 149 S. E. 321 (1929), holding taxable the portion going to the heirs
under such an agreement made by the charitable beneficiaries.
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though there is nothing as yet to indicate that the revenue authorities
would ask that it be done.
Another change in the death tax laws adds a provision that "nothing
in this Article shall be construed as imposing a tax upon any transfer
of intangibles not having a commercial or business situs in this State, by
a person, or by reason of the death of a person, who was not a resident
of this State at the time of his death, and, if held or transferred in trust,
such intangibles shall not be deemed to have a commercial or business
situs in this State merely because the trustee is a resident or, if a cor-
poration, is doing business in this State, unless the same be employed
in or held or used in connection with some business carried on in whole
or in part in this State." The latter part of this, which appears in sec-
tion 2(c) of the new law, explains its enactment, for it is intended to
prevent taxation of intangibles held in trust by our banks for non-
resident beneficiaries, unless the trust itself involves some active business
(as distinguished from the bank's business) in this State. This method
of avoiding potential double taxation (it might actually avoid any tax-
ation) which might be prejudicial to the trust business of local banks
had already been put into effect by ruling of the Revenue Commis-
sioner, 9 and the practical consequences of the change are, therefore, not
very great. The same ruling applied in terms to the intangible personal
property tax and would probably be followed as to the gift tax, also;
but, apparently because the banks did not request it, no statutory recog-
nition was given it in connection with those taxes.
Section 2(d) of the new law provides for -deduction from gross
estate of "taxes accrued and unpaid at the death of the decedent and
unpaid ad valorem. taxes accruing during the calendar year of death,"
this language being substituted for "taxes that have become due and
payable and the pro rata part of taxes that have accrued for the fiscal
year that have not become due and payable." The reason for the change
is to eliminate the troublesome proration provision, which had special
application to property taxes; and this both explains the peculiar word-
ing of the new provision and indicates the administrative interpretation
it will receive. It will be construed to permit deduction of the entire
'604 (New) C. C. H. Inher., Estate and Gift Tax Serv. (1939) 8246. The
latter seems to be based on the idea that the state would not have been permitted
to levy such taxes prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Curry v.
McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 83 L. ed. 1339 (1939) ; that the legisla-
ture, therefore, did not contemplate such taxation when it passed the statutes; and
that no attempt would be made to assess such taxes without further explicit direc-
tions from the Assembly. In the light of Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia,
280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed. 180 (1929), this line of reasoning was (and
except to the extent that it is supported by the new statute, still is) highly ques-
tionable if not obviously erroneous, particularly as applied to intangible property
taxes.
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.amount of property tax becoming a lien on January 110 of the year of
death; and it will not be construed as, by implication, prohibiting de-
duction of unpaid property taxes accruing in the years prior to the year
of death.
License Taxes (Schedule B)
Among a. sprinkling of minor amendments attention need be called
to but three: (1) Section 3(f) of C. 50, in deference to the views of
the United States Supreme Court, repeals the tax on display of mer-
chandise in hotel rooms, etc., declared unconstitutional in Best & Co.,
Inc. v. Maxwell.' However, the assembly proves that the court cannot
rush it into precipitate action by expressly delaying the effective date of
the repeal until June 1, 1941. (2) The state supreme court's refusal2 to
concede that the weasel words of Section 130 of the 1939 Revenue Act
repealed any part of the sweeping prohibitions in the Flanagan Anti-slot
Machine Act,3 caused that section to be rewritten in Section 3(h) of
the new law. The revised Section 130 leaves the field to the Flanagan
Act, unassisted by any language even remotely in conflict therewith, and
taxes only vending, weighing and music machines. This is accom-
panied by omission of the former provision authorizing destruction of
machines seized because unlicensed, the new section authorizing tax
authorities (state or local) only to seize, remove and "hold" the machines
until the section is complied with. So far as appears, if payment is
never forthcoming, the holding continues indefinitely. (3) An exemp-
tion from coal and coke dealer's license is granted by Section 3(c) to
those who deliver "to State institutions or public schools only". Assum-
ing that such a classification is valid, its wisdom may be open to ques-
tion. Whatever the purity of its motives may be, it can hardly operate
to save the state much more in coal prices than it costs in license taxes;
and such a policy, if it becomes common, might operate to encourage
development of a special class selling only to the state, depriving those
in the general business of selling to the public of the opportunity to
make such sales.
Franchise Taxes
Section 210(2) of the 1939 Revenue Act requires every subsidiary
or affiliated corporation whose capital stock is inadequate for its busi-
ness needs to include its indebtedness owed to, or endorsed or guaranteed
by, its parent or affiliate in computing the capital stock, surplus, and
undivided profits which form the basis for franchise tax. To this is
1 0N.'C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 310, §1401.
*- U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 334, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 274 (1940).
'State v. Abbott, 218 N. C. 470, 11 S. E. (2d) 539 (1940).
3 N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 196.
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added, by Section 4(b) of the new law: "The capital stock for the pur-
pose of this section shall be deemed to be inadequate to the extent that
additional loans, credits, goods, supplies or other capital of whatsoever
nature is furnished by the parent or affiliated corporation." While this
is not the happiest wording that might have been devised, the intention
seems to be to negative any idea that there might be any subsidiary or
affiliate which, by contending that its capital was otherwise sufficient,
could omit from its tax base any indebtedness owed to, or endorsed or
guaranteed by the parent or affiliate. This rule has already been fol-
lowed as an administrative principle.
The only other change worth mentioning is that in Section 4(c),
which rewrites that part of Section 210 of the Revenue Act defining
the corporations which are to pay franchise taxes under the gross re-
ceipts formula. The intention, which is probably accomplished, is solely
to clarify the wording of the law, without making! any changes in exist-
ing practice. A similar change was also. made, by Section 5 (c) of the
new law, in Section 311 of the Revenue Act, dealing with corporations
paying income tax under the gross receipts formula.
Income Taxes
(1) Tax on local income of nonresidents. Section 325 of the 1939
Revenue Act is repealed.' This section formerly allowed a nonresident
to credit against the tax on his income taxable by this state the tax he
paid to the state or country of his residence, provided the laws of that
state or country carried reciprocal provisions for our residents deriving
income there. The effect of the repeal is that the nonresident individual,
after deducting from his North Carolina income such deductions as are
reasonably connected therewith, 2 and taking a proportionate personal
exemption,3 must pay the regular North Carolina income tax on the
remaining net, without regard to whether or in what amount the state
of his residence taxes the same income. In other words, the North
Carolina policy now is that if double taxation is to be prevented in such
cases,4 it is up to the state of residence to do the preventing. It seems
probable that the change was motivated by the existence of cases in
which the taxes of the state of residence equalled or exceeded the North
Carolina tax and, therefore, prevented collection of any tax here. The
' This was done originally by section 5(1) of c. 50, but this, in turn, was re-
placed by section 1(b) of c. 204 (which retained the repeal of section 325).
'N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 158, §322(11).
8 Id. §324 (2).
'That there is no constitutional prohibition against taxing income both at its
source and at the residence of the recipient, even where its source is real property,
seems now reasonably clear. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 57
Sup. Ct. 466, 81 L. ed. 666 (1937) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U. S. 9, 59
Sup. Ct. 1, 83 L. ed. 16 (1938).
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new policy seems reasonable because: (a) the locality which furnishes
the income has a legitimate right to tax it, the waiving of which in favor
of the state of residence unduly favors the great creditor states; and
(b) the political influence of the taxpayer should normally be greatest in
the state of his residence, and, therefore, he has a reasonably good chance
of insisting upon a policy there which avoids inequitable double taxation
of the same income.
Income taxable to nonresidents, under our statute, consists primarily
of income from property in the state and income from any business,
trade, profession or occupation carried on within the state.5 Despite
these broad general provisions, the Attorney General ruled that federal
salaries earned by nonresidents in North Carolina were not taxable, be-
cause the specific 1939 provision which, for the first time, expressly
undertook to tax federal salaries, referred only to federal employees
"resident of this State".0 This has been rewritten to clarify its scope
generally and, in particular, to make it clear that federal salaries will
receive the same treatment as other salary income.7
(2) Tax on income of residents from outside the state. The scheme
of the 1939 Revenue Act for taxation of the income of residents de-
rived from sources outside the state was: (a) to tax all income from
states having no income tax; (b) to exempt income from an established
business or property, in another state if that state levied a. tax upon
such income; (c) to tax income from personal services or from mort-
gages, stocks, bonds, securities and deposits, even though originating
in a state levying an income tax.8 The effect of this. latter provision
was (chiefly as applied to personal service income) to impose a double
tax wherever the law of the state where it originated also taxed it with-
out granting a credit of the type contained in our former Section 325
(see the discussion above).
Two things occurred to cause dissatisfaction with this as applied to
salaries: (a) Repeal of old Section 325 opened up the possibility of
double taxation even where the other state's law contained a reciprocal
credit and (b) the taxing of federal salaries raised the possibility of
double taxation for a numerically sizeable and politically influential group
of federal employees who, though living elsewhere, maintain voting res-
idence in this state. Pressure from this group probably accounts, in the
main, for enactment of new Section 325, providing that when a resident
of this state is required to pay an income tax to another state or taxing
N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 158, §§301 (c), 310.0 C. C. H. North Carolina Corp. Tax Serv. (1939) 15-143.
'This change was accomplished by section 5 (e) of c. 50. This section was later
amended by c. 283 in such a way as to eliminate any specification of the Revenue
Act section it amends. However, the intention of the assembly can still be clearly
divined and should be effectuated.
'N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 158, §322(10).
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jurisdiction other than the United States on compensation for personal
services rendered outside this state, he does not have to pay any tax
thereon here, though his personal exemption must be prorated accord-
ingly.9 This new provision takes effect with the income year 1940.
The most troublesome legal question likely to arise under it is that of
what is meant by being "required to pay" an income tax to another juris-
diction. The major possibilities are: (a) actual payment; (b) actual
liability (i.e., an enforceable tax obligation, even though no actual pay-
ment has been made); and (c) earning of the money under circum-
stances which, in general, make it subject to the income tax of another
jurisdiction, even though, because of exemptions or deductions, no tax
liability is incurred in the particular case. If the language used is to
be given its normal meaning, (a) seems the most likely construction,
though its adoption will result in some difference of treatment between
personal service income from extra-state sources and business or prop-
erty income from extra-state sources.10 Another difference between the
two types is that the business or property income is exempt here only if
taxed where earned, whereas the salary income is exempt here if any
other state requires payment of a tax.1 A third difference is that the
salary provision refers to the tax of any jurisdiction other than the
United States, while the business and property income provision refers
only to the tax of another "state", though this might be construed to
include the District of Columbia.12 Finally, the business and property
income provision refers to the tax of another state on "net income",
while the new. salary provision specifies only "income", thus leaving
open the question of the status of a gross income tax in another
jurisdiction.
Discounting the troublesome (and unnecessary) differences between
the two, the net effect of the new provision is to place extra-state salary
income (though not that from securities, etc.) more nearly on a par
with that from extra-state business and property; and little quarrel can
be had with this, as far as it goes. However, whether the income be
' C. 204, §1 (b). Originally, in section 5 (1) of c. 50, the new version of section
325 was worded in such a way that it would have virtually applied only to federal
employees, but more general language is employed in the version finally enacted.
"0Under section 322(10) of the Revenue Act the practice has been to collect
no North Carolina tax if the income is of the specified kind and originates in a
state which has a net income tax law. The statutory language is "a state that levies
a tax upon such net income." No judicial construction of the phrase has been
found necessary.
" The reason for this is, again, federal employees. Many of them who work
in the District of Columbia live in Maryland or Virginia. Under the new provision
payment of tax to either of those states will prevent levy of the North Carolina
tax. This result would not have followed had the provision been limited to payment
of tax to the jurisdiction where the compensation is earned.
12 The salary provision was apparently deliberately drafted in language broad
enough to include a tax paid to a foreign country.
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from salary or business or property, there is little reason why a North
Carolinian having $10,000 income from Florida should pay tax on the
entire amount, because Florida has no income tax, while the North
Carolinian having $10,000 income from comparable sources in Virginia
pays North Carolina nothing on it, even though the Virginia tax he
pays amounts to less than would his North Carolina tax. By far the
most satisfactory device would be to require that all extra-state income
of our residents, regardless of source, be reported and included in com-
puting our tax, and then credit the tax paid elsewhere on our tax (not
exceeding the actual North Carolina tax on the same income). The
result of such a policy would be that, so far as North Carolina could
control it without sacrificing its right to tax income of our residents
earned in this state, every resident earning $10,000 would pay the same
total state income taxes, though some would pay the entire amount to
North Carolina and some would pay it partly to North Carolina and
partly to other states. This is obviously the only result really con-
sistent with the principle of ability to pay, the following of which is
usually regarded as the greatest merit of the net income tax.
Some further attempt was made to clarify questions turning upon
residence by redefining "resident" in Section 5(a) of the new law.
Among the changes are: elimination of the old confusing requirement
that a resident ,be such on the first day of the year in which the tax is
payable;18 inclusion of express language dealing with cases in which
residence is changed during the income year; and inclusion of a re-
buttable presumption that anyone spending more than six months in the
state during the income year is a resident. Originally a presumption
was also included that persons voting here should be deemed residents,
but this was eliminated by amendment, presumably under pressure from
federal employees (though voting here should still be an important fac-
tor in determining residence).
(3) Income of subsidiary corporations. Section 31834 of the 1939
Act is so rewritten, in Section 5(f) of the new law, as to become prac-
tically unrecognizable, but the only substantial change intended results
from incorporations of a lengthy new provision authorizing the Com-
missioner of Revenue, upon finding that the return of a subsidiary or
affiliated corporation does not reflect its true net income in the state,
to require it to file a consolidated return showing income for parent and
all subsidiaries and affiliates. The income of the subsidiary or affiliate
in question may then be determined "by taking the factor of investment
in real estate and tangible personal property in this state and volume of
business in this state and by relating these factors to the total investment
of the parent corporation and its subsidiaries and affiliated corporations
8N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 158, §302(13).
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in real estate and tangible personal property in and out of this state
and their total volume of business in and out of this state." Generally
speaking, when a corporate system is engaged in a business of such a
character that the profits of the member of the system can reasonably
be said to be interrelated or interdependent, the attempt to determine the
taxable income of a subsidiary by assigning it a reasonable portion of
the consolidated net income of the system should be constitutional.14
Particularly is this true when it -can be shown thaf over a long period
of years the system as a whole has earned money while the subsidiary
operating in this state, though doing a substantial business with the
system and the public, has nominally earned none. The statute, in turn'
is not confined to cases in which the various members of the corporate
family are engaged in one so-called "unitary" business or in a common
enterprise of a type which makes their profits interrelated or interde-
pendent. The Commissioner must find that the members: "(a) ... are
owned or controlled by the same financial interests; or (b) ... are...
together... carrying on a unitary business or are branches or parts of
a unitary business or are carried in different phases of the same general
business or industry." It is obvious that the inclusion of (a) renders
the provisions of (b) somewhat innocuous. However, the fact that a
statute of this type cannot, in fact, be fairly applied in a case where the
various corporations are doing a completely independent business (as, for
instance, two commonly controlled construction companies might be
doing), should not render the statute unconstitutional. It should rightly
prevent application of the statute in the particular case.
It should be noted that the new provision goes further than simply
authorizing specific contracts or credits or charges between parent and
subsidiary to be revised or disregarded in determining the latter's tax-
able income. Provisions granting such authority were supposed to
remain in the act ;15 but the new provision will,, if valid, authorize con-
" There is no United States Supreme Court case squarely passing upon a
statute of the type -here involved. For discussions of the problem, see Huston,
Allocation of Corporate Net Income (1932) 26 ILL. L. Ray. 725; Magill, Alloca-
tion of Income by Corporate Contract (1931) 44 HAav. L. RaV. 935. In addition
to the cases therein discussed, see Curtis Companies, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tax Com-
mission, 214 Wis. 85, 251 N. W. 497 (1933); Burroughs Co. v. Wisconsin Tax
Comm., 297 N. W. 574 (1941); Northern States Power Co. v. Wisconsin Tax
Comm., 297 N. W. 578 (1941).
"The provision was, however, garbled in the process of re-enactment and at-
tempted strengthening in the 1941 law. As it originally appeared in section 5(f)
of c. 50, it provided for "eliminating all payments to or charges by the parent
corporation or other subsidiaries or affiliates of the parent corporation in excess
of fair (and reasonable value and by including fair) compensation for all services
performed for or commodities or property sold, transferred, leased, or licensed
to the parent or its other subsidiary or affiliated corporations by the corporation
doing business in this State." Apparently as the result of copying errors some-
where along the line, that part of the provision shown above in parentheses is not
to be found in the law as finally enacted. Unfortunately, unless the courts could
find some way of going back to the original version, the provision seems virtually
meaningless.
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sideration of the system's entire income without finding any unfairness
or unwarranted bookkeeping methods in connection with specific inter-
company transactions.16
Possible objections to the provision are: (a) It does not adopt any
of the allocation formulae prescribed for other corporations by Section
311 and thus, even if the entire system be regarded a§ one corporate
enterprise, it is still being classified for special treatment. However,
the classification is probably not so arbitrary as to render it invalid.
(b) What particular allocation formula it does prescribe, if any, is
somewhat uncertain. The most careful reading of the phrase quoted
fails to reveal any very definite standards. There is no definition of
"investment". Is it to be taken literally, or was the actual value of the
property or the assessed value or the book value17 intended? There is
likewise no definition of "volume of business". Its most likely meaning
seems to be gross receipts, though if that is what is meant it should
have been specified.1 8  Further, there is nothing to indicate whether the
investment ratio and volume of business ratio are to be determined
separately and then averaged, or whether one ratio is to be determined
by comparing totals of "investment" plus "volume of business"; or
whether the Commissioner can give each such weight as he sees fit.
No doubt there was some deliberate intention to leave room for admin-
istrative discretion in construing the provision;19 but some room for
discretion could easily have been left without approaching the degree
of uncertainty the provision attains, particularly since harsh or uncon-
stitutional results from a more definite provision could have been avoided
in a particular case under the further provision that "if the commis-
sioner finds that the determination of the income ... under a consol-
idated return ... will produce a greater or lesser figure than the amount
earned in this State, he may' readjust the determination of reasonable
methods of computation to make it conform to the amount of income
earned in this State."'20  It is to be hoped that, if and when the validity
of the provision is tested, the courts will be able to thread their way
through these subsidiary questions of construction in some way which
6 The only findings required, other than those quoted in the text, above, are
that the subsidiary report "does not disclose the true earnings of such corporation
on its business carried on in this state," and that "the business in this state is
handled or effected in such manner as to distort or not reflect the true income
earned in this state."
1 Cf. N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 158, §311, II, 1(a), (f).
16 Cf. section 5(c) of the new law.
16 As illustrating the willingness of the court to follow the administrative con-
struction of a doubtful provision, see Powell v. Maxwell, 210 N. C. 211, 186 S. E.
326 (1936).
-O Curiously enough, our Revenue Act does not contain a provision of this gen-
eral character in connection with the formulae prescribed for allocating to this
state the income of foreign corporations, despite the decision in Hans Rees' Sons,
Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 51 Sup. Ct. 385, 75 L. ed. 879 (1931).
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will leave them free to uphold the fundamental power of the assembly
to consider the entire corporate system in taxing income of one member
of the system which, as far as profit and loss statements are concerned,
seems to be unaccountably a stepchild in the corporate family.
(4) Personal exemptions. The matter of personal exemptions for
married women" has long been a troublesome one in this state. Though
there was some question about it under the language of the 1939 act, the
Attorney General recently ruled that a wife who is the actual head of the
household-i.e., its financial mainstay-could secure the $2,000 exemp-
tion if she supported in the household one or more dependent relatives,
though the husband could not be treated as a dependent relative for this
purpose unless under eighteen years of age or mentally or physically in-
capacitated. 2 ' This ruling, which represented a liberalization of the for-
mer practice, was clearly written into the statute by Section 5(j) of the
new law. It is still true, though it probably ought not to be, that the wife
cannot be allowed the $2,000 exemption where her only dependent is
the husband and he is dependent simply because out of work rather
than because under eighteen or incapacitated.
The new provision, by Section 5(k), also specifies that the credit
for dependent children of taxpayers shall be allowed only to the person
entitled to the $2,000 exemption. This, apparently designed simply to
promote administrative convenience and certainty, will work satisfactorily
in the average case in view of the concession now clearly made that the
wife can secure the $2,000 exemption where she is actually maintaining
the household and supporting the children. It may give trouble in un-
usual cases which were probably not within the contemplation of the
draftsman but which are still within the language used-such, for in-
stance, as the case of a divorced woman who has remarried and who,
while not the head of a household, is nevertheless supporting one or
more children of her former marriage.
Sales and Use Taxes.
Of course, fiscally speaking, the most important change in the sales
tax (and probably in the entire Revenue Act) is the provision of Sec-
tion 6(c) of C. 50, granting exemption to sales by retail merchants of
"food and food products for human consumption." The quoted phrase
is to be given "its usual and ordinary meaning", but excludes "malt or
vinous beverages, soft or carbonated drinks, soda, or beverages such as
are ordinarily sold or dispensed at stores, bars, stands or soda fountains
or in connection therewith, candies or confectioneries, medicines, tonics,
and preparations in liquid, powdered, granular, tablet, capsule, or pill
form sold as dietary supplements." It also excludes "prepared meals
21 C. C. H. North Carolina Corp. Tax Serv. (1937) ff15-113, 15-120.
[Vol. 19
STATUTORY CHANGES IN N. C. IN 1941
or foods sold or served ... by. restaurants, cafes, cafeterias, hotel dining
rooms, drug stores, or other places where prepared meals or foods are
sold or served." No doubt questions will arise under this definition, but
administrative authorities are anticipating no serious trouble. The most
serious question, on the surface, is whether the language last quoted is
so broad as to exclude from the exemption many prepared food products
of the delicatessen type, sold ready to eat by grocery stores. However,
administrative authorities probably will not raise that question, as the
actual legislative intention to exempt the grocery store sales is conceded.
The definition of a sale is rewritten and broadened in Section 6(a),
the chief changes being to refer to transfers of possession for consider-
ation as well as transfers of title, and expressly to include "any bail-
ment, loan, lease, rental or license to use or consume tangible personal
property for a consideration paid or to be paid." The probable primary
purpose of this is to bring under the sales tax rental, as well as outright
sales, of business, sewing and other types of machines. Such rentals
were once subject to the tax.1 However, the language used in the new
provision apparently will include other situations, as is illustrated by the
fact that the assembly thought it advisable expressly to exempt rental
of motion picture film (because of the 3% admissions tax). Very
possibly many other situations not at all within the contemplation of the
draftsman will now be brought within the orbit of the tax. For in-
stance, why would not rental of a "U-drive-it" automobile come within
the new definition?
The only other sales tax change worth mentioning is the provision
of Section 6(f) of the new law to the effect that, in the absence of fraud,
no deficiency assessment shall include sales made more than three years
prior to the assessment and, where the assessment is in respect to an
"audit", it shall not be made more than one year after completion of
the audit. Is examination of the taxpayer's return in the office of the
commissioner an "audit", or does that term refer only to field audit of
the taxpayer's books? If the so-called "office audit" is included, then
is assessment barred after one year as to any sales covered by the return,
even though the facts could not have been discovered by the office audit
procedure? Clearly the provision should not be given too restrictive a
construction.
The use tax article of the Revenue Act is the only one completely
rewritten by the 1941 law (Section 9). The rewriting is a considerable
technical improvement and probably makes this article the best drafted
part of the act. However, outside of the desire for general clarification,
the main purposes of the redrafting can be summarized by pointing out
three changes which necessitated changing language in a great many
1 N. C. Pub. L. 1933, c. 445, §§119, 120.
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places. (a) It is made certain that retailers engaged in business in this
state must collect the tax on goods sold or delivered to North Carolina
customers, the former provision having used the word "may". 2 (b) The
definition of those "engaged in business in this State," who are thus
made responsible for collecting the tax, now includes not only those
"maintaining, occupying or using, permanently or temporarily, directly,
indirectly, or through a subsidiary or agent, by whatever name called,
any office, place of distribution, sales or sample room or place, ware-
house or storage place, or other place of business", but also those "per-
manently or temporarily, directly or through a subsidiary, having any
representative, agent, salesman, canvasser, or solicitor operating in the
State in such selling or delivery." The latter provision, which includes
retailers having no definitely located place of business in the state, is
perhaps the most important innovation,8 though if any attempt is made
to enforce it literally, the provisions making retailers of those doing
business in the state through a subsidiary might give rise to more serious
legal problems.4 (c) Under the prior article when a contractor installing
an article, such as an elevator, was also its manufacturer, the use tax
could be collected from it only on the value of the raw materials, and
tax on any balance of the value of the article at the time of installation
ha-d to be collected separately from the building owner. The new article,
as part of its definition of "sales price", on which the tax is based,
specifies that in such case it shall be the fair market value of such prop-
erty "at the time and place of sale." Just how this fits with another
provision which excludes from "sales price" the "cost for labor or serv-
ices rendered in erecting, installing or applying property", is nowhere
specified.
By C. 204 the assembly moved to make certain that the state can
take advantage of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision
that a retailer doing business in the state can be required to collect the
tax on sales made to customers in the state, though not made through
its retail outlets in the state.5 It seems entirely probable that the pro-
visions of the article as they originally appeared in C. 50 would have
permitted the state to do this anyway, as they seem at least as broad in
this respect as the Iowa statute involved in the decision. However, the
rewriting in the light of that case has removed all doubt that the North
2 N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 158, §805.
'This seems to be valid. McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U. S.
70, 60 Sup. Ct. 404, 84 L. ed. 584 (1940); United Autographic Register Co. v.
McGoldrick, 260 App. Div. 157, 21 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 129 (1st Dep't 1940) ; Jewel
Tea Co., Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 293 N. W. 386 (N. D. 1940).
Compare this discussion in the text, above, of the new provision authorizing
an entire corporate system to be considered, in certain cases, in computing the
income tax of a subsidiary corporation.
'Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,--U. S.-, 61 Sup. Ct. 586, 85 L. ed. Adv.
Ops. 522 (1941). See (1939) 17 N. C. L. R~v. 148.
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Carolina authorities can go at least as far as permitted by that decision.
The new language goes as far as any one is likely, at least in the near
future, to insist that the state's power extends.
Intangible Property Tax.
Aside from the increase of local government's share of the tax from
60% to 75%, which requires no further comment here, the most im-
portant change made in the intangible property tax article is that made
by Section 8(e) with respect to taxpayers "buying, selling, collecting,
discounting, negotiating or otherwise dealing in" taxable intangibles.
While it is not expressly so stated, the provision as a whole seems in-
tended to apply only to taxpayers whose principal business consists of
the activities mentioned. It provides: (a) if the North Carolina activity
is carried on as agent or representative of another, both agent and prin-
cipal shall be deemed to be doing business here for purposes of this
article; (b) if the business is here carried on by a subsidiary, both it and
the parent corporation are deemed to be doing business here; (c) in-
tangible property acquired by either in the conduct of the business here
is deemed to have a situs for taxation within the state; (d) the tax
return for such property is to be made either by the owner or by the
agent or subsidiary in this state. This is intended primarily to tax
installment paper acquired by subsidiary corporations which immediately
discount it to the parent, the paper being held by the latter outside the
state until collection time arrives. Under this method of doing business,
the overwhelming part of the paper originating in this state owned by
the entire corporate system at any given time is held by a corporation
which claims that it does no business here and that, therefore, the in-
tangibles it owns can have no tax situs, business or otherwise, in this
state. The result sought to be accomplished by the new provision is thus
an eminently reasonable one-that is, to tax something which, except
for the theoretical difference in the corporate personalities and presences,
could clearly be said to have such a business situs here as to make it
subject to taxation here.' In fact, the result seems so reasonable that
the statute should finally be upheld, despite theoretical stumbling blocks
which lie in its path.
2
Another change, effected by Section 8(d) of C. 50, exempts from
Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 56 Sup. Ct. 773, 80 L. ed.
1143 (1936) ; First Bank Stock Corporation v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234, 57 Sup.
Ct. 677, 81 L. ed. 1061 (1937) ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900,
83 L. ed. 1339 (1939). (Compare the discussion at p. 000 of the new provision
authorizing an entire corporate system to be considered, in certain cases, in com-
puting income taxes of a subsidiary corporation.)
'Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333, 45 Sup. Ct. 250, 69
L. ed. 634 (1925). However, as illustrating the present Court's willingness to
look through form to substance in determining -where intangibles can be taxed, see
Pearson v. McGraw, 308 U. S. 313, 60 Sup. Ct. 211, 84 L. ed. 293 (1939).
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the tax on funds deposited with insurance companies (Section 707 of
the Revenue Act) the first $20,000 when the funds are payable "to a
widow and/or children of the person deceased whose death created such
funds on deposit." This amendment resulted from the belief, sold to
the assembly with evident success, that the tax (which is collected
through the insurance company and charged to the deposited funds)
called for payment to the state of too great a percentage of the income
from- the deposited funds. Apparently the exemption would apply only
once per ecedent; and if several companies hold funds totaling in ex-
cess of $20,000, resulting from the death of one decedent, the exemption
should be prorated. Whether this possibility will necessitate continued
information reports by the companies in all cases remains to be seen.
During the progress of the new law through the assembly, an amend-
ment was added to this provision to make it apply also to the first
$20,000 of funds "paid over to and held by a 'bank as trustee." Since
the provision as a whole relates only to "the tax liability under this
section" and the section thus referred to levies a tax only on funds de-
posited with insurance companies, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know
what this addition means. No bank, acting as trustee or otherwise, can
be liable for a tax on funds deposited with insurance companies. Prob-
ably it was intended to exempt insurance funds paid over to banks from
the bank deposit tax, and possibly from taxes on other intangible prop-
erty in which such funds might be invested by the bank as trustee; but,
under the general rule that exemptions must be strictly construed against
the taxpayer, it is doubtful that any meaning at all can be given to this
inserted language. Of course, the whole provision may be unconstitu-
tional, as it is entirely possible that the classification power does not
extend to the point of authorizing complete exemption.8 However, the
Department of Revenue very probably will make no attempt to disregard
that part of it which applies to deposits with insurance companies, and,
as long as this is true, the practical effect is likely to be the same as if
the provision were constitutional.4
Other intangible property tax changes rating a very brief mention
are the following: (a) The definition of those "accounts payable" which
are deductible in computing net accounts receivable is broadened by
' See the discussion of C. 221 at p. 523, exempting from local property taxes, for
one year, farm produce owned by the producer.
" Person v. Watts, 184 N. C. 499, 115 S. E. 336 (1922); Person v. Doughton,
186 N. C. 723, 120 S. E. 481( (1923). These cases held that mandamus would not
lie to compel the state tax authorities to tax property which the legislature had
exempted, without regard to the constitutionality of the exemption. However, in
the recent cases involving exemption of the property of municipalities and charitable
institutions (see the discussion, below, of C. 125 involving hospital property), the
court has apparently found nothing objectionable in the action of tax authorities
in voluntarily disregarding express exemptions in the statute when they contended
the exemptions were unconstitutional.
[Vol. 19
STATUTORY CHANGES IN N. C. IN 1941
Section 8(a) to include "current notes payable of the taxpayer incurred
to secure funds which have been actually paid on his current accounts
payable within 120 days prior to the date as of which the intangible tax
return is made." 5 (b) Section 8(b) provides for deduction, from the
value of shares of stock, of money borrowed to purchase the stock, for
which the stock is pledged as collateral, the deduction being prorated if
the stock involved is only partially taxable.6 (c) Section 8(c) rewrites
Section 706 of the Revenue Act to provide for a tax on the value of
beneficial interests in trusts held by foreign fiduciaries at the flat rate
of 30c per $100. Under the 1939 law the tax rate depended upon the
character of the trust's holdings, the tax being the same as if a pro rata
share of the trust assets were owned outright by the beneficiary. That
provision was clearly equitable in theory, but it apparently proved diffi-
cult to deal with in practice. However, while the 1939 provision made
it reasonably clear that the tax was imposed only on interests in foreign
trusts of intangibles, the new language apparently applies even though
the trust holdings congist of realty or tangible personalty. It seems pos-
sible that the beneficial interest in a foreign realty trust, when owned
by a resident of North Carolina, can be taxed here, but the United
States Supreme Court has not yet gone so far.7
General Provisions.
(1) Garnishment. Probably the most important change in the general
provisions of the Revenue Act is that effected by Section 10(b) of C. 50,
The policy of attempting to draw a line between accounts receivable and notes
receivable, and limiting deductions from accounts receivable to accounts payable,
and barring accounts payable as deductions from notes receivable (see Revenue
Act, Sections 703 and 704) is, of course, well calculated to cause trouble. The
present amendment hits at only one of a number of troublesome problems. It is
apparently not broad enough to authorize deduction of a note given to secure money
with which to make cash purchases or a note given directly to the vendor of the
goods purchased.
A similar provision was in the 1937 Revenue Act. See N. C. Pub L. 1937, c.
127, §706. It was inadvertently omitted in the redraft of the act in 1939; but, as
the 1941 Intangible Personal Property Tax return blank (Form H-1) will show
(see Schedule E), the Revenue Department permitted the deduction to be made for
the years covered by the 1939 act.
Despite the contrary implications of Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280
U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed. 180 (1929), and the contrary holding in Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore v. Gibbs, 166 Md. 364, 171 Atl. 37 (1934), cert.
denied 293 U. S. 559, 55 Sup. Ct. 71, 79 L. ed. 660 (1934), it now seems settled
that a state can impose a property tax on the beneficial interest of a resident in a
foreign trust of intangibles. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 338 Pa. 9, 12 At. (2d)
444 (1940), affirmed per curianz-U. S.-, 61 Sup. Ct. 445, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 391
(1941). The affirmance was on the authority of Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S.
357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 83 L. ed. 1339 (1939), and Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383,
59 Sup. Ct. 913, 83 L. ed. 1356 (1939). However, the Curry case (which was a
trust case, though one not involving the precise question raised by the new statute)
seems to concede that jurisdiction to tax tangibles is much different from jurisdic-
tion to tax intangibles. And see Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422, 55 Sup. Ct. 800,
79 L. ed. 1520 (1935), cf. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 57
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making garnishment available as a remedy for the collection of state
taxes. The principal limitation is that salaries or wages amounting to
less than $200 per month may not be garnished, and only 10% of those
amounting to more than that figure can be reached. The general idea is
to provide a summary method for satisfying the delinquent's tax bill out
of his intangible assets, without the necessity of reducing the tax claim to
judgment, issuing execution, and resorting to supplemental proceedings.
Detailed discussion here is impossible. The provision encountered con-
siderable legislative opposition and was patched up several times to
make it more palatable; and this probably accounts for the fact that it
gives the reader the impression that it wanders around too much. While
summary, the proceeding seems to protect adequately the rights of the
garnishee.
Apparently, it is intended that the taxpayer shall not be allowed to
defeat the garnishment by contending that the tax is erroneous, illegal
or invalid, as it is provided that "the taxpayer's sole remedies to ques-
tion his liability ... shall be those provided in the Revenue Act of 1939,
as now or hereafter amended or supplemented."
The most serious weakness of the law is its omission of any express
provision as to the procedure to be followed when, after the prescribed
notice has been served upon the garnishee, no answer at all is forthcom-
ing from him or he admits liability but does not pay.' Possibly the effect
of this omission can be minimized if the Commissioner of Revenue, in
such cases, brings action, serving regular summons and complaint, for
a judgment against the garnishee.2
(2) Refunds. Section 937 of the Revenue Act directs the Commis-
Sup. Ct. 466, 81 L. ed. 666 (1937); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U. S.
19, 59 Sup. Ct. 1, 83 L. ed. 16 (1938).
'The general plan of the procedure is that notice shall be served on the gar-
nishee, who is to reply to the commissioner, indicating whether he has any defense
or set-off to the claim of the taxpayer against him. If he has none and admits
liability, he makes payment direct to the commissioner. If he claims a defense or
set-off, and the commissioner refuses to recognize its validity, then the commis-
sioner is to file, in the Superior Court where the garnishee resides or does business,
copies of the notice, answer of the garnishee and objections of the commissioner.
There is then a provision for judgment against the garnishee "by default or after
hearing," but the context indicates that this applies only where an original reply
was received from the garnishee setting up a defense or set-off. There is no pro-
vision dealing expressly with procedure where the garnishee fails to reply to the
notice or fails to pay after replying with an admission of liability. Compare N. C.
COD ANN. (Michie, 1939) §820, providing that when a garnishee fails to appear
after being summoned, a conditional judgment is to be entered against him, an
order to show cause issued, and, if he still does not appear, judgment against him
for the plaintiff's entire claim against the defendant is to be made final. It seems
unlikely, however,that this provision, which applies in connection with attachment
in civil actions, and which clearly involves a penalty, could be construed as
available in the state tax garnishment cases.
2 Compare the provisions permitting garnishment for collection of county and
city taxes, N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 310, §1713(d).
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sioner of Revenue to refund any overpayment he discovers within 60
days after the discovery. Section 10(e) of the new law adds to this:
"Provided, further, that demand for such refund is made by the taxpayer
within three years from the date of such overpayment." The effect of this
is apparently not only to deprive the taxpayer of the right to compel a
refund, except under the circumstances specified, but also to prevent the
making of a voluntary refund by the commissioner. A possible exception
is where a refund is due on the income tax after report by the taxpayer
of changes made in his tax return by the federal authorities.8
TRUSTS
Compensation.
C. 124 revises the statutory rates of commissions for executors,'
administrators, collectors and guardians.2 Six changes are made: (1)
The statute is extended so as to cover "testimentary trustees . . . or
other personal representatives or fiduciaries. . . ." This particular
phraseology may be broad enough to include trustees under living trust
agreements, insurance trust agreements and receivers.8 In any event,
the statutory standards for executors, etc. have sometimes been used as
an analogous yardstick for such trustees 4 (2) The term "receipts" is
extended to include "the value of all personalty when received. .. ."
This appears to overrule, in part, Rose v. Bank of Wadesboro,5 and
earlier cases there cited. (3) The factors the clerk may take into account
in determining the amount of compensation are extended to include "the
... responsibility ... and skill involved.... ." This appears to state the
current practice. (4) In the following sentence, the terms italicized are
new: "Where land is sold to pay debts or legacies, the commission shall
be computed only on the proceeds actually applied in the payment of
debts or legacies." (5) Heretofore, there has been no rule, statutory or
judicial, indicating when or how often, during the course of administra-
tion,6 compensation might be claimed. This is partly clarified by the
provision that "The clerk may make allowances on account ... at any
time during the course of the administration, but the total commissions
allowed shall be determined on final settlement of the estate and shall
not exceed the limit herein fixed." (6) And the current practice is
'N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 158, §334; cf. Maxwell v. Hinsdale, 207 N. C. 37, 175
S. E. 847 (1934).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §157.
Id., §2190. 'Id., §1215.
'Boyd v. Hawkins, 17 N. C. 195 (1832), Id., 329 (1833); Seawell v. McIver,
179 N. C. 535, 103 S. E. 22 (1920).
-217 N. C. 600, 608-609, 9 S. E. (2d) 2 (1940) (which denied commissions on
personal property received as a part of the estate).
'Compare 217 N. C. 600, 607, 9 S. E. (2d) 2 (1940).
19411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
codified as follows: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow
commissions on allotment of dower, on distribution of the shares of
heirs, on distribution of the shares of distributees of personal property
or on distribution of shares of legatees. . .
Self-deposit.
C. 77 adds to the powers 7 of state banks, the substance of §4 of the
uniform trusts act,8 but with three differences: (1) ".... all uninvested
fiduciary funds of cash..." may now be deposited in the commercial
department, whereas the uniform act limits such deposits to "funds ...
held as fiduciary awaiting investment or distribution" and expressly ex-
cludes "savings accounts or certificates of deposit." This eradication of
the stigma of "violation of fiduciary duties" which Rose v. Bank of
Wadesboro9 placed upon self-deposits, probably, by exceeding the limits
of the uniform act, goes too far.' 0 (2) Such deposits are to be secured
under the regulations of the state banking commission. Section 4 of the
uniform act, as adopted in North Carolina, is the text of the then
appropriate regulation of the commission. 11 (3) Self-deposits "shall not
be deemed to constitute a use of such funds in the general business of
the bank and the bank in such instance shall not be liable for interest on
such funds." This overrules, in part, Rose v. Bank of Wadesboro,'2
which required the bank to pay 6% interest on these deposits. But can
even a legislative fiat prevent the actual use of these funds in the com-
mercial banking operations? Why else require security for their protec-
tion? One wonders why the statute book was complicated with these
conflicts with the uniform act. Would it not have been better, if possible,
to amend the latter?
Uniform Trusts Act-Time of Taking Effect.
C. 269 extends the effectiveness of the uniform trusts act of 1939,18
by amending §25.14 Originally, this section made the considerable
changes in the law of trusts brought about by the act applicable "only to
testamentary trusts created by wills or codicils executed after the
effective date of the act (July 1, 1939) and to non-testamentary trusts
"By adding a seventh subdivision to N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939), §220(a).
'Id., §4035(g).
p217 N. C. 600, 607-609, 9 S. E. (2d) 2 (1940). This case arose in 1938 and
could not have been affected by the uniform trusts- act, which was not adopted
until 1939 and which was effective only upon trusts thereafter established. See,
infra, Uniform Trusts Act--Time of Taking Effect.
10 See Whitmore, Self-Deposit by Trust Companies of Fiduciary Funds (1934),
12 N. C. L. REv. 350.
"1 Sub-section E of regulation 4 of order No. 339, issued Dec. 8, 1937. See
Statutory Changes in N. C. in 1939 (1939), 17 N. C. L. REv. 327, 398-399.
12217 N. C. 600, 607-609, 9 S. E. (2d) 2 (1940).
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4035 (d-z).1
"Id., §4035(z).
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created .. ." thereafter. Now the uniform act is to apply "in the con-
struction of and operation under (a) all agreements containing trust
provisions entered into subsequent to the effective date hereof; (b) all
wills made by testators who shall die subsequent to the effective date
hereof; and (c) all other wills and trust agreements and trust relations
in so far as such terms do not impair the obligation of contract or de-
prive persons of property without due process of law.... ." The amend-
ment became effective March 15, 1941. Does the phrase "subsequent to
the effective date hereof", in clauses (a) and (b) refer to July 1, 1939,
or to March 15, 1941 ? Because of the ambulatory character of a will,
clause (b), regardless of this question, is clearly valid. And because the
changes' 5 in the law of trusts effectuated by the uniform act make for
better administration, the change made by clause (b) does no harm. But
those who have heretofore executed wills setting up trusts would do
well to re-examine their provisions in the. light of the new law while
there is time to revise. What is the difference between clause (a) "agree-
ments containing trust provisions" and the last clause of the original
section, "non-testamentary trusts" ? Is clause (c) anything more than a
prolific breeder of unnecessary litigation? Clauses (a) and (c) seem to
substitute confusion for clarity.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
For an excellent summary of the 1941 amendments to the North
Carolina Unemployment Compensation Law, the attention of LAw
REVIEW readers is directed to an article by Adrian J. Newton, Chief
Counsel of the Commission, entitled "Synopsis of Changes in Unem-
ployment Compensation 1941 Amendments" to be found in the April
issue of North Carolina Employment Security Information, published
by the Unemployment Compensation Commission.1
" For a summary of differences, see Statutory Changes in N. C. in 1939 (1939)
17 N. C. L. REV. 327, 396-399.
1 Attention is also called-to previous discussions in (1937) 15 N. C. L. Rv.
382 and (1939) 17 N. C. L. REv. 415. It would require a great deal of space to
make a detailed analysis of the many substantive and procedural changes made in
1941. There are changes in schedules of benefit payments to unemployed employees
(C. 108, sec. 1(b) (1)) and tables of rates of credit for the employer (C. 108,
sec. 6(b) (4) (B) ). Employees' benefits are increased and the waiting period is
shortened from two weeks to one week (C. 108, sec. 2). Merit rating for the em-
ployer is clarified and strengthened. Provision is made for preserving the benefit
rights of those in military service (C. 276). Newsboys under 18 are exempted
from the coverage provisions of the law (C. 198). Employers are relieved of pay-
ing taxes on wages and salaries in excess of $3,000 (C. 320). The principal
amendments are found in C. 108. A very convenient pamphlet published by the
Unemployment Compensation Commission contains the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Law as amended, the amendments being printed in italics.
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WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
Gravestones.
C. S. 108 has heretofore required the executor or administrator of
an estate who desired to spend more than $100 for a gravestone for the
decedent to procure an order from the clerk of court specifying the
amount to -be paid. This law has been amended by C. 102 so as to per-
mit the personal representative to spend in his discretion and without
order of the clerk a sum not to exceed $500 for that purpose provided
the net value of the estate is more than $15,000.'
Careless draftsmanship is in evidence in the new act, which provides
that C. S. 108, volume 1, of 1919 be amended "by striking out the pe-
riod following the word 'district' in line eleven, substituting a colon
therefor, and adding the following:" (the substance of which has been
stated above). By referring to the word "district" the legislature evi-
dently had in mind the last clause of C. S. 108, as it formerly appeared
in the section, which required that the clerk's order permitting the ex-
penditure of more than $100 for a gravestone "be approved by the resi-
dent judge of the district". That clause, however, was deleted by the
1925 legislature.2 The question, therefore, arises: does the present
amendment by implication repeal the 1925 amendment and revive C. S.
108 as it existed prior to 1925 and require the resident judge of the
district to confirm all orders of the clerk which authorize the expendi-
ture of more than $100 for a gravestone where the net estate of the dece-
dent is less in value than $15,000? Such does not appear to have been
the legislative intent, since the present amendment authorizes the pur-
chase of a tombstone costing not over $500 for a decedent whose estate
exceeds $15,000 without even an order from the clerk, much less a
confirmatory order by the resident judge. As it stands, however, the
amendment, predicated on inadequate research, leaves open a possible
question of construction.
Payment of Debts.
C_ S. 93 provides that debts of the decedent incurred for medical
services within the twelve months preceding his death shall fall within
the sixth class in the order of payment of his debts upon the adminis-
tration of his estate. C. 271 amends class six also to include therein
,debts incurred "for drugs and all other medical supplies necessary for
the treatment of such deceased person during the last illness of such
See In re Estate of Bost, 211 N. C. 440, 190 S. E. 956 (1937), where it was
held that the provisions of C. S. 108, requiring order of court to spend more than
$100, were not necessarily controlling where the will itself directed the payment of
a greater sum. The estate in that case was valued at approximately $16,000.
2 N. C. Pub. L. 1925, c. 4.
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person, said period of illness not to exceed twelve months." This
amendment seems to be a logical extension of the old law which clearly
places doctors' bills within the sixth class, and which, by our court's
construction of the phrase "medical services", also includes reasonable
hospital expenses within that class.' If the doctors and hospitals are
given preferential treatment, it seems but fair that the drug stores
which furnish drugs and medical supplies to the decedent during his
last illness should likewise be accorded a preference.
Allowance and Recordation of Wills of Nonresidents.
C. S. 4152 provides that when the will of a nonresident of North
Carolina disposes of real property in this state, such devise or disposition
shall not have any validity or operation unless the will has been executed
according to the laws of this state; "and that fact must appear affirma-
tively in the certified probate or exemplification of the will." C. 381
amends the quoted provision to read: "and that fact must appear affirm-
atively from the testimony of a witness or witnesses to such will, or
from findings of fact or recitals in the order of probate, or otherwise,
in such certified copy or exemplification of the will and probate proceed-
ings." This amendment is at least an improvement on the former law
in that it attempts to spell out the manner in which the certified probate
or exemplification may show affirmatively that such foreign will was
executed according to the laws of this state.
It must be affirmatively shown that the will was written in the testa-
tor's lifetime, and signed by him or by some other person in his presence
and by his direction, and subscribed in his presence by at least two
witnesses no one of whom shall be interested in the devise; or that it
was in the handwriting of the deceased, proved by three credible wit-
nesses, and was found among his valuable papers and effects or de-
posited by him with some person for safekeeping. These are the statutory
requirements' which must be met in North Carolina before the will
operates to dispose of realty in this state. The amendiment permits these
facts to be shown by the testimony of a witness or witnesses to the will.
Before the passage of C. S. 4152 it was held by our court in Hunter v.
Kelly,2 that the will of a nonresident, probated and recorded in the state
of the domicile, could not be admitted to probate in this state upon a
copy certified by the clerk of court where it had been probated unless
re-probated in this state by an examination of the witnesses in person
or on comndssion.3 Under the amendment the facts of the due execution
1 Park View Hospital Association, Inc. v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 211 N. C.
244, 189 S. E. 766 (1937).
1 N. C. CoDE AxN. (Michie, 1939) §4131.
292 N. C. 285 (1885).
See Vaught v. Williams, 177 N. C. 77, 97 S. E. 737 (1918).
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of the will may also be shown "from findings of fact or recitals in the
order of probate, or otherwise, in the certified copy or exemplification
of the will and probate proceedings." The requirements of this part of
the amendment would not be met, however, by the mere recitation in
the attestation clause of the will that it was signed in the presence of
witnesses and that they had signed in the presence of the testator.4
ZONING'-AIRPORTS
Airports may be seriously handicapped by the presence on adjoining
land of obstacles of such a height or nature as to menace the safe land-
ing and taking off of planes. Buildings, towers, smoke stacks, radio
towers, high tension transmission lines, telephone and telegraph poles
and trees are the more common obstacles. Smoke. may be regarded as
an obstacle because it reduces visibility.
Even nine years ago it was said: "To insure a safe aerial approach
to an airport or landing field of average dimensions, it is generally
acknowledged that all obstacles of an ordinary nature within an exterior
zone of from 1,000 to 1,500 feet in width contiguous to the perimeter
of the airport should in the interest of safe aviation be subject to reg-
ulation."2  With the increase in size of planes and with the use of
instrument landing, both requiring a longer gliding angle, the need for
larger airports and the removal of obstructions surrounding airports is
constantly increasing.
The purchase of land for the purpose of enlarging airports may in-
volve a prohibitive expenditure of money, and this financial problem is
also present where the power of eminent domain is used to acquire land
or easements therein. But the police power, which does not require
compensation, operating in the form of zoning regulations, would appear
to offer the most likely solution to the problem of safe airport approaches.
C. 250, known as the "Model Airport Zoning Act", authorizes North
Carolina municipalities and counties to divide the ,rea surrounding pub-
lic airports into zones and "within such zcnies, specify the land uses
permitted, and regulate and restrict the height to which stru, Lures and
trees may be erected or allowed to grow."3 Two or more political s.jb-
divisions may join together where airport approaches are located .vithil,
the territorial limits of more than one such political subdivision 4
To avoid the risk of unconstitutionality, 5 the act contains the fol-
lowing exceptions:
.' Raleigh & Western R. R. v. The Glendon & Gulf Mining and Manufacturing
Company, 113 N. C. 241, 18 S. E. 208 (1893).
1 For general discussions of this topic, see Elliott, Unobstructed Airport Ap-
proaches, (1932) 3 J. AIR L. 207; Rhyne, The Legal Experience of Airports,
(1940) 11 J. AIR L. 297. 2 Elliott, supra note 1 at 208.
: §3(1). '§3(3).
It is almost universally held that the exemption of existing structures and
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"Sec. 3. Adoption of Airport Zoning Regulations.
"(5) All airport zoning regulations adopted under this Act shall be
reasonable, and none shall require the removal, lowering, or other change
or alteration of any structure or tree not conforming to the regulations
when adopted or amended, or otherwise interfere with the continuance
of any non-conforming use, except as provided in Section four (1).
"(6) Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent trees
existing at the time any zoning regulations are adopted to continue their
natural growth."
By Section four (1), when new structures are to be erected or old
structures and other uses are to be replaced or to undergo substantial
repair or alteration, permits must be secured from the administrative
agency in charge.6 The act calls for a permit "before any non-conform-
ing structure or tree may be replaced, substantially altered or repaired,
rebuilt, allowed to grow higher, or replanted", and provides that no such
permit may be issued which will allow the structure or tree in question
to be made higher or become a greater hazard to air navigation than ii
was when the applicable regulation was adopted.. However, in view of
the express exception in Section three (6), quoted above, this provision
for a permit would not control the natural growth of existing trees, but
would apparently apply only to the replacement of old trees. There is
also a special provision applicable to non-conforming structures or trees
which have been abandoned or more than 80 percent torn down, de-
stroyed, deteriorated or decayed. In such cases, no permit may be issued
which will allow any deviation from the zoning regulations, and the ad-
ministrative agency may compel the owner to conform to the regulations
by lowering, removing or reconstructing the non-conforming structure
or tree at his own expense, or may proceed by direct action of the agency,
if the owner refuses or neglects to comply with such order. A provision
whereby the cost of such direct action could be assessed against the
recalcitrant owner was stricken out by amendment.
Section four (2) provides for "variances" from zoning regulations
to be allowed by the board of appeals, provided for in the act,7 upon
application of any person who desires to use his property in violation
of applicable zoning regulations. The conditions for granting such
uses does not violate constitutional limitations of due process or, equal protection.
But if existing structures and uses are not excepted, a constitutional doubt is
raised. Some decisions hold that losses may not be so inflicted without compen-
sation. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1931). For
discussion of this problem, see RorrscHAEraR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 529;
Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 735; Elliott, supra note 1 at 220.
' Such a provision in zoning laws which prohibits the rebuilding or substantial
repair of non-conforming structures is held to be valid. State v. Shannonhouse,
166 N. C. 241, 80 S. E. 881 (1914).
"§5(3). The use of a zoning board of appeals is an approved practice in
zoning legislation in order that individual cases may receive proper consideration.
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"variances" are that the literal application or enforcement of the regula-
tions woul result in practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship and the
relief granted would not be contrary to the public interest but do sub-
stantial justice and be in accordance with the spirit of the regulations
and this act. In any case where a permit or variance is granted, the
administrative agency or the board of appeals may require the owner
of the structure or tree in question to permit the political subdivision,
at its own expense, to install suitable obstruction markers or obstruction
lights.
The act sets out an adequate and detailed procedure (1) for the
adoption and administration of zoning regulations, (2) for the hearing
and deciding of appeals by the board of appeals and (3) for judicial
review of decisions of the board of appeals. Provisions for notice and
opportunity to be heard are clearly sufficient. Assuming that the pur-
pose of the act, to promote the safety of approaches to public airports,
is within the police power, there should be no difficulty about its validity.
And that the public safety is involved is not subject to any practical
doubt.8
Because zoning, under C. 250, does not put an end to existing non-
conforming uses, Section 8 of the act adds the power of eminent domain
to the zoning power, so that North Carolina municipalities and counties
may be enabled to acquire by condemnation, property rights, such as air
rights, easements or other interests. The North Carolina law concerning
municipal airports authorizes eminent domain for the purpose of ac-
quiring airport sites9 and this implies the taking of the land itself. C. 250
authorizes eminent domain in the air space, so that the owner will still
have his land but subject to such air rights and easements as may be
found necessary to provide safe airport approaches. While the use of
eminent domain in the air space involves expense and presents new prob-
lems of valuation, yet these difficulties are not essentially different from
those present in the condemnation of other interests in property.
The integration of the zoning power and the power of eminent do-
main in C. 250 should make effective the attempt to provide safe airport
approaches.
'A state zoning law which prohibited erection of buildings within one hundred
feet of the border of the Baltimore City Airport and restricted the height of
buildings at greater distances was held unconstitutional as a confiscation of prop-
erty. Mutual Chemical Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 1939 U. S.
Av. Rep. 11 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore, 1939). The court declared that the zoning reg-
ulations were promulgated for the benefit of those interested in aerial transporta-
tion rather than for the general public benefit. This opinion seems to be clearly
erroneous and particularly as to the class of persons benefited. The elimination
and prevention of hazards in airport approaches is definitely for the general public
safety and welfare.
9N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§191(e) and (f).
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